Abstract
The axiological elements of scientific prediction are relevant. In this regard, this chapter follows several steps. (1) Nicholas Rescher’s proposal regarding the axiology of research is considered in order to see how he modulates the axiological features of prediction. Thus, values are seen as a system, within a double perspective of analysis: internal and external. The internal perspective sees science as activity in itself; while the external viewpoint deals with the relations of science with the context. (2) The axiological characters of prediction are investigated. This is twofold: on the one hand, the research in prediction as a value of science is addressed; and, on the other, the values which accompany prediction are analyzed.
Regarding these problems, there are two dimensions of analysis: the structural perspective and the dynamic component. Rescher’s proposal is preferentially structural. In this way, it is possible to broaden his proposal through attention to the dynamic component. Consequently, the study of how prediction and the connected values modulate the aims, processes, and results of the scientific research (basic, applied, or of application) is required, from both an internal and external perspective.
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Notes
- 1.
On the differences between basic science and applied science with regard to the aims, processes, and results, see Gonzalez (1999b, pp. 139–171; especially, pp. 158–159). On the distinction between applied science and the application of science , see Niiniluoto (1993) and Gonzalez (2013b, pp. 17–18). See also Chap. 5, Sect. 5.2 herein.
- 2.
This happens, especially, when the research is oriented towards applied science or the application of science , because the nexus with the context (social, cultural, economic, etc.) is clearer than in the case of basic science.
- 3.
“Value issues should also be seen in a ‘realistic’ light. Matters of value too can and should be regarded as objectively factual—the difference is just that we are dealing with evaluative rather than simply informative facts ,” Rescher (2014b, p. 77).
- 4.
On his approach to objectivity , see Rescher (1997).
- 5.
“Our values themselves are not—and should not be—arbitrary and haphazard . For in the final analysis, they pivot not on mere wants and the vagaries of arbitrary choice in fortuitous preference, but on our best interests and real needs—on what is necessary to or advantageous for a person’s well-being. (…) For the fact is that values are valid just exactly to the extent they serve to implement and satisfy our needs and our correlatively appropriate interests,” Rescher (2012b, p. 38). On human needs as the support of objectivity of values , see Rescher (1999a, pp. 85–90).
- 6.
Both Laudan and Rescher were students of Hempel. Furthermore, Rescher claims that both he and Laudan are part of the “younger generation” of the legacy of the Berlin School . Cf. Rescher (2006). The influence of the received view in both authors can be seen in the fact that, when they think of the relation between science and values, internal criteria prevail, above all, cognitive criteria. However, Laudan was also influenced by Thomas Kuhn and especially by Imre Lakatos , so his concern for the historicity of science is much higher than Rescher’s.
- 7.
In effect, Laudan ’s proposal about the relation between science and values is focused on cognitive values and their role with regard to the aims of research. Cf. Laudan (1984). In this regard, see Wenceslao J. Gonzalez’s comparison between the axiology of scientific research of Laudan and Rescher’s approach: Gonzalez (2008b).
- 8.
- 9.
On the differences between science and technology, see Gonzalez (2005, pp. 3–49; especially, pp. 11–12). Obviously, this conceptual difference, which has to do with the aims, processes, and results of science and technology, is compatible with the acknowledgement of a clear practical interaction, above all in certain companies, between science and technology. This intense interaction is one of the reasons that have led to think of “technoscience ” for several years. There is a line of thought about this topic, where diverse senses of “technoscience ” can be considered. Javier Echeverría has contributed to this realm (2001, 2003).
- 10.
Since Rescher is mainly focused on the natural sciences , especially when they are oriented towards basic research, the relation with technology is centered, above all, in the need for technological artifacts in order to develop the scientific activity . See, for instance, Rescher (1999a, p. 100).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
In this regard, his higher interest in basic science than in applied science can be seen in the fact that he does not mention expressly prescription as one of the aims of scientific research.
- 14.
This directly affects hypotheses and, therefore, scientific theories, especially if they are contemplated from statements that convey contents regarding real things.
- 15.
Expressly, he mentions the case of formal sciences : “We do not ask social scientists for the same criterion of rigor that a mathematician imposes himself,” Rescher (1999a, p. 94).
- 16.
Prescription is required in order to encompass applied science .
- 17.
This can be seen in the comparison made by Wenceslao J. Gonzalez between Rescher’s and Laudan ’s proposals. Cf. Gonzalez (2008b).
- 18.
Regarding the greater importance of the internal dimension in Rescher’s axiology of scientific research, there are convergence points between his proposal and the logical empiricism and naturalism, which are two of the most influent philosophical traditions in the North American philosophy of science in the 20th century. Rescher himself notes his relation with the legacy of the logical empiricism and considers that he is a member of the “young generation” of the Berlin School , because he was a student of Hempel. Cf. Rescher (2006, p. 282).
- 19.
This feature of values can be clearly seen in the case of brain studies. Cf. Gómez (2005).
- 20.
“One has to accommodate general considerations with particular contexts and with variability of contexts. This has impact on normative conceptions (values, duties, etc.),” Rescher, Personal communication , 26.5.2015.
- 21.
Since the 1960s, there has been a series of proposals that have acknowledged the importance of the historicity of science. Thus, the Lakatosian “research programs,” Laudan ’s “research traditions ,” and other conceptions of the advancement of science have insisted on scientific activity related to historicity (for example, Paul Thagard ). On this issue and the debate about “scientific revolutions ,” see Gonzalez (2011).
- 22.
The internal dimension and the external perspective with regard to economic values are developed in Gonzalez (2008b).
- 23.
- 24.
A detailed analysis of his approach to prediction is in Gonzalez (2004).
- 25.
A study of Kuhn ’s proposal on scientific prediction is in Gonzalez (2010, pp. 127–159).
- 26.
- 27.
“It may even turn out that a certain hypothesis can be accepted as physically certain [pro physice certa] if, namely, it completely satisfies all the phenomena which occur, as does the key to a cryptograph. Those hypotheses deserve the highest praise (after the truth), however, by whose aid predictions can be made, even about phenomena or observations which have not been tested before; for a hypothesis of this kind can in practice be accepted as truth,” Leibniz (1969, p. 188). This text is quoted in Rescher (1998a, pp. 160–161).
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
“To predict is, more or less by definition, to endeavor to provide warranted answers to detailed substantive questions about the world’s future developments,” Rescher (1998a, pp. 37–38).
- 31.
Rescher thinks that a prediction’s quality—if it is scientific or not—depends on the predictive questions and on the kind of processes used in order to predict. This implies that a non-scientific prediction (for example, anticipating the choice of an individual on the basis of his tastes and inclinations) can also have values such as reliability, accuracy, precision, etc. Hence, the main difference between scientific and non-scientific prediction is rooted in the type of processes: it consists in the use of non-scientific procedures or properly scientific methods (such as predictive models ) in order to achieve predictions. Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 15.7.2014.
- 32.
Due to Rescher’s insistence in a view of science as our science —that is, the result of the interaction between the researcher and the researched object—the analysis of predictors can be seen in his approach as an internal element, instead of being an external factor of prediction. In fact , he thinks that the elements for the evaluation of predictors are the same as the features that we should take into account in order to evaluate the methods of prediction. Cf. Rescher (1998a, pp. 113–118). On his conception of science as our science , see especially Rescher (1992b).
- 33.
“In the end, only the course of experience can inform us about the extent to which the phenomena of a particular domain are predictable,” Rescher (2014a, p. 44).
- 34.
Regarding the level of precision of predictions, there is an important problem: the more informative a predictive statement is, the less secure it is. Thus, generally, the more generic predictions are also the more secure ones. Cf. Rescher (1998c, pp. 1–48; especially, pp. 19–24).
- 35.
According to Rescher, the quality of predictions does not depend on their scientific character, because there might be non-scientific predictions that are more reliable than some scientific predictions. Thus, he considers that the difference between scientific and non-scientific predictions is mainly methodological; that is, it is rooted in the type of processes that are used in order to predict the future. For this reason, in order to evaluate the quality of predictions, the values of predictive questions (importance, interest, …) and the values of the answers or statements about the future (accuracy, precision, …) are especially important. Moreover, the quality of the predictions achieved will depend on the type of reality prediction is about (for example, predictions about natural phenomena are usually more reliable than predictions about social reality ). Rescher, Personal Communication , 15.7.2014.
- 36.
Sensu stricto, the notion of “foresight ” refers to a scientific prediction which achieves an effective control of the relevant variables. Therefore, it is the most reliable type of prediction, irrespective of its temporal projection (that can be in the short, medium, or long run). Cf. Fernández Valbuena (1990, p. 388). See also Sect. 2.4.2 herein.
- 37.
On this analysis of the axiology of prediction from the dynamic perspective see also Guillán (forthcoming).
- 38.
- 39.
This claim does not have to do directly with the controversy about the methodological weight of prediction versus accommodation . But it should be acknowledged that Rescher manifests a preference for prediction.
- 40.
On the different types of predictions (forecast, prediction, foresight , …) see Sect. 2.4.2 of this monograph.
- 41.
- 42.
For Rescher, a main issue regarding prediction is the fact that our ideas about what will happen in the future have a clear influence on our present decisions. Cf. Rescher (1998a, p. 64).
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Guillán, A. (2017). Axiological Elements of Scientific Prediction. In: Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63043-4_8
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