Abstract
Following a pragmatic setting, Rescher’s methodology of scientific prediction is connected with his general methodological approach. Prediction has a fundamental role in it, since it is one of the main indicators of methodological efficacy. In order to clarify the conceptual framework of the methodology of prediction, this chapter follows several steps. First, the focus is on Rescher’s methodological pragmatism as a framework for the analysis of scientific prediction from a methodological perspective. Second, the attention shifts to the roles of prediction in scientific activity. Third, the different groups of empirical sciences (the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the sciences of the artificial) are considered.
Thereafter, the preconditions for rational prediction are analyzed. In Rescher’s judgment, these preconditions are three: data availability, pattern discernability, and pattern stability. In his approach, preconditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for predictability, so they are especially relevant in his methodological proposal about scientific prediction.
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- 1.
“Proposition” is used here with the meaning of the content expressed by a statement, a content that can be evaluated regarding truth or truthlikeness .
- 2.
The three types of sciences are analyzed here, although Rescher is mainly interested in the natural sciences (above all, in physics ).
- 3.
- 4.
It should be highlighted that frequently pragmatism goes hand in hand with another complementary philosophical approach, above all regarding epistemological matters. For example, Philip Kitcher combines realism with pragmatism. Cf. Gonzalez (2011c).
- 5.
“A noteworthy—and distinctly curious—aspect of contemporary American philosophy relates to the fate of ‘pragmatism,’ which has undergone a remarkable deformation from its original conception. Many—indeed most—philosophers nowadays think of pragmatism as something radically different from what was originally at issue with this conception. And, oddly enough, this latter-day sort of pragmatism is not a ‘new improved version’ but a markedly inferior product,” Rescher (2012b), p. 1.
- 6.
“On such a view, pragmatism is not so much a philosophical doctrine as a position that urges the abandonment of philosophy and recommends finding something else to do instead,” Rescher (2000, p. xi).
- 7.
Although Rescher uses many times the term “instrumental” regarding his methodological approach, it is certainly not an instrumentalist approach in the sense of a subordination of theory to practice in terms of importance. In his judgment, practical rationality (which allows us to decide about the rationality of the processes) also encompasses a theoretical dimension. Practice and theory are equally important. However, “it takes considerations of purposive effectiveness to provide the test-standard for the adequacy of the operative principles of human endeavor—alike in theoretical and in practical matters. Effective implementation is its pervasive standard of adequacy,” Rescher (2004, pp. 43–44).
- 8.
On the problem of the methodological universalism, see Gonzalez (2012c).
- 9.
Rescher considers that a method consists of a series of general rules or patterns in order to perform a task, so it is possible to use a method on successive occasions. However, there are different levels of generality or abstraction regarding methods, depending on the general or specific character of the matter at issue. Hence, he assumes that different levels of scales of reality (macro, meso, and micro) require different methods. Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 10.6.2014.
- 10.
About the role of consensus in other contexts from a broad perspective, see Rescher (1993).
- 11.
In this regard, Rescher notes that “on the standard ‘inductive’ model of scientific method, the predictions of science are generated by logico-mathematical derivations that apply general theories to situation-specific facts so as to preindicate future observations . Then, insofar as the actual observations agree with those predictions, the theories at issue are confirmed and thereby evidentially substantiated, and insofar as they diverge, the theories are disconfirmed and evidentially undermined,” Rescher (1998a, p. 161).
- 12.
Usually, Rescher does not distinguish between the subject matters of the natural sciences , the social sciences , and the sciences of the artificial. His approach seeks to be as general as possible.
- 13.
- 14.
Changes might be positive or negative as well as developments, which might be positive or negative.
- 15.
This can be clearly seen in Rescher’s “thesis of harmony,” according to which explanation and prediction are not symmetrical processes, but are closely interrelated as crucial goals of science. See, in this regard, Sect. 3.4.2 of this book.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
“Prediction, in sum, is our instrument for resolving our meaningful questions about the future, or at least of endeavoring to solve them in a rationally cogent manner,” Rescher (1998a, p. 39).
- 19.
In this regard, Rescher’s view is quite different from M. Friedman ’s (1953).
- 20.
- 21.
On the distinction between basic science, applied science , and the application of science , see Gonzalez (2013a, pp. 11–40; especially, pp. 17–18).
- 22.
There is also a third possibility: heuristic novelty . See Gonzalez (2014, pp. 1–25; especially, pp. 14–16).
- 23.
- 24.
This is a clear expression of his rejection of the instrumentalist predictivism without realism of the assumption, which was defended by M. Friedman (1953).
- 25.
On this issue, see Sect. 3.1 of this book.
- 26.
These ethical features are analyzed in-depth in Chap. 9.
- 27.
On the discussions about determinism and freedom, see Gonzalez (2012d).
- 28.
“As many writers see it, complexity is determined by the extent to which chance, randomness, and lack of lawful regularity in general is absent. But this cannot be the whole story, since law systems themselves can clearly be more or less complex,” Rescher (1998b, p. 8).
- 29.
On the differences between science and technology, see Gonzalez (2005, pp. 11–12).
- 30.
Since Simon emphasizes the connections between sciences of design and technology, his approach to the notion of design is somewhat ambiguous, insofar as it does not make it possible to distinguish “design” form “scientific design.” Cf. Gonzalez (2007, p. 11).
- 31.
Of course, the outcomes attained could differ from the stated aims. This can happen commonly when the possible problems are not correctly anticipated.
- 32.
On the role of prediction and prescription in the sciences of the artificial, see Gonzalez (2008, sect. 4, pp. 179–183).
- 33.
- 34.
It should be noted that Rescher does not consider “relevance,” as such, as a criterion regarding the data that is required in order to predict. However, he offers a series of criteria that the relevant data for prediction should meet, such as accuracy or reliability.
- 35.
According to Rescher, we are not really interested in prediction as such; but our interest is in reliable predictions. In his judgment, the reliability of a prediction might rest partly on the evidence and partly on the kind of phenomenon at issue (for example, if it is stable or volatile). In this case, the ontological aspect involves the attention to the context, which may influence the behavior of the phenomena. Rescher, Personal communication , 2.6.2015.
- 36.
On the implications of anarchy for predictability, see Sect. 7.3.1 of this monograph.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
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Guillán, A. (2017). Conceptual Framework of the Methodology of Prediction and Preconditions for Rational Prediction. In: Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63043-4_5
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