Abstract
One major issue remains unaddressed in the picture so far presented. While I have cited extensive scientific experience on how to deal with the encoding and decoding between natural and formal systems (what amounts to most of contemporary science), and I have briefly mentioned the encoding and decoding between formal systems (through functors), still largely unaddressed is the question of encoding and decoding between natural systems. What are the conditions for one natural system to behave as a model of another natural system? To gain an initial grasp of the profound importance of encoding and decoding between natural systems, consider the capacity of an organism to navigate in its environment, e.g. through its perceptions. The organism’s percepts work as models of the environment (and of the perceiving system as well). In this regard, two major options compete. They may be called the ‘representational’ and the ‘presentational’ perspectives. The former is the mainstream position adopted by most practitioners of cognitive science, and it branches into many other fields, including computer science and the social sciences. The main problem for the representational position is explaining the origin of the modeling capacity of the representational system. The alternative position – called ‘presentational’ – introduces two divides. The first is the distinction between the processes pertaining to the mind and the processes of the brain that underlie, make possible, or bear mental processes. The second divide is between first-level and higher-order cognitive processes. From the point of view of the perceptor, the former are naturally endowed with meaning since their first appearances whilst the latter are higher-order re-codifications of the formers’ outcomes. The difference between first-level and higher-order cognitive processes depends on processes unfolding in the ‘time of presentness’, also known as ‘specious present’ or ‘moment now’, and processes unfolding in wider temporal windows.
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Notes
- 1.
Hartmann (1935, 1940). Strictly speaking, Hartmann was not a pupil of Brentano and pertains more to the phenomenological movement at large than to the School of Brentano. See Spiegelberg (1984). On Hartmann see Werkmeister (1990), Poli (2012), Poli, Scognamiglio, and Tremblay (2011), Poli (2012), Cicovacki (2014), Peterson and Poli (2016).
- 2.
Visual perceptions require a slightly different wording. See Albertazzi (2003).
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Poli, R. (2017). The Self-Generation of Models. In: Introduction to Anticipation Studies. Anticipation Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63023-6_13
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