Abstract
Social media platforms and services have become nowadays both the object and the instruments of security-oriented initiatives. Their capabilities are exploited by law enforcement, security, and public safety agencies for managing crisis and emergencies, for policing, and/or conducting intelligence activities in the field of counter-terrorism, crime and other threat prevention and response. This chapter reviews these initiatives and, from a broad perspective, addresses some of the relevant governance implications they raise. Starting from a short presentation of the position of social media platforms, technologies, and services in the EU and the Italian security discourse, the chapter examines the potential use of these tools for policing, intelligence, and crisis management. Then, it reviews the EU (supranational) and Italian (domestic) policy frameworks governing the employment of social media for security. Special attention is paid to the study of the role, responsibilities and functions that are assigned to providers. The chapter concludes by acknowledging that improvements to the governance of the security-related employment of social media can be achieved through the adoption and implementation of a more coordinated, coherent, comprehensive, and effectively inclusive approach to the matter.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
According to Digital in 2017, there were 2.79 billion (out of 3.77 billion internet users) active social media users in the world in January 2016; 21% more than in January 2016 (WeAreSocial 2017, p. 5–6).
- 2.
There is no agreed definition of social media in the literature and among practitioners. In plain language, the expression refers to both the Internet-based technologies and the techniques/practices that allow users to generate and share content in different formats (video, audio, textual). In everyday life, the expression social media is often used interchangeably with that of social network, which is employed to refer to both a group of individuals that interact among themselves on the basis of a shared interest and to websites devoted to the building up and development of a virtual social web. From this latter point of view, a social network represents a virtual space in which the individuals-users share information and establish relations among them. In general, the lack of a clear common definition of “social media” seems to be ascribed also to a close dependence of its notion on: the applied technologies/software, their continuous development and update, as well as the different kind of social interactions users can establish among themselves. These elements seem to contribute, in a dynamic perspective, to constantly refine the concept of social media and prevent the “crystallisation” of a notion. In addition, it seems also hard to proceed with a coherent classification of the plethora of existing social media platforms (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, MeetUp, Wikipedia, Flickr, YouTube, Vimeo, Slideshare.net , Second Life, etc.) even if part of the academic literature has tried to do so. See for instance Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), who identify different social media categories according to: the main goal which is pursued through their use (bi/multi-directional communication among individuals-users, independently from their object or aim; the collaboration among them in more or less circumscribed fields and for more or less pre-determined purposes; the sharing of multimedia content and entertainment); the type of content which is shared (textual, image, video, audio) and, last but not least, the degree of personal involvement and participatory expectation of the individual-user.
- 3.
Internet represents an important vector of the globalisation process and since its very beginning has had the role of main generator and, at the same time, of main collector of information in almost all areas (Ivan et al. 2014, p. 505). In particular, within the Internet, social media embody a new kind of private/public space in which individual users or groups interact and generate, share, obtain information.
- 4.
See infra in the text.
- 5.
The Union competences are a complex set of rules separating policy areas and specifying levels of Union and Member State involvement in those areas. Under Article 3 TFEU, the EU has exclusive supranational competence in the areas of the customs union, Eurozone financial matters, establishing competition rules for the internal market and conservation of marine resources under the common fisheries policy. It has a shared competence with Member States in areas such as wider internal market policy, the environment, the area of freedom, security and justice, energy policy and consumer protection. In policies areas such as health, industry, culture and tourism the EU can only support national governments. The EU has no competence with regards to matters falling within Member States’ national security (see next footnote).
- 6.
Art. 4(2) of the TEU reads as follows: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States (…) as well as their national identities (…) It shall respect their essential state functions, including (…) safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”.
- 7.
Please see below.
- 8.
Europol is the EU’s agency whose main goal is to support and enhance Member States’ competent authorities action and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States (Council of the European Union 2009). Starting from May 2017, a new legal instrument will govern Europol activities (European Union 2016).
- 9.
In particular, the EU IRU has the following tasks: (1) to coordinate and share the flagging of terrorist and violent extremist content online with relevant partners (i.e. Member States LEAs and social media providers); (2) to carry out referrals in close cooperation with the industry; (3) to support competent authorities, by providing both strategic and operational analysis; (4) to act as a hub of expertise in these fields (for further operational details see infra paragraph 11.3.2). The EU IRU builds upon another Europol promoted initiative. It is the “Check-the-Web” (CTW) which aimed at strengthening cooperation on monitoring and evaluating open Internet sources on a voluntary basis. CTW has led to the creation of an electronic reference library of jihadist terrorist online propaganda, accessible by the competent authorities of EU Member States and associated third Parties (Council of the European Union 2007, p. 4–5).
- 10.
In practical terms, within the EU Internet Forum, Europol EU IRU contributes to flag and refer terrorist content online in cooperation with LEAs from EU Member States and the Internet industry whereas civil society is engaged in designing alternative narratives with the support of the Internet industry. In the framework of the EU Internet Forum, civil society has been so far represented by the Radicalisation Awareness Network, a EU sponsored network of practitioners. In addition, it is within the EU Internet Forum that a number of projects have been developed and launched such as the recent shared database of digital “hashes” to help identify potential terrorist content on social media and prevent its reappearance on other platforms, or the Civil Society Empowerment Programme, a 10 million Euros financial support to civil society actors to develop alternative narratives to combat terrorism online which will be distributed mainly through social media channels.
- 11.
For further details on its content and implementation see infra in paragraph 11.4.
- 12.
In general, the EU put great emphasis on the need to safeguard individuals’ privacy and the principle of due process with regard to the disclosure of digital evidence, in order to ensure that the Internet and social media service providers do not become a ‘choke-point’ for investigations (European Commission 2015a, p. 19–20).
- 13.
The EC3 was launched in January 2013 as a specialised centre within Europol to strengthen the law enforcement response to cybercrime in the EU. In particular, EC3 focuses on cybercrimes: (1) committed by organised criminal groups, generating large criminal profits; (2) seriously harming victims such as online child sexual exploitation; (3) affecting critical infrastructure and information systems in the EU. The European Cybercrime Centre serves as a central hub for criminal information and intelligence. It provides EU Member States and Third partner countries’ law enforcement agencies with strategic analysis products as well as highly specialised technical and digital forensic support capabilities to investigations and operations. (Europol 2013, p. 4). See also https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-cybercrime-centre-ec3
- 14.
In order to facilitate the process, the Ministers called for the establishment of a point of contact within each of the service providers to directly respond to legal requisitions from the competent authorities.
- 15.
See the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en. Accessed 19 December 2016.
- 16.
See also the European Flood Alert System, developed by the European Commission’s Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES), the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) and the Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS) which can gather and process data extracted from social media (European Commission 2016).
- 17.
The Department coordinates the response to natural disasters, catastrophes or other events.
- 18.
The security intelligence community worldwide acknowledged the different advantages in crafting knowledge from social media data. These are: the low cost of gathering and analysing data, the huge quantity and great variety of available information, as well as the speed with which data can be accessed and collected (often at real-time). These advantages are noticeable especially when compared with more traditional techniques of data gathering (e.g. telephone tapping, application of hidden microphones, undercover operations, just to mention some). There are of course constraints and disadvantages that cannot be underestimated (Bonfanti 2015, p. 19–20; Omand et al. 2012b, p. 51–61).
- 19.
It is worth noting that the application of social media in crisis and emergency management has offered a change of perspective in what affected populations can do in these critical situations. In fact, individuals have gradually become active users of official recommendations and advice coming from rescue agencies, as well as active contributors of relevant information through their social media profiles (Wendling et al. 2013, p. 8).
- 20.
Among the existing applications used in disaster management that generate knowledge from social media data, see for example the Slándáil System (http://slandail.eu/) i.e. a software which collects social media data, as texts, images and videos (including sensitive data like names) during a natural disaster. It then aggregates these data and provides outputs in the form of actionable information for rescuers (e.g. key places under particular threat, identities and numbers of missing people and casualties) (Jackson et al. 2015, p. 168).
- 21.
In order to investigate the extent to which social media data are used by law enforcement agents, the US business research company LexisNexis carried out an online survey on more than 1200 US federal, state and local law enforcement professionals. The result is quite clear as 81% of the interviewed people confirmed to utilise social media as an investigative and intelligence gathering tool and, more in particular, 63% used social media for crime investigation, whereas 51% used them for crime anticipation purposes (LexisNexis 2014, p. 4). This trend may be justified by both the lower cost of social media tools compared to more classical forms of surveillance and, in particular, as a response to public pressure for the police to investigate crimes online after a number of violent attacks occurring at world level revealed to have been anticipated on social media with several warning signs (Mateescu et al. 2015, p. 1).
- 22.
In some European countries (e.g. France, Germany, United Kingdom) Governmental authorities have recently asked providers of social media as well as of services of instant messaging (e.g. WhatsApp) to make any relevant encrypted information “readable” and directly accessible to law enforcement authorities for investigation purposes (Sparrow 2017).
- 23.
For instance, during the investigations carried out in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings, the Boston Police Department used Twitter to communicate with the population. They provided updates on police activities and the status of the investigation, announced traffic diversions, and requested public assistance as eye witnessing/statements. Furthermore, Twitter proved to be a timely source of direct observations of, and immediate reactions to events, such as turmoil like the 2011 London riots (Glasgow 2015, p. 40).
- 24.
The term SOCMINT does not only refer to a process but also to the product that results from such process (Bonfanti 2015, p. 12).
- 25.
For example, the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has also developed an instrument that scans social media for individual faces by analysing millions of postings for images of a single person. As reported in an interview released by Gen. Flynn, the previous DIA Director, this technique proved useful during the Crimean annexation by Russia in the beginning of 2014 (Barnes 2014).
- 26.
Safety Check is an app launched by Facebook which allows people to quickly share with friends and family that they are safe and helps them connect with close people. In particular, during a disaster, Safety Check allows: to acknowledge friends and family that a person is safe; control on friends and family in the affected area and connect with them and share what a person knows regarding a friend or family member’s status. See https://www.facebook.com/help/695378390556779. See also Google (2016) and https://www.google.org/crisisresponse/about
- 27.
The policy document and guidelines are available at http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/view_dossier.wp?contentId=DOS52445
- 28.
See supra.
- 29.
See also the case of the UK Counterterrorism Internet Referral Unit (National Police Chiefs’ Council 2016).
- 30.
The EU IRU acts according to the rules set out in the Europol Council Decision (which will be substituted by the Europol Regulation starting from 1 May 2017). This means that research for information is performed in compliance with Europol data processing rules and for the purpose of determining whether the information is relevant for Europol tasks. Therefore, Europol identifies terrorist and extremist online content based on its mandate. An expert evaluation of the content is performed in accordance with the principles set up in Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA on combating terrorism. The Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA on combating terrorism (amending the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA) sets out a definition on what is to be considered as “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”.
- 31.
European Union 2000. See art 12–14 of Directive 2000/31/EC, setting out a number of exemptions from liability. See also art. 42–45 that further clarify the conditions according to which service providers can benefit from the concerned exemptions. These are: “the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network not having knowledge of or control over the information which is transmitted or stored” (art. 42); “the service provider is in no way involved with the information transmitted by, for example, deliberately collaborating with one of the recipients of its service in order to undertake illegal acts” (art. 43–44). It is worth highlighting that the exemptions from liability of service providers “do not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds” (e.g. orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it). It should be noted that there is a growing debate among Governmental bodies and, in general, the public opinion about making social media providers responsible and liable for their users’ activities. Extending providers’ responsibility would imply a significant change in the “nature” and core activities of social media: from enabling communications to publishing content—a crucial distinction which presently means that they are not liable for trolling or abuse.
- 32.
In 2016 the EU Internet Referral Unit has taken 20,548 decisions for referral to internet service providers (82% of which resulted in removals by the companies) (Europol 2017).
- 33.
See supra paragraph 11.2.1.
- 34.
In the aftermath of the publication of the progress report regarding the level of commitment of Internet companies to the “Code of Conduct” showing disappointing results (40% of recorded cases reviewed within 24 h, 80% after 48 h with other contents not being removed at all), Vĕra Jourová, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, stated during an interview to the Financial Times that “If Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft want to convince me and the ministers that the non-legislative approach can work, they will have to act quickly and make a strong effort in the coming months”, therefore casting doubts on the effectiveness of self-regulation, speculating instead on the application of a hard law approach (Beesley 2016).
- 35.
These concerns increased after the revelations made in May 2013 by Edward Snowden, a former contractor at the US National Security Agency (NSA). Snowden revealed the existence of internet and phone mass surveillance programmes that were carried out by the NSA and other intelligence agencies with the cooperation of telecommunication companies. (Greenwald Glenn et al. 2013).
- 36.
According to the June 2015 Eurobarometer survey on data protection, 81% of Europeans feel that they do not have complete control over their personal data online; 69% would like to give their explicit consent before the collection/processing of their data and only 24% of Europeans trust online platforms (including social media providers).
- 37.
Twitter has recently terminated the agreement with the US intelligence community to use Dataminr. This data mining service partially owned by Twitter (5% stake) was the only authorised one to accessing the real-time stream of public tweets. Dataminr’s software is able to detect patterns in hundreds of millions of daily tweets, traffic data, news wires and other sources and matches the data with market information and geographic coordinates to determine what information is credible. It seems that this service proved useful to detect unfolding terroristic attacks (Stewart and Maremont 2016).
- 38.
Documents from the Chicago Cook County Sheriff’s Office revealed the increasing use by law enforcement personnel of undercover online operations carried out with very little clarity both in terms of frequency and legal framework. Sometimes, the implementation of these actions has been left up to the discretion of police officers themselves and without prior ad hoc training (Joseph 2016).
- 39.
It is worth noting that the Law Decree No. 7 of 18 February 2015, converted into Law No. 43 of 17 April 2015 on Misure urgenti per il contrasto del terrorismo, anche di matrice internazionale originally foresaw a provision on remote monitoring of data stored in suspected individuals’ computers, other devices and their applications - including those related to social media accounts—by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The provision was amended upon request from the former Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, during the parliamentary debate of the bill within the Committee on Justice at the Chamber of Deputies (Innamorati 2015).
- 40.
One recent example of thematic research on the use of social media for public security is the MEDIA4SEC project, presented by a consortium including academia, private companies and public stakeholders. It focuses on enhancing the understanding of the opportunities, challenges and ethical considerations of social media use for public security. The project began on 1 July 2016 and will run for 30 months. It is financed under the EU Horizon 2020 Research Framework Programme. More info are available on http://media4sec.eu/about)
- 41.
It is worth noting that the adoption and implementation of soft law instruments could also be seen as an approach that acknowledges the essence of the Internet and social media that are based on freedom of expression and right to participation.
- 42.
The present chapter was conceived by Dr. Matteo E. Bonfanti who elaborated and drafted all the sections it consists of. Mr. Piergiorgio Stefanucci assisted in the collection of relevant documentation, drafted the preliminary version of sections 11.2 and 11.3, as well as compiled the reference list of the present chapter. The authors would like to thank those national law enforcement officers who provided useful insight on the topic discussed by the chapter.
References
Article 29 Working Party. (2014). Working Document on surveillance of electronic communications for intelligence and national security purposes. Accessed January 24, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf
Barnes, J. E. (2014). U.S. Military Plugs Into Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. The Wall Street Journal (online edition), August 6. Accessed November 22, 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-plugs-into-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering-1407346557
Bayerl, P. S., Akhgar, B., Brewster, B., Domdouzis, K., & Gibson, H. (2015). Social media and its role for LEAs: Review and applications. In B. Akhgar, A. Staniforth, & F. Bosco (Eds.), Cyber crime and cyber terrorism investigator’s handbook (pp. 197–220). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Beesley, A. (2016). Brussels urges US social media sites to act swiftly on hate posts. The Financial Times (online edition), December 4. Accessed December 16, 2016, from https://www.ft.com/content/b3163cca-ba32-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080
Bonfanti, M. E. (2015). Social Media Intelligence a Salvaguardia dell’Interesse Nazionale: Limiti e Opportunità di una Pratica da Sviluppare. In U. Gori & L. Martino (Eds.), Intelligence e Interesse Nazionale (pp. 231–262). Roma: Aracne editrice.
Chan, J. C. (2012). The role of social media in crisis preparedness, response and recovery. Rahs Think Centre. Accessed November 20, 2016, from http://www.oecd.org/governance/risk/The%20role%20of%20Social%20media%20in%20crisis%20preparedness,%20response%20and%20recovery.pdf
Council of the European Union. (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Accessed December 17, 2016, from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204
Council of the European Union. (2007). Council conclusions on cooperation to combat terrorist use of the Internet (“Check the Web”). Accessed March 20, 2017, from https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208457%202007%20REV%203
Council of the European Union. (2008). Council conclusions on reinforcing the union’s disaster response capacity – Towards an integrated approach to managing disasters. Accessed March 20, 2017, from http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/June/0616_GAERC-Disaster_Response.pdf
Council of the European Union. (2009). Council decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol). Accessed April 27, 2017, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/council-decision-of-6-april-2009-establishing-european-police-office-europol
Council of the European Union. (2010). Internal security strategy for the European Union – Towards a European security model. Accessed December 17, 2016, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/pdf/qc3010313enc.pdf
Council of the European Union. (2015a). Draft Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015–2020. Accessed February 11, 2017, from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9798-2015-INIT/en/pdf
Council of the European Union. (2015b). Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and of the Member States meeting within the Council on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. Accessed December 18, 2016, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/20-conclusions-radicalisation/
Council of the European Union. (2016a). Joint statement of EU Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs and representatives of EU institutions on the terrorist attacks in Brussels on 22 March 2016. Accessed February 11, 2017, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/24-statement-on-terrorist-attacks-in-brussels-on-22-march/
Council of the European Union. (2016b). Council conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace. Accessed December 18, 2016, from www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2016/06/cyberspace--en_pdf
Council of the European Union. (2016c). German-French letter concerning cooperation between law enforcement agencies and electronic communication service providers. Accessed December 18, 2016, from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14001-2016-INIT/en/pdf
Di Paolo, F. (2015). Social media per le crisi. Accessed November 19, 2016, from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/social-media-per-le-crisi-ferruccio-di-paolo
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile. (2016). Manifesto #socialProCiv. Accessed December 19, 2016, from http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/resources/cms/documents/manifesto_socialProCiv.pdf
European Commission. (2015a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security. Accessed December 17, 2016, from https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf
European Commission. (2015b. EU Internet Forum: Bringing together governments, Europol and technology companies to counter terrorist content and hate speech online (press release). Accessed December 18, 2016, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6243_it.htm
European Commission. (2016a). Fighting illegal online hate speech: first assessment of the new code of conduct. Accessed April 16, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?&item_id=50840
European Commission. (2016b). Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online. Accessed December 16, 2016, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_en.pdf
European Commission. (2016c). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council – Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union. Accessed December 18, 2016, from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/legislative-documents/docs/20160420/communication_eas_progress_since_april_2015_en.pdf
European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. Accessed April 8, 2017, from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-cybersecurity-plan-protect-open-internet-and-online-freedom-and-opportunity-cyber-security
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). (2015). Opinion 4/2015 – Towards a new digital ethics: Data, dignity and technology. Accessed January 22, 2017, from https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-09-11_Data_Ethics_EN.pdf
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). (2016). Opinion 9/2016 – EDPS Opinion on Personal Information Management Systems: Towards more user empowerment in managing and processing personal data. Accessed March 20, 2017, from https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2016/16-10-20_PIMS_opinion_EN.pdf
European Parliament. (2013a). Study on National Programmes for mass surveillance of personal data in EU Member States and their compatibility with EU law. Accessed March 20, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493032/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf
European Parliament. (2013b). LIBE Committee Inquiry on electronic mass surveillance of EU citizens – Protecting fundamental rights in a digital age: Proceedings, Outcome and Background Documents. Accessed March 20, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201410/20141016ATT91322/20141016ATT91322EN.pdf
European Police Office (Europol). (2013). European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) – First year report. Accessed April 8, 2017, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/european-cybercrime-center-ec3-first-year-report
European Police Office (Europol). (2017). One year of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol. Accessed February 11, 2017, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/information-sharing-counter-terrorism-in-eu-has-reached-all-time-high
European Union. (2000). Directive 2000/31/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce). Accessed March 20, 2017, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN
European Union. (2010). Consolidated treaties and charter of fundamental rights. Accessed January 24, 2017, from https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/eu_citizenship/consolidated-treaties_en.pdf
European Union. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA. Accessed January 22, 2017, from https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/regulation-eu-2016/794-of-european-parliament-and-of-council-of-11-may-2016
Facebook. (2016). Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content. Accessed December 17, 2016, from http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. (2014). Relazione 2014. Accessed January 24, 2017, from http://194.242.234.211/documents/10160/2148177/Relazione+annuale+2014.pdf
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. (2015). Relazione 2015. Accessed April 26, 2017, from http://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/upload/images/06_2016/160628134834.pdf
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali. (2016). Audizione di Antonello Soro Presidente del Garante per la protezione dei dati personali presso le Commissioni riunite I e II della Camera dei Deputati (22 settembre 2016) in merito alla Comunicazione della Commissione al Parlamento europeo, al Consiglio europeo e al Consiglio recante “Attuare l’Agenda europea sulla sicurezza per combattere il terrorismo e preparare il terreno per l’Unione della sicurezza” (COM(2016) 230). Accessed April 26, 2017, from http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/export/5447549
Glasgow, K. (2015). Big data and law enforcement: Advances, implications, and lessons from an active shooter case study. In B. Akhgar, G. B. Saathoff, H. Arabnia, R. Hill, A. Staniforth, & P. Bayerl (Eds.), Application of Big Data for National Security. A practitioner’s Guide to Emerging Technologies (pp. 39–54). Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Google. (2016). Google crisis response: Making critical information more accessible in times of disaster. Accessed April 27, 2017, from https://www.google.org/our-work/crisis-response/
Greenwald, G., MacAskill, E., & Poitras, L. (2013). Edward Snowden: The whistleblower behind the NSA surveillance revelations. The Guardian (online edition), June 11. Accessed April 27, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance
Hadjimatheou, K., Roosendaal, A., & Vermeulen, P. (2016). Ethics and legal issues inventory: Positive and negative societal impacts of the adoption of social media across the public security community. Media4SEC. Accessed January 24, 2017, from http://media4sec.eu/downloads/d1-3.pdf
Hadley, A., Khan, S., Ruiz, D., Sestito, M., & Wilson, K. (2016). Private sector engagement in responding to the use of the internet and ICT for terrorist purposes. Strengthening Dialogue and Building Trust. ICT for peace foundation and UNCTED. Accessed January 21, 2017, from https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Private-Sector-Engagement-in-Responding-to-the-Use-of-the-Internet-and-ICT-for-Terrorist-Purposes.pdf
Innamorati, G. (2015). Terrorismo: Renzi, via norma su computer. ANSA, March 25. Accessed March 20, 2017, from http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/flash/2015/03/26/renzi-fa-stralciare-da-antiterrorismo-norme-su-computer_1e3e819f-ff70-4d3d-a9e8-853560b927f2.html
Ivan, A. L., Anamaria, C., Iov, R. C., Lutai, G., & Nicolae, M. (2014). Social media intelligence: opportunities and limitations. CES Working Papers, 7(2A), 505–510.
Jackson, D., Aldovrandi, C., & Hayes, P. (2015). Ethical framework for a disaster management decision support system which harvests social media data on a large scale. In N. B. B. Saoud, C. Adam, & C. Hanachi (Eds.), Information systems for crisis response and management in mediterranean countries – Second international conference, ISCRAM-med 2015, Tunis, Tunisia, October 28–30, 2015, proceedings (pp. 167–180). Zurich: Springer.
Jennex, M. (2012). Managing crises and disasters with emerging technologies: Advancements. Hershey: IGI Global Group.
Joseph, G. (2016). How police are watching you on social media. CityLab, December 14. Accessed December 17, 2016, from http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/12/how-police-are-watching-on-social-media/508991/?utm_source=atlfb
Kaplan, A., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68.
Landon-Murray, M. (2015). Social media and U.S. intelligence agencies: Just trending or a real tool to engage and educate? Journal of Strategic Security, 8(5), 67–79. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.8.3S.1476.
Leavey, J. (2013). Social media and public policy, What is the evidence? Alliance for Useful Evidence. Accessed November 22, 2016, from https://www.alliance4usefulevidence.org/assets/Social-Media-and-Public-Policy.pdf
LexisNexis. (2014). Social media use in law enforcement. Accessed November 22, 2016, from https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/whitepaper/2014-social-media-use-in-law-enforcement.pdf
Mateescu, A., Brunton, D., Rosenblat, A., Patton, D., Gold, Z., & Boyd, D. (2015). Social media surveillance and law enforcement. Data & Society, Data & Civil Rights Conference. Accessed November 22, 2016, from http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Social_Media_Surveillance_and_Law_Enforcement.pdf
Ministère de l’intérieur de la République Française et Ministère de l’intérieur de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne. (2016). Initiative franco-allemande sur les enjeux clés de la coopération européenne dans le domaine de la sécurité intérieure. Accessed December 18, 2016, from http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-ministre-de-l-interieur/Archives-Bernard-Cazeneuve-avril-2014-decembre-2016/Interventions-du-ministre/Initiative-franco-allemande-sur-la-securite-interieure-en-Europe
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC). (2016). The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. Accessed November 27, 2016, from http://www.npcc.police.uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/PREVENT/TheCounterTerrorismInternetReferralUnit.aspx
Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012a). Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security, 27, 801–823. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.716965.
Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012b). “A balance between security and privacy online must be struck.... ” #INTELLIGENCE. Demos. Accessed November 20, 2016, from https://www.demos.co.uk/files/_Intelligence_-_web.pdf?1335197327
Parlamento Italiano. (2001). Legge 15 dicembre 2001 n. 438 - Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 18 ottobre 2001 n. 374, recante disposizioni urgenti per contrastare il terrorismo internazionale. Published on the Official Journal of the Italian Republic No. 293 of 18 December 2001. Accessed December 19, 2001, from http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/01438l.htm
Parlamento Italiano. (2005). Legge 31 luglio 2005, n. 155 – Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 27 luglio 2005, n. 144, recante misure urgenti per il contrasto del terrorismo internazionale. Published on the Official Journal of the Italian Republic No. 177 of 1 August 2005. Accessed December 19, 2001, from http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05155l.htm
Parlamento Italiano. (2015). Legge 17 aprile 2015, n. 43 – Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 18 febbraio 2015, n. 7, recante misure urgenti per il contrasto del terrorismo, anche di matrice internazionale, nonché proroga delle missioni internazionali delle Forze armate e di polizia, iniziative di cooperazione allo sviluppo e sostegno ai processi di ricostruzione e partecipazione alle iniziative delle Organizzazioni internazionali per il consolidamento dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione. Published on the Official Journal of the Italian Republic No. 91 of 20 April 2015. Accessed December 19, 2016, from http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2015-04-20&atto.codiceRedazionale=15A02961&elenco30giorni=false
Pennisi, M. (2016). Google, Facebook, Twitter e Microsoft contro il terrorismo online. Il Corriere della Sera (online edition), December 5. Accessed December 17, 2016, from http://www.corriere.it/tecnologia/social/16_dicembre_06/google-facebook-twitter-microsoft-contro-terrorismo-online-4ac67432-bb8b-11e6-a857-3c2e3af6f0b6.shtml
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2013a). Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri del 24 gennaio 2013. Direttiva recante indirizzi per la protezione cibernetica e la sicurezza informatica nazionale (13A02504). Published on the Official Journal of the Italian Republic No. 66 of 19 March 2013. Accessed February 11, 2017, from http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/03/19/13A02504/sg
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2013b). Piano nazionale per la protezione cibernetica e la sicurezza informatica. Accessed December 19, 2016, from http://www.agid.gov.it/sites/default/files/leggi_decreti_direttive/piano-nazionale-cyber_0.pdf
Quadling, A., & Potter, H. E. (2014). Is social media responsible for your safety during a disaster? The Conversation, November 10. Accessed November 26, 2016, from http://theconversation.com/is-social-media-responsible-for-your-safety-during-a-disaster-33138
Sparrow, A. (2017). WhatsApp must be accessible to authorities, says Amber Rudd. The Guardian (online edition), March 26. Accessed April 9, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/26/intelligence-services-access-whatsapp-amber-rudd-westminster-attack-encrypted-messaging
Stewart, C. S., & Maremont, M. (2016). Twitter bars intelligence agencies from using analytics service. The Wall Street Journal (online edition), May 8. Accessed November 22, 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-bars-intelligence-agencies-from-using-analytics-service-1462751682
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2013). Comprehensive study on cybercrime. Accessed March 20, 2017, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf
WeAreSocial. (2017). Digital in 2017. Accessed April 25, 2017, from https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2017/01/digital-in-2017-global-overview
Wendling, C., Randish, J., & Jacobzone, S. (2013). The use of social media in risk and crisis communication. OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, 24, 1–41. Accessed April 26, 2017, from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k3v01fskp9s-en.pdf?expires=1493215945&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=27FB2BE608839D837DB59E3276DEB1F0
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bonfanti, M.E., Stefanucci, P. (2018). Exploring the New Frontiers of Security Privatisation: Web-Based Social Networking Services and Their Challenging Contribution to Foster Security and Public Safety. In: Bures, O., Carrapico, H. (eds) Security Privatization. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63010-6_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63010-6_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-63009-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-63010-6
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)