Abstract
This article aims to analyse some aspects of Francisco de Vitoria’s moral arguments with regard to the principle of self-defence. It will first trace the reasons for saying that the intended aim of self-defence, being an evident moral principle, is self-preservation, which, however, often results in choosing means that harm or kill the aggressor. Although Vitoria introduces a series of practical limitations that limit the harm done, the case of self-defence is nonetheless a clear instance of the doctrine of double effect. A case that mirrors the arguments set forth in the discussion on self-defence is the killing of innocents in the course of a just war. It will be argued that Vitoria can obviously not morally justify the death of innocents on the grounds of an aggression, and this calls into question the validity of his overall argument. It will finally be shown that for Vitoria a way to morally justify the deaths of innocents is in fact not compatible with the doctrine of double effect and that it should rather be seen as the consequence of an early form of probabilistic reasoning, which in the end endorses less certain moral principles over more certain rules. Thus, killing innocents, although undesirable, can be justified on moral grounds.
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Notes
- 1.
de Vitoria 1981, 110. The translations from De iure belli are my own.
- 2.
See MacIntyre 2014 for a short, if sympathetic, discussion of this doctrine.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
de Vitoria 1997, 63.
- 6.
Brufau Prats 1989, 38–41.
- 7.
Aquinas ST I-II q. 7 a. 8 c.: Concomitanter quidem, quando ignorantia est de eo quod agitur, tamen, etiam si sciretur, nihilominus ageretur. Tunc enim ignorantia non inducit ad volendum ut hoc fiat, sed accidit simul esse aliquid factum et ignoratum, sicut, in exemplo posito, cum aliquis vellet quidem occidere hostem, sed ignorans occidit eum, putans occidere cervum. Et talis ignorantia non facit involuntarium […] quia non causat aliquid quod sit repugnans voluntati, sed facit non voluntarium, quia non potest esse actu volitum quod ignoratum est. I will use the canonical custom of quoting the Summa theologiae.
- 8.
de Vitoria 1997, 103.
- 9.
de Vitoria 1981, 126.
- 10.
See also Boyle 2015, 465.
- 11.
Aquinas ST II-II a. 64 a. 7 c. transl. Aquinas 2006, 41–43.
- 12.
For a contemporary reading of war and self-defence in the light of Aquinas’s theory, see Porter 2015.
- 13.
Aquinas ST I-II q. 13 a. 6 ad 1.
- 14.
The metaphysics of the moral action is laid out in detail in Aquinas ST I-II qq. 18–21. Here, he distinguishes the species of the act in virtue of its object and its concomitant aspects which he calls the circumstances.
- 15.
de Vitoria 1997, 193.
- 16.
de Vitoria 1997, 201.
- 17.
This line of argument is also applied to the apparently unrelated question as to whether it is legitimate to pre-emptively kill enemies. This is an interesting case analogous to the killing of innocent people insofar as neither is actively involved in an aggression that would justify killing in the name of self-defence. Preventive killing of enemies is contrary to self-defence “within the bounds of blameless defence” (cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae), cf. de Vitoria 1997, 148.
- 18.
Cf. de Vitoria 1934: 304.
- 19.
de Vitoria 2015, 234: Si autem neutra pars sit tuta, v. g. maritus dubitat hanc haec sit uxor eius et dubitat quia reddo debitum pecco, si non reddo etiam pecco; et supponamus quod iste non scit deponere dubium, quid tune est faciendum cum non debeat esse perplexus?”.
- 20.
de Vitoria 2015, 234: […] Tunc magis debeo inelinare in partem illam ubi minus periculum est, quia esse homicidam est peceatum mortale, mentiri autem veniale, si mentiret ut non pecearet quia ex alia parte incurreret peccatum mortale.
- 21.
de Vitoria 2015, 234–235: Sed si ex utraque parte sit periculum mortale, tune comparanda sunt peccata inter se et declinandum esset in minus, v. g. si aliquis religiosus videt quod iste homo moritur fame et praelatus iubet sub pracepto quod non dem illi panem sunt illi pro utraque parte dubia. Sed tamen magis credo quod teneor oboedire praelato, tunc dico quod potest.
- 22.
de Vitoria 2015, 238: […] Semper est considerandum periculum et si pro una parte sit maius et gravius, ut si quis dubitat quod hodie non licet comedere carnes, sed habet formidinem quod moriretur tunc potius debet inclinari in formidinem, et comedere quam abstinere. The translations of this text are my own.
- 23.
From Vitoria’s perspective, another interesting case is that of prostitution, which requires the pondering of various moral alternatives; cf. de Vitoria 1934, 163: […] Dare stipendium scorto non est malum nisi ex fine, quia datio de se est bona, nec illa ideo quod sit meretrix perdit jus ad hoc quod non possit sibi aliquid dari. Unde si datio fiat ad movendum illam ad fornicationem, est mala, et argente peccat mortaliter; sicut si diceret, veni in domum meam, et dabo tibi duos argenteos; etiam quidquid aliud faciat, est malum si propter talem finem faciat. Secundo dico, quod peracta re, id est post fornicationem, si dat aliquid tamquam mercedem, bene potest ei licite dare, et non est peccatum, quia jam illic finis non est malus. See also Decock 2013, 432–457.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
Vitoria thinks that priests are a more trusted source of normative certainty than are jurists; see de Vitoria 1952, 364: Profecto opinio est verissima, et ita quod opposita, quantumcumque omnes canonistae convenirent in illam opinionem, esset falsissima, quia in his quae sunt in foro conscientiae, standum est opinioni theologorum, et non canonistarum.
- 27.
de Vitoria 1981, 164: Fundamentum iusti belli est iniuria […]. Sed innocens nihil malum fecit. Ergo [non licet bello uti contra illum].
- 28.
de Vitoria 1981, 300: Non licet in republica pro delictis malorum punire innocentes. Ergo etiam nec pro iniuria malorum non licet interficere innocentes apud hostes.
- 29.
de Vitoria 1981, 300: Licet fortasse posset defendi quod in tali casu licet eos interficere, tamen credo quod nullo modo licet, quia non sunt facienda mala ut vitentur etiam alia mala maiora. Et intolerabile est profecto quod occidatur aliquis pro peccato futuro. Et primum sunt multa alia remedia ad cavendum in futurum ab illis, ut captivitas, exilium, etc. item non licet hoc in propriis civibus, occidere aliquem pro peccato futuro. Ergo non licet in extraneos. Non dubito de hoc.
- 30.
de Vitoria 1981, 166: Per accidens autem etiam scienter aliquando licet interficere innocentes, puta cum oppugnatur arx aut civilas iuste, in qua tamen constat esse multos innocentes nec possunt machinae solvi vel alia tela vel ignis aedificiis subici quin etiam opprimantur innocentes sicut nocentes. Obviously the issue of using the civilian population as a human shield springs into mind.
- 31.
de Vitoria 1981, 166: Et tandem nunquam videtur licitum opprimere innocentes etiam per accidens et praeter intentionem, nisi quando [ad] bellum iustum expedit et geri aliter non potest […].
- 32.
MacIntyre 2014.
- 33.
Aquinas ST II-II q. 64 a. 7.
- 34.
In ST I-II q. 19 a. 6 ad 1 Aquinas quotes Ps.-Dionysius’s famous saying from De divinis nominibus IV that “good is caused by a complete cause, while evil [is caused] by particular defects” (bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus).
- 35.
de Vitoria 2015, 244–246: […] Ponamus quod Petrus nunc diligat Deum super omnia et postea iudicat quod est diligendus proximus et quod subveniendum est illi et quod ad hoc oportet furari. Tunc arguitur: diligere Deum est bonum nunc. Ergo volitio conformis illi iudicio est bona. Et ex illa dilectione Dei sequitur dilectio proximi quae est bona, et ex illa dilectione sequitur furtum.
- 36.
de Vitoria 2015, 246: Quid ergo dicemus ad argumentum? Respondetur quod, supposita distinctio quod volitio medii aliquo modo necessitatur et aliquo modo non, volitio finis bona, si medium non necessitat, est bona; si autem necessitat ad volitionem mali medii, est mala. Patet quia necessitat scienter et non potest stare sine peccato […].
- 37.
de Vitoria 2015, 246: […] Potest dici quod forte ex intentione necessaria finis non sequitur electio medii, quia in tali medio apparet ratio mali, et sic non necessitor.
- 38.
Aristotle, Topics 100b20. See also Schüssler 2015.
- 39.
In reference to Romans 3, 8 Aquinas discusses the related issue of suicide; cf. Aquinas ST II-II q. 64 a. 5 c.: “[…] Nobody is entitled to kill himself for fear of consenting to sin, because evil may not be done that good may come […]”. Trans. in Aquinas 2006, 35.
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Tellkamp, J.A. (2017). Francisco de Vitoria on Self-defence, Killing Innocents and the Limits of “Double Effect”. In: Beneyto, J., Corti Varela, J. (eds) At the Origins of Modernity. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62998-8_9
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