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Knowing-Who in Quantified Epistemic Logic

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Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics

Part of the book series: Outstanding Contributions to Logic ((OCTR,volume 12))

Abstract

This article proposes an account of knowing-who constructions within a generalisation of Hintikka’s (Knowledge and belief. Cornell UP, Ithaca, MA, [10]) quantified epistemic logic employing the notion of a conceptual cover Aloni PhD thesis [1]. The proposed logical system captures the inherent context-sensitivity of knowing-wh constructions Boër and Lycan (Knowing Who. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, [5]), as well as expresses non-trivial cases of so-called concealed questions Heim (Semantics from different points of view. Springer, Berlin, [9]). Assuming that quantifying into epistemic contexts and knowing-who are linked in the way Hintikka had proposed, the context dependence of the latter will translate into a context dependence of de re attitude ascriptions and this will result in a ready account of a number of traditionally problematic cases including Quine’s well-known double vision puzzles Quine (The ways of Paradox and other essays. Random House, New York, [16]).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If we consider also non-serial, non-transitive and non-euclidean frames, the principle is valid only if \(\phi \) does not contain any modal operator.

  2. 2.

    Definite descriptions will be translated as (non-rigid) individual constants until Sect. 4.4.2.

  3. 3.

    This axiomatisation taken from Aloni [3] is based on the axiom system of modal predicate logic with identity in Hughes and Cresswell [13]. See in particular Chaps. 13, 14 and 17.

  4. 4.

    Notice that (8-b) above is stronger than the negation of (10-b) (if \(|D|>2\)). Embedded questions have been observed to exhibit so-called homogeneity effects [15]: “a knows who \(\phi \)” is intuitively true if a is fully informed about who \(\phi \), whereas its negation “a doesn’t know who \(\phi \)” conveys that a has pretty much no idea who \(\phi \). A compositional account of the semantics of the English examples would have to account for these facts (among others). Such a compositional analysis, however, is outside the scope of this article.

  5. 5.

    It is well known that English know also allows acquaintance readings.

    figure m

    In languages like Italian and Dutch, where epistemic know and acquaintance know are lexically distinct, the CQ reading can be forced by using the verb for epistemic know (sapere in Italian and weten in Dutch), as shown by (ii) for Italian, which does not allow acquaintance interpretations.

    figure n
  6. 6.

    Aloni [4] also uses conceptual covers to account for concealed questions, but there concealed questions are analysed as questions employing Groenendijk and Stokhof’s [9] partition theory.

References

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Appendix

Appendix

Let \(M=\langle W, R, D, I, C \rangle \) be a CC-model and \(M'=\langle W, R, D, I \rangle \) be the corresponding classical QEL-model. And given a CC-assignment g and a world \(w \in W\), let \(h_{g,w}\) be an element of \(D^{{\mathscr {V}}_N} \) such that for all \(v \in {\mathscr {V}}_N: h(v) = g(v)(w)\). We prove the following theorem for any closed \(\phi \) in \({\mathscr {L}}_{CC}\):

Theorem 4.3

$$M, w, g \models _{CC} \phi \hbox { iff } M', w, h_{g,w}\models _{QEL} \phi . $$

Proof

The proof is by induction on the construction of \(\phi \). We start by showing that the following holds for all terms t:

figure an

Suppose t is a variable. Then \([\![t ]\!]_{M,w,g}= g(t)(w)\). By definition of \(h_{g,w}\), \(g(t)(w)=h_{g,w}(t)\), which means that \( [\![t ]\!]_{M,w,g} = [\![t ]\!]_{M', w, h_{g,w}}\). Suppose now t is a constant. Then \([\![t ]\!]_{M,w,g}= I(t)(w)=[\![t ]\!]_{M', w, h_{g,w}} \). We can now prove the theorem for atomic formulae.

Suppose \(\phi \) is \(Pt_1,...,t_n\). Now \(M , w, g\models _{CC} Pt_1,...,t_n\) holds iff (a) holds:

figure ao

By (A), (a) holds iff (b) holds:

figure ap

which means that \(M', w, h_{g,w} \models _{QEL} Pt_1,...,t_n\).

Suppose now \(\phi \) is \(t_1=t_2\). \(M , w, g\models _{CC} t_1=t_2\) holds iff (c) holds:

figure aq

By (A) above, (c) holds iff (d) holds:

figure ar

which means that \(M', w, h_{g,w}\models _{QEL} t_1=t_2\).

Suppose now \(\phi \) is \(\Box \psi \). \(M , w, g\models _{CC} \Box \psi \) holds iff (e) holds:

figure as

By induction hypothesis, (e) holds iff (f) holds:

figure at

And (f) holds iff (g) holds:

figure au

Since \(\psi \) does not contain any free variable, (g) is equivalent to \(M' , w, h_{g,w} \models _{QEL} \Box \psi \).

Suppose now \(\phi \) is \(\exists x_n \psi \). \(M , w, g\models _{CC} \exists x_n \psi \) holds iff (h) holds:

figure av

By induction hypothesis, (h) holds iff (i) holds:

figure aw

By definition \(h_{g[x_n/c],w}= h_{g,w}[x_n/c(w)]\), and \(c(w)\in D\). But then (i) holds iff (j) holds:

figure ax

which means \(M' , w, h_{g,w} \models _{QEL} \exists x_n \psi \). The induction for \(\lnot \) and \(\wedge \) is immediate. \(\square \)

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Aloni, M. (2018). Knowing-Who in Quantified Epistemic Logic. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Sandu, G. (eds) Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_4

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