Abstract
This chapter illustrates how the ambiguous fragile states notion moves from discourse to action, through a surge of standard-setting and reform activities of international development organizations. It describes the challenges that international development organizations face when seeking to engage with fragile states based on a state-centric paradigm, and provides an overview of their evolving response. The focus is on standard-setting activities in the context of the OECD, as well as strategic and operational reforms undertaken by the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme.
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Notes
- 1.
See also Jackson, Quasi-states. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, pp. 5 and 48, arguing that many developing countries are “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations – like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law and material aid – a kind of international safety net”; or Kal Raustiala, ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’, 6 Journal of International Economic Law, 841 (2003), arguing that international economic institutions help reasserting the sovereignty of developing countries.
- 2.
Seen through the lens of constructivist theories of international relations, the discourse on fragile states contributes to the formation of identities and interests with an important impact on how fragile states are perceived and addressed by the international community; see e.g. Newman, ‘Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World’.
- 3.
Bhuta, ‘Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of Political Order’, pp. 134, 136.
- 4.
Examples include the Brookings “Index of State Weakness’ and the ‘Failed State Index’ issued jointly by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. For an overview, see Javier Fabra Mata & Sebastian Ziaja, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and German Development Institute, ‘Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility’ (2009), 24.
- 5.
The indicators used are a compilation from various sources and regularly include data that was not collected for the specific purpose of measuring fragility. Indicators are typically aggregated to generate the index value that seeks to display a country’s degree of fragility. Dan Harris, et al., German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 9/2009, ‘Country Classifications for a Changing World’ (2009), pp. 17–23.
- 6.
For example, Kevin E. Davis, et al., ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’, 46 Law & Society Review, 71 (2012).
- 7.
Bhuta, ‘Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of Political Order’, p. 143.
- 8.
Kharas & Rogerson, ‘Horizon 2025. Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry’, p. 26.
- 9.
OECD, ‘Fragile States 2013. Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World’, Figure 2.1 (p. 46). Since 2011, however, aid to ‘fragile states’ has started declining somewhat.
- 10.
Ibid., Figure 2.14 (p. 66). In 2010, by far the largest share of resources went to Afghanistan, followed by Ethiopia, DRC, Pakistan, Haiti, Tanzania, West Bank and Gaza, Iraq, Sudan and Nigeria.
- 11.
Ibid., Figures 2.9 and 2.10 (p. 58), on the evolving allocation of aid to fragile states per sector. However, the OECD’s 2015 fragile states report finds that despite the growing recognition of the importance of security and justice for development in fragile states, only a fraction of ODA is allocated to security and justice sector reforms. OECD, ‘ States of Fragility. Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions’, Figure 3.7 (p. 68).
- 12.
Charles T. Call, ‘The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State”’, 29 Third World Quarterly, 1491 (2008), 1495.
- 13.
Assistance provided by a group of donor states to one or more recipient countries without being channelled through an international organization also constitutes multilateral development cooperation, but shall not be considered here.
- 14.
See also Joanna Macrae, et al., Overseas Development Institute, ‘Aid to ‘Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues’ (July 2004), para. 4.3, arguing that “development cooperation relies on three related but distinct conditions being in place: that a state exists; that the state is competent and legitimate; that there is an authority recognized and sanctioned internationally to represent that state.”
- 15.
On the concepts of empirical and juridical statehood, see supra Sects. 2 and 3 in Chap. 2.
- 16.
These treaties regulate a variety of aspects, e.g. certain obligations of recipients in connection with the carrying out of a development project. See Michael Riegner & Philipp Dann, ‘Foreign Aid Agreements’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, May 2011); and on the content of agreements and the procedural regime for their adoption , Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 377–379 (on the World Bank); and 391–392 (on the EU’s financing agreements).
- 17.
Infra Sect. 2 in Chap. 4.
- 18.
For an overview of the changing role of the state in development theory, see, for instance, John Martinussen, Society, State and Market. A Guide to Competing Theories of Development (Zed Books, 1997), chapter 4; or Adrian Leftwich, States of Development. On the Primacy of Politics in Development (Blackwell, 2000), pp. 71–104.
- 19.
The Washington Consensus refers to a set of policy prescriptions that were believed a necessary first step requirement for all countries to achieve economic growth, for instance, restructuring the bureaucratic apparatus, reducing public employment, privatizing certain industries, and deregulating markets.
- 20.
The work of Amartya Sen had an important influence on shifting the focus to a more holistic and human-centred conception of development. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2001); or Leftwich, States of Development. On the Primacy of Politics in Development, pp. 40–70.
- 21.
On the legal nature and content of good governance, also Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, pp. 234–235.
- 22.
In 2000, US economists Craig Burnside and David Dollar furnished statistical data to undermine the correlation between economic growth and sound institutions and (monetary, fiscal, and trade) policies. C. Burnside & D. Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, 90 American Economic Review, 847 (2000). However, subsequent studies found that aid can still have positive outcomes in less favourable policy and institutional environments; e.g. William Easterly, et al., Center for Global Development. CGD Working Paper # 26, ‘New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting “Aid, Policies, and Growth”’ (2003); or David Roodmann, ‘The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development and Cross-Country Empirics’, 21 World Bank Economic Review 255 (2007).
- 23.
The concept itself does not indicate whether more or less government is more conducive to achieving development, nor does it prescribe a certain form of government. Its emergence, however, has entailed a growing concern with the question how different political systems influence governance, including considerations of democracy and human rights. See also Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation. A Comparative Analysis of the World Bank, the EU and Germany, 118, who finds that “[t]he goal of all concepts is more stable and responsible statehood”.
- 24.
See, for instance, The World Bank, ‘Good Practice Note for Development Policy Lending. Development Policy Operations and Program Conditionality in Fragile States’ (7 June 2005), 7, listing revenue collection, public expenditure management and civil service appointment as desirable state functions, but also functions that relate to “state authority” (e.g. security services) and to “state legitimacy” (e.g. the holding of elections).
- 25.
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted in 2005 concretized and strengthened by the Accra Agenda for Action in September 2008, and developed further by the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation of November 2012. The Paris Declaration is not hard law, but some overlap exists between its five principles and norms of international law. See Leonie Vierck & Philipp Dann, ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)/Accra Agenda for Action (2008)’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, April 2011), paras. 14–17.
- 26.
The OECD DAC defines national ownership as “[t]he effective exercise of a government’s authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or partially – on external resources. For governments, this means articulating the national development agenda and establishing authoritative policies and strategies.” See the OECD’s Glossary of Statistical Terms, available online: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7238 (accessed January 2017). For a critical discussion, see Willem H. Buiter, ‘“Country Ownership”: A Term Whose Time has Gone’, 17 Development in Practice, 647 (2007).
- 27.
For example, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, para. 14 (“developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative processes”), or para. 20 (“ensure that national systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and transparent”).
- 28.
Virtually all international development organizations have committed to adhere to the principles of ownership and alignment, mutual accountability and results included in the Paris Declaration, and to the principles of partnership, transparency and shared responsibility included in the Busan Partnership Agreement.
- 29.
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015).
- 30.
Infra Sect. 2 in Chap. 4.
- 31.
The according tension underlying donor-recipient relations is somewhat characteristic for the regime of development cooperation, but becomes more obvious with regards to fragile states. See also Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State-Building (Oxford University Press, 2005), 4–5, referring to a ‘sovereignty paradox’ with regards to the state-building practice of international transitional administrations. These compromise the right to self-government as one element of sovereignty, in order to implement domestic reforms and strengthen local political institutions to ultimately strengthen sovereignty.
- 32.
Zoellick, ‘Fragile States: Securing Development’, pp. 68–69.
- 33.
It has become much easier for a state to be regarded as ‘fragile’ if the opposite – effective or resilient statehood – is seen to require not just the maintenance of a minimum level of law and order (‘ effective government’), but also the transparent, accountable, participatory conduct of public affairs (‘good government’). See supra Sect. 2 in Chap. 2.
- 34.
The World Bank, ‘World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development’, pp. 60–65.
- 35.
Ibid., Table 7.2 (p. 236). Normal developing countries accordingly spend USD 267 per person every year, as opposed to USD 131 per person (purchasing power parity adjusted) in fragile states.
- 36.
For example, insufficient coordination regularly leads to gap between crisis response and longer-term recovery. For a comprehensive account of the difficulties facing development and humanitarian actors in protracted crisis, see Adele Harmer & Joanna Macrae, Overseas Development Institute, HPG Research Report 18, ‘Beyond the Continuum. The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises’ (July 2004).
- 37.
Both are factors that are rarely addressed in academic literature concerned with the challenges of development cooperation with fragile states. I am aware of only one brief discussion in Macrae, et al., ‘Aid to ‘Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues’, pp. 43–45.
- 38.
Importantly, the lack of or unresolved legal status of a government generally precludes an entity from receiving traditional forms of government-to-government assistance that require the conclusion of an international legal agreement between donor and recipient. As we will see later, other forms and channels of aid can remain open, for instance, humanitarian assistance, or ODA provided through trust funds.
- 39.
On the importance of non-state actors and non-traditional forms of governance in fragile states, see, for instance, Martina Fischer & Beatrix Schmelzle, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Dialogue Series 8, ‘Building Peace in the Absence of States – Challenging the Discourse on State Failure’ (2009); or Lemay-Hébert, ‘Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach’.
- 40.
State fragility is primarily conceptualized in terms of the government’s lack of capacity, rather than legitimacy. Governments that command sufficient resources but deliberately choose to starve or otherwise oppress their population fortunately remain a marginal phenomenon. However, studies on state fragility sometimes point to the intrinsic link between weak state legitimacy and a lack of state capacity and authority; e.g. OECD, ‘The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity’.
- 41.
In detail, see infra Sect. 2 in Chap. 4.
- 42.
On the risk of inaction and how it can outweigh the risks associated with action in fragile states, see OECD, ‘Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts. The Price of Success?’ (2011); or The World Bank, ‘IDA 17. IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States’ (March 2013).
- 43.
Lant Pritchett, et al., Center for Global Development Working Paper 234, ‘Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure’ (December 2010), referring to “isomorphic mimicry” as a tactic of states to adopt certain organizational forms or best practices that are successful elsewhere as a mere camouflage, hiding their actual dysfunction.
- 44.
Forms of engagement that rely on country ownership or that favour the use of conditionality to ensure the effective use of ODA therefore face restrictions in fragile states; e.g. Laurence Chandy, The Brookings Institution, Global Economy and Development Policy Paper 2011–12, ‘Ten Years of Fragile States. What Have We Learned?’ (2011), p. 6; or Oxford Policy Management and The IDL Group, ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study. The Applicability of the Paris Declaration in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.’ (August 2008).
- 45.
See also Macrae, et al., ‘Aid to ‘Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues’, p. xi. The authors analyse the performance of different developing countries against two sets of indicators, economic growth and infant mortality, and find that few countries appear consistently across indicators and time as performing poorly. Therefore, country performance alone does not explain why certain countries are perceived as particularly challenging environments—rather, “the problem of poorly performing countries must also be understood as relational, in other words that the labeling of a country as poorly performing is in part a reflection of the political, security and aid relations between that country and the international community.”
- 46.
Importantly, the OECD does not itself provide ODA to developing countries, but is only engaged in development policy-making.
- 47.
With a systematic analysis of how the World Bank and OECD have shaped the concept of fragile states, see Olivier Nay, ‘International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: How the World Bank and the OECD helped invent the Fragile State Concept’, 35 Third World Quarterly, 210 (2014). Nay finds that the concept was originally invented by a small group of bilateral donors, but successfully promoted and disseminated through international organizations, acting as norm entrepreneurs in constant interaction with other organizations, policy forums, and knowledge networks.
- 48.
On the influential role of the OECD DAC in defining and monitoring standards for development assistance rendered by traditional donor countries, see Martin Marcussen, ‘OECD Governance through Soft Law’, in Ulrika Mörth (ed) Soft Law in Governance and Regulation . An Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2004). The OECD DAC is assisted by the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD), which acts as its Secretariat and provides technical expertise and operational capacity.
- 49.
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, paras. 7, 37–39. The OECD’s focus on the specific development challenges of countries with weak institutional capacity or political commitment began in 2001, with a serious of discussions on ‘poor performers’ and ‘difficult partnerships’, resulting in the creation of a Fragile State Group in 2003.
- 50.
The Fragile States Principles were first agreed at a Senior Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States in 2005, and after a piloting phase, were adopted in April 2007, together with an OECD Ministerial Policy Commitment to improve development effectiveness in fragile states (DCD/DAC(2007)29).
- 51.
Fragile States Principles, para. 7, stating that if it is not possible or desirable to align with local priorities as conveyed by the government due to weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should seek to consult with national stakeholders outside of the government.
- 52.
Several of the Fragile States Principles state the need to recognize linkages between political, security and development objectives, as well as to improve policy coherence and practical coordination between political, security, development and humanitarian actors.
- 53.
Policy documents adopted by bilateral and multilateral donors regularly refer to the OECD’s Fragile States Principles, for instance, the African Development Fund, ‘Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States’ (2008) (at para. 7.1).
- 54.
So far two voluntary surveys through which the implementation of the principles is monitored yield that international practice of aid delivery and management in fragile states has not significantly improved in line with the principles. See online, http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/monitoringthefragilestatesprinciples.htm (accessed January 2017).
- 55.
The International Dialogue was set up in 2008 and meets once per year at the ministerial or senior level. It is supported by a steering group and a Secretariat hosted by the OECD.
- 56.
The g7+ is supported by a Secretariat based in Dili, Timor-Leste, which acts as a counterpart to the International Dialogue’s Secretariat. The Secretariat receives annual funding from Timor Leste’s national budget, and some staff are funded by international donors.
- 57.
Dili Declaration – A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, adopted at the first meeting of the International Dialogue on April 10, 2010.
- 58.
See the “Statement of the g7+”, Annexed to the Dili Declaration, which also serves as the Charter of the g7+.
- 59.
The New Deal, endorsed on 30 November 2011, at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea.
- 60.
A compact constitutes a basic agreement between national governments and international partners on what should be delivered, and how, by interventions aimed at supporting a transition from fragility. It is not an international legal treaty, and does not contain any sanction mechanism. The first such Compact was developed for Somalia.
- 61.
For instance, the emphasis on state-building and the linkage between political, security, and development objectives, as well as donor commitments to ensure more sustainable and predictable aid flows, were all set out in the OECD Fragile States Principles. Further, significant parallels exist with the INCAF publication OECD, ‘The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity’, and the OECD DAC Guidelines OECD, ‘Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance’ (2011).
- 62.
With the push of the g7+, however, the language actually used in the New Deal’s implementation was watered down to ‘inclusive politics’.
- 63.
See International Dialogue Secretariat, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, ‘New Deal Monitoring Report 2014’ (June 2014), which states that progress was scattered and had to intensify; also Jacob Hughes, et al., The Brookings Institution, ‘Implementing the New Deal for Fragile States’ (July 2014).
- 64.
A still more universal endorsement constitutes the inclusion of ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’ as stand-alone Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals, the post-2015 development agenda. For an analysis of the respective negotiations leading up to the adoption of the SDGs , see L. Ribeirio Pereira, Friedrich Eberst Stiftung (FES), ‘What’s Peace Got To Do With It? Advocating Peace in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda’ (September 2014).
- 65.
The largest percentage of ODA to fragile states is provided in the form of bilateral aid, as is generally the case. The share of multilateral aid, however, is significantly higher in fragile states than in non-fragile states (50% over 37%). See OECD, ‘Fragile States 2014. Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Fragile States’, p. 32.
- 66.
The IDA provided US$4.365 million to fragile states in 2012, a bit less than the EU institutions with US$5.599 million. See OECD, ‘States of Fragility. Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions’, p. 119, Figure B.5 (providers of official development assistance to fragile states and economies in 2012). For a detailed analysis of the World Bank’s engagement with fragile states, see infra Chap. 5.
- 67.
The task force led to the launch of the LICUS initiative in 2002, which shifted the focus from improving development effectiveness in weak-capacity environments, to the broader goals of peace- and state-building.
- 68.
For instance, the findings and policy implications of the LICUS task force were taken up by the OECD DAC, by the UN and various bilateral donors. The OECD’s Fragile States Principles, in turn, emerged from a process led by the World Bank and DFID as co-chairs of the OECD DAC’s Fragile States Group.
- 69.
The World Bank, ‘World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development’. The World Development Report is the World Bank’s annual flagship publication. The WDR 2011 was prepared by a team of World Bank researchers, with inputs from other international organizations and governments and other stakeholders in donor and recipient countries.
- 70.
The reform program is set out in a staff paper that calls on the Bank “to significantly adjust its operations model while remaining within its established mandate”. The World Bank, Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development, DC2011-0003 (4 April 2011), p. iii.
- 71.
The World Bank, ‘Additions to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment – IDA 16: Delivering Development Results’ (2011), paras. 84–92. A signal that the Bank’s focus will remain on fragile states is the increase by over 50% of IDA’s resources made available to fragile states in the period from 2014 to 2017.
- 72.
The bibliography of the 2011 World Development Report refers to 22 OECD documents and publications.
- 73.
For a detailed analysis of the AfDB’s and the ADB’s engagement with fragile states in comparison with that of the World Bank, see infra Sect. 2 in Chap. 6.
- 74.
Like the World Bank, the AfDB keeps a list of ‘fragile situations’, which includes countries with particularly weak policies and institutions, or the presence of a UN peace operation. The quality of institutional arrangements and governance is assessed in the AfDB’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).
- 75.
African Development Fund, ‘ Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States’; and the independent evaluation Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank, ‘Evaluation of the Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States’ (2012), vii. In 2014, the organization adopted a new Fragile States Strategy for 2014–2019, providing authoritative guidance on how to adapt policies and processes to the specific circumstances and needs of fragile states. See African Development Bank, ‘Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa: The African Development Bank Group Strategy 2014–2019’ (June 2014).
- 76.
The FSF was created by means of a Resolution of the Executive Directors, B/BD/2008/05-F/BD/2008/03, adopted on 28 March 2008.
- 77.
See, for instance, the Asian Development Bank, ‘Achieving Development Effectiveness in Weakly Performing Countries. The Asian Development Bank’s Approach to Engaging with Weakly Performing Countries’ (April 2007); and ADB’s long-term strategic framework, Asian Development Bank, ‘Strategy 2020. The Long-term S trategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008–2020’ (April 2008).
- 78.
Asian Development Bank, ‘Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations – The ADB Experience: A Staff Handbook’ (2012) and Asian Development Bank, ‘Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB’s Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations’ (April 2013).
- 79.
Supra note 66. For a detailed analysis of the EU’s engagement, see infra Sect. 3 in Chap. 6.
- 80.
In fact, the EU became concerned with fragility first as a security, and then as a development challenge: the 2003 European Security Strategy identifies state failure as a key threat before the 2005 European Consensus on Development formulates the commitment to more effectively address state fragility. See European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, 12 December 2003; and the Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the development policy of the EU entitled “The European Consensus” (hereinafter European Consensus on Development), OJ C 46/1 of 24 February 2006, at paras. 20–22; 89–92.
- 81.
See, for instance, the Communication from the Commission, Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility – Engaging in Difficult Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace, Brussels, 25.10.2007, COM (2007) 643; and the Council Conclusions on a EU Response to Situations of Fragility, 2831st External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19–20 November 2007.
- 82.
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change, Brussels, 13 October 2011, COM(2011) 637 final (hereinafter: EU Agenda for Change), pp. 9–10.
- 83.
Instrument for Stability (IfS), Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006, which was succeeded by Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014.
- 84.
In this context, Furness describes the EU “as a ‘norm taker’ rather than a ‘norm maker’”. Markus Furness, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper 5/2014, ‘Let’s Get Comprehensive. European Union Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries’ (2014), p. 7.
- 85.
UNDP also leads the United Nations Development Group, consisting of 32 UN programmes and funds, departments and offices, as well as UN-specialized agencies that all play a role in development cooperation.
- 86.
For an overview of UNDP’s engagement, see also Bruce D. Jones, ‘The Changing Role of UN Political and Development Actors in Situations of Protracted Crisis’, in Harmer & Macrae, ‘Beyond the Continuum. The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises’.
- 87.
Further, UNDP has adopted a long-term strategy of “resilience-building”, and developed specific “fast track policies and procedures” to get there. UNDP, ‘Changing with the World. UNDP Strategic Plan 2014–2017’, pp. 34–37.
- 88.
All three organizations have concluded formal agreements to facilitate their inter-organizational cooperation in fragile states. For example, the World Bank and the UN have established the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations in 2008, and concluded a Fiduciary Principles Accord to facilitate cooperation. UNDP and the EU collaborate through a special partnership on crisis prevention and recovery since 2003, whereby both institutions share best practices and jointly develop operational guidance.
- 89.
The fact that UNDP’s own financial contributions to fragile states are comparatively minor (amounting to less than 5% of the EU’s contributions) is deceiving. It has an operational presence in more fragile states than the World Bank, and almost half of the EU’s funding to UNDP in 2011 was to support its work on crisis prevention and recovery.
- 90.
See, for example, the Report of the MDB Working Group, ‘Towards a More Harmonized Approach to MDB Engagement in Fragile Situations’, adopted in 2007, wherein the heads of the AfDB, ADB, the Islamic Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agree to develop common definitions and operating principles, and effective and participatory procedures.
- 91.
OECD, ‘States of Fragility. Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions’.
- 92.
Supra Sect. 1 of this chapter.
- 93.
This entanglement is often viewed critically, since political and security actors may seek to influence the means and ends of development cooperation, particularly in countries considered of strategic importance; e.g. Eva Nieuwenhuys, ‘Development Aid by Tank Viewed in the Light of the Globalisation of the Western Development Model’, in Bruce Currie-Alder, et al. (eds), International Development. Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 94.
For example, Macrae, et al., ‘Aid to ‘Poorly Performing’ Countries: A Critical Review of Debates and Issues’, 44, arguing that there is “a link between aid, the capacity of political authorities to govern and claims to juridical status.”
- 95.
Ibid., 41, highlighting the powerful role of donors in analysing “the type and quality of statehood”, and thus in deciding on the volume of aid, the form of aid, and the channels through which it is delivered.
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von Engelhardt, M. (2018). Development Cooperation with Fragile States: From Discourse to Action. In: International Development Organizations and Fragile States. Governance and Limited Statehood. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62695-6_3
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