Abstract
In this chapter, I examine the case of Aceh during Indonesia’s democratic transition to explore how the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization occurred in the face of the separatist movement. This conflict was the longest separatist movement in the history of independent Indonesia. Altogether, the Acehnese liberation struggle lasted for forty years. In terms of fatalities, the case of Aceh demonstrated a high level of violence; during the whole period, between 10,000 and 30,000 people were killed (Crisis Management Initiative 2012: 9; Amnesty International 2013: 9; Pergub Aceh No. 70/2012: 62).
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Notes
- 1.
Aceh (majority), Tamiang (in the eastern part of East Aceh), Alas (in Southeast Aceh), Aneuk Jamee and Kluet (in South Aceh), Naeuk Laot, Semeulu and Sinabang (in Semeulue), Gayo (in Bener Meriah, Central Aceh and Gayo Lues), Pakpak, Lekon, Haloban and Singkil (in Aceh Singkil). Each of these ethnic groups has its own culture, language, and traditional identities (RPJP Aceh Tahun 2005–2025, 2009: 30–1). Some people believe that ACEH is an abbreviation which stands for Arabs, Chinese, European, and Hindustan.
- 2.
Banda Aceh (the capital), North Aceh, South Aceh, West Aceh, East Aceh, Southeast Aceh, Southwest Aceh, Central Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Singkil, Aceh Besar, Simeulue, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Gayo Lues, Aceh Tamiang, Nagan Raya, Bener Meriah, Sabang, Langsa, Lhokseumawe, Subulussalam.
- 3.
The religious composition in Aceh shows that with 98.81 percent, Islam is the major religion in Aceh. The religious minorities in Aceh include Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians. Places of worship for non-Muslims in Aceh include 154 churches, fourteen Hindu and Buddhist monasteries, and two Confucian temples (BPS-Statistics of Aceh Province in collaboration with BAPPEDA Aceh, 2012: 113–114). Although the Muslims make up the biggest part of the population, no inter-religious conflict has been recorded so far (Bhakti 2008).
- 4.
The Aceh Sultanate made treaties and sent diplomats to the Ottoman Empire from 1538 to 1658 to gain protection against foreign powers, especially Portugal, in exchange. See, Bhakti 2008: 8.
- 5.
Since the early nineteenth century, the Aceh Sultanate had developed trading and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, the UK, the USA, France, and Italy. In 1819 when the Sultanate learned that the English colonial power was much stronger than the Dutch, it agreed to sign a defense treaty with the English. However, when the Acehnese realized that the English would not provide the promised protection against the Dutch, it sought a defense agreement with the USA in 1873, right before the Aceh–Dutch war broke out. See ibid.
- 6.
For a detailed account of the historical background of the roots of the Aceh separatism, see Kell 1995.
- 7.
This includes a donation from the Acehnese in 1948, which was equal to 20 kg of gold, to buy Indonesia’s first aircraft. This aircraft was named Dakota RI-001 Seulawah.
- 8.
On 7 August 1949, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo declared the NII Province of West Java.
- 9.
Initially, Hasan Tiro strongly supported and believed in the creation of an Indonesian state. He was 22 years of age and studying in Jogjakarta (at the time one of the centers of Indonesian republicans and the nationalist movement) when Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared the country’s independence on 17 August 1945. He wrote in 1948 that “Aceh, as it has been in the past, is inseparable from the Republic of Indonesia; therefore the history of Aceh is inherently inseparable from the history of Indonesia; our slogan is one nation, one language, and one motherland.” In fact, Hasan Tiro was one of the Indonesian delegates to the United Nations in New York. He moved to the USA in 1950 and studied in New York. Hasan Tiro, however, changed his mind later due to his disappointment with the Jakarta’s mistreatment of Aceh. He took sides with Daud Beureueh when the Darul Islam movement broke out in 1953. His disappointment toward the central government even worsened, especially after oil and gas exploration started in Aceh in 1971. He stayed and lived as a businessman in the USA until his return to Aceh in 1976 when he declared the independence of the region. See, Bhakti 2008; Reid 2004; and Schulze 2004.
- 10.
Sinar Harapan, 31 March 2003.
- 11.
This disappointment related to B.J. Habibie’s failures to fulfill his promises of bringing the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice and to plan for withdrawing troops. Among other obstacles was the different interpretation among Jakarta’s elites regarding the time period of the crimes. For instance, it was said that there was consensus of the government and the National Commission on Human Rights that the latter’s subject of investigation would only deal with cases of violation of rights that occurred after 1998 (The Jakarta Post, 3 July 1999). This meant that the investigation would not cover any violations committed prior to 1998. Regarding the second issue, B.J. Habibie’s government also had to abandon the plan for withdrawing the troops. The increasing number of riots and the escalation of violence were two major reasons behind this failure. Even the national police requested later that military troops should not be withdrawn from a number of unrest-prone areas. Instead of troop withdrawal, Jakarta planned to establish a military command in the province (The Jakarta Post, 27 August 1999). Facing protests by Acehnese leaders and observers, the government delayed the plan as a response to “people’s aspiration” (The Jakarta Post, 31 August 1999). Later on, President Megawati Sukarnoputri eventually signed the re-establishment of the military command Kodam Iskandar Muda.
- 12.
Those killed included Syiah Kuala, Rector Dayan Dawood; Acehnese PPP parliamentarian, Tgk. Nashiruddin Daud; South Aceh local legislator, Harun Aldy; New York-based International Forum for Aceh, Chairman Jafar Hamzah Siddiq; North Aceh local legislator, Tgk. Ibrahim Ilyas; IAIN Rector, Prof. Safwan Idris; Aceh’s Golkar Chairman, Maj. Gen (ret.) Tengku Haji Djohan; and an Acehnese member of the peace-monitoring team, Teuku Al-Kamal (Miller 2009: 76–7; Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012).
- 13.
See Kontras’s press release, 12 January 1999. Available at http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=66, accessed on 25 September 2013. Initially, OSW 99 was a response for GAM’s action on 29 December, when the rebels captured and killed seven soldiers in Lhok Nibong, East Aceh. Subsequently, the mission of OSW 99 was to locate the captured soldiers and arrest those responsible for their deaths. See, Amnesty International. Available at http://www2.amnesty.se/uaonnet.nsf/dfab8d7f58eec102c1257011006466e1/b76e82d50366392dc1256714004262f5?OpenDocument, accessed on 20 December 2013.
- 14.
In his interview with Tempo, Johny Wahab stated that this operation had already failed after four civilian detainees were killed by a group of soldiers. Tempo, “Wawancara Johny Wahab: Operasi Ini Sudah Gagal.” Tempo, 17 January 1999.
- 15.
Kompas, 20 March 2001.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
See, Presidential Instruction No. 7/2001 and Miller 2009.
- 18.
Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Tb. Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
See, Miller 2009: 157.
- 21.
- 22.
Kafil Yamin, “Jakarta Offensive in Aceh Drags On,” Asia Times Online, 27 June 2003.
- 23.
On 9 November 1998, B.J. Habibie signed Presidential Instruction No. 191/1998 concerning the formation of DPKSH. The Council only had one task: to control and coordinate the state’s response to the crisis, which might threaten the national stability and the rule of law, in a timely and integrated manner. See, Presidential Instruction No. 191/1998.
- 24.
The Suharto government had previously abolished the Aceh military command in the mid-1980s as part of a national-wide reorganization and consolidation of the army territorial commands (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 106).
- 25.
See Presidential Instruction No. 28/2003 on the Declaration of the State of Military Emergency in Province of Aceh.
- 26.
According to Miller, economic activities of the military included, for example, “providing security to big businesses[,] selling fishing licenses to foreign fishing vessels, selling arms to GAM, extortion [among others]” (Miller 2009: 106).
- 27.
In 1992, the US Congress cancelled $2.3 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Indonesia as the USA’s response to the event at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor, in November 1991, where the Indonesian security personnel shot dozens of unarmed civilians. In 1994, the USA banned the sale of small and light arms and riot-control equipment to Indonesia. In 1995 and 1996, the USA expanded the list of prohibited items to include helicopter-mounted equipment and armored personnel carriers. In June 1997, Indonesia withdrew from the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program, after Suharto complained over a “totally unfair criticism of Indonesian human rights practices by the U.S. Congress.” In 1998, the USA suspended the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) program. After violence erupted in the aftermath of the 1999 referendum in East Timor, the Clinton administration suspended the transfer of defense goods and services to Indonesia as well as military exercises and exchanges (Rabasa and Haseman 2002: 113–115).
- 28.
Gen. Endriartono Sutarto in Media Indonesia, 9 June 2005.
- 29.
Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret) Tb Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
- 30.
Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012.
- 31.
Interview with Head of Aceh Police Security Management Agency, Sen. Police Commander (Kombes) Budiono, Banda Aceh, 16 May 2012.
- 32.
The other factor according to Endang Suryana was that “soldiers in the field used an inappropriate approach to win the people’s trust” (Sukma 2004: 32).
- 33.
Atjeh Post, 7 August 2012.
- 34.
The Jakarta Post, 22 July 1999.
- 35.
Law No. 18/2001 (the Special Autonomy Law, UU No. 18/2001). See also, Miller 2009: 96–97.
- 36.
The generals are: (1) Tri Sutrisno, the former Commander of the Armed Forces and Vice-president; (2) L.B. Moerdani, the former Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Security; (3) Feisal Tanjung, the former Coordinating Minister on Politics and Security; (4) Syawan Hamid, the former Minister of Home Affairs; and (5) Anwar Makarim, the former Head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency. The active ministers from Wahid’s cabinet were: (1) Wiranto, the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security; (2) Surjadi Soedirdja, the Minister of Home Affairs; (3) Ryaas Rasyid, the Minister of Regional Autonomy; and (4) Hasballah M. Saad, the Minister of Human Rights. See, Miller 2009: 68–71.
- 37.
The Jakarta Post, 31 July 2002. See, Miller 2009: 119.
- 38.
The Jakarta Post, 8 August 2002.
- 39.
See also Tempo, February 8–14, 2005.
- 40.
Serambi Indonesia, 7 July 2005.
- 41.
Tempo Interaktif, 11 June 2005.
- 42.
See also Media Indonesia, 9 June 2005)
- 43.
Interview with Jusuf Kalla, Jakarta, 14 March 2012.
- 44.
Kompas, 12 May 2000.
- 45.
Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Tb. Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 16 April 2012.
- 46.
Cut Nyak is a name for respected Acehnese women. Rencong is the Acehnese’s traditional dagger. See the report on this speech in Kompas, 30 July 1999. See also, Miller 2009: 101.
- 47.
Interview with Prof. Yusni Saby, Banda Aceh, 17 May 2012.
- 48.
The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2005.
- 49.
Conciliation Resource, 2008, “Aceh’s New Era: An Interview with Irwandi Yusuf,” Accord 20.
- 50.
The Jakarta Post, 30 July 2005.
- 51.
The Jakarta Post, 28 December 2005.
- 52.
Sinar Harapan, 9 May 2005.
- 53.
“Aceh: Post-conflict Complications” Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/139-aceh-post-conflict-complications.aspx, accessed on 7 March 2012.
- 54.
International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh,” Asia Briefing No. 61, 22 March 2007.
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Kurniawan, Y. (2018). Securitization and Desecuritization Dynamics in the Aceh Separatist Movement. In: The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62482-2_5
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