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Detecting Failed Attacks on Human-Interactive Security Protocols

  • A. W. RoscoeEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10368)

Abstract

One of the main challenges in pervasive computing is how we can establish secure communication over an untrusted high-bandwidth network without any initial knowledge or a Public Key Infrastructure. An approach studied by a number of researchers is building security though involving humans in a low-bandwidth “empirical” out-of-band channel where the transmitted information is authentic and cannot be faked or modified. A survey of such protocols can be found in [9]. Many protocols discussed there achieve the optimal amount of authentication for a given amount of human work. However it might still be attractive to attack them if a failed attack might be misdiagnosed as a communication failure and therefore remain undetected. In this paper we show how to transform protocols of this type to make such misdiagnosis essentially impossible. We introduce the concept of auditing a failed protocol run and show how to enable this.

Notes

The author thanks Long Nguyen, Peter Ryan, Catherine Meadows and Thomas Gibson-Robinson for useful conversations on this work.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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