Abstract
Shorter life cycles as well as increasing complexity of new product developments can induce companies to form research and development alliances. This study especially focuses on the management accounting perspective of such alliances and analyses the companies’ research efforts, the distribution of costs, and the division of resulting profits. The analytically obtained results as well as the numerical studies show that: (a) not each scenario leads to a viable equilibrium in which both companies would like to participate; (b) research effort will be higher under an equal distribution of power; (c) total profit under equal distribution of power and individual profit maximization yields the same profit as a joint profit maximization, which is always higher than with a dominant company.
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Aust, G., Dominko, D., Buscher, U. (2018). Interorganizational Resource Sharing in Research and Development Alliances. In: Mueller, D., Trost, R. (eds) Game Theory in Management Accounting. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_6
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