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The Usability and Suitability of Allocation Schemes for Corporate Cost Accounting

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Game Theory in Management Accounting

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

Several instruments may be employed by accountants to assist management’s operations. These include models of game theory. Game theoretic solution concepts are based on different argumentations, from which follow different properties and—different results. From the viewpoint of management accounting, the question arises whether these allocation schemes are suitable for solving corporate cost allocation problems. Therefore, this paper provides a detailed literature review of the crucial properties of some well-known solution concepts. This serves as the basis for the evaluation of these solutions with respect to management accounting purposes.

The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to the chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_20.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Using this procedure for designing cost savings games for public goods is criticised by Hougaard 2018, p. 291.

  2. 2.

    For a deep and broad discussion of incentives in this volume cf. Trost and Heim (2018).

  3. 3.

    Cf. Kunz (2018) for analysing the applicability of strategic game theory to management accounting purposes.

  4. 4.

    Cf. the contributions in the part “Non-cooperative Models” in this volume.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Zelewski and Heeb (2018), p. 391 for a similar critique.

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  1. Chair of Management Accounting and Control, BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg, Erich-Weinert-Str. 1, 03046, Cottbus, Germany

    David Mueller

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  1. Institute of Economics, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, Germany

    David Mueller

  2. Faculty of Economic Sciences and Media, Ilmenau University of Technology, Ilmenau, Germany

    Ralf Trost

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Mueller, D. (2018). The Usability and Suitability of Allocation Schemes for Corporate Cost Accounting. In: Mueller, D., Trost, R. (eds) Game Theory in Management Accounting. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_19

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