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Controlled Randomness – A Defense Against Backdoors in Cryptographic Devices

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Paradigms in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2016. Malicious and Exploratory Cryptology (Mycrypt 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10311))

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Abstract

Security of many cryptographic protocols is conditioned by quality of the random elements generated in the course of the protocol execution. On the other hand, cryptographic devices implementing these protocols are designed given technical limitations, usability requirements and cost constraints. This frequently results in black box solutions. Unfortunately, the black box random number generators enable creating backdoors. So effectively the signing keys may be stolen, authentication protocol can be broken enabling impersonation, confidentiality of encrypted communication is not guaranteed anymore.

In this paper we deal with this problem. The solution proposed is a generation of random parameters such that: (a) the protocols are backwards compatible (a protocol participant gets additional data that can be ignored), (b) verification of randomness might be executed any time without any notice, so a device is forced to behave honestly, (c) the solution makes almost no change in the existing protocols and therefore is easy to implement, (d) the owner of a cryptographic device becomes secured against its designer and manufacturer that otherwise might be able to predict the output of the generator and break the protocol. We give a few application examples of this technique for standard schemes.

This research has been supported by the Polish National Science Centre, project HARMONIA, DEC-2013/08/M/ST6/00928.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    EAC and PACE are protocols of high importance for the security of biometric passports and electronic identity documents. EAC is a standardized authenticated key exchange protocol, which goal is to authenticate the identity document and the terminal against each other. PACE is a password authenticated key exchange protocol which secures the transmission between an identity document and the reader.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Fundamental Problems of Technology, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Lucjan Hanzlik, Kamil Kluczniak & Mirosław Kutyłowski

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  1. Lucjan Hanzlik
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  2. Kamil Kluczniak
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  3. Mirosław Kutyłowski
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Correspondence to Mirosław Kutyłowski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Multimedia University, MMU, Cyberjaya, Malaysia

    Raphaël C.-W. Phan

  2. Snapchat and Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Hanzlik, L., Kluczniak, K., Kutyłowski, M. (2017). Controlled Randomness – A Defense Against Backdoors in Cryptographic Devices. In: Phan, RW., Yung, M. (eds) Paradigms in Cryptology – Mycrypt 2016. Malicious and Exploratory Cryptology. Mycrypt 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10311. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61273-7_11

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