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Violence and Politics in Northern Ireland: IRA/Sinn Fein’s Strategy and the 2005 Disarmament

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Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions
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Abstract

Ethnic conflicts have become increasingly common in the world we live in, some of which ultimately result in bloodshed. Russell Hardin’s One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict, published in 1995, offered an alternative view to the prevailing explanations of ethnic conflict as the result of behavior motivated by emotion. Hardin shook up the field by proposing that group identification, conflict, and violence could be understood from a rational choice account. This chapter seeks to analyze the Northern Ireland case from this perspective.

I thank Kim Stanton for valuable comments. All errors remain mine.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The pluralist theory provides a convincing explanation, asserting that the cleavages are reinforcing (Rose 1971).

  2. 2.

    The Sutton Index of Deaths includes data since 1969 to 2001. Update of the book “An Index of Death from the Conflict in Ireland 1969–1993”, CAIN Web Service of the University of Ulster at Magee. Web site: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk (Accessed October 25, 2015).

  3. 3.

    There is evidence indicating that Northern Ireland has become more segregated since 1998, provided that “the number of peace lines maintained by the Northern Irish Office has grown from 37 in October 2006 to 48 in November 2010” (Power 2011: 5).

  4. 4.

    In the Republic of Ireland, its share of votes was estimated on average to be as little as less than 2%.

  5. 5.

    Let me comment briefly on the issue of IRA membership. Due to the secrecy of the paramilitary activity, it is hard to learn the exact membership. The Official Northern Ireland police files indicate that 17,000 individuals have been arrested for involvement in this kind of activity (republicans and loyalists) since 1979 (Hayes and McAllister 2001). This information is not helpful for two reasons . On the one hand, many participants might have avoided police’s scrutiny. On the other hand, the police might have probably identified wrongly in many cases.

  6. 6.

    Catholics, as a group, cannot accurately be defined by the actions of the IRA. As Hardin (2000: 185) notes: “It is a fallacy of composition to suppose without argument that a group has the characteristics of an individual member of the group.”

  7. 7.

    1991 Census

  8. 8.

    2011 Census for Northern Ireland, www.nisra.gov.uk (accessed on October 28, 2015)

  9. 9.

    Twenty-six counties formed the Irish Free State, while Northern Ireland kept the remaining six, with a Protestant majority.

  10. 10.

    Data calculated in base of the 1926 and 1911 census. Source: Irish Central Statistics Office, web site: www.cso.ei

  11. 11.

    As Hardin (2004: 180) points out: “Nationalism is a political issue only if it is intentionalist for at least many of the relevant group.”

  12. 12.

    Even though it is true that Northern Ireland used to be economically more successful than the Irish Republic, in the past decades the performance of the latter has been better (Birnie 1998).

  13. 13.

    SPA was abolished in 1972.

  14. 14.

    We have necessarily left out other sources of hostilities between the two groups. For a detailed presentation and assessment of different accounts, see McGarry, J. and O’Leary, B. Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Oxford, 1995.

  15. 15.

    See Hayes and McAllister (2001).

  16. 16.

    Responsible of killings: INLA (11), Real IRA (13), OIRA (8). Source: The Sutton Index of Deaths includes data since 1969 to 1998. Update of the book “An Index of Death from the Conflict in Ireland 1969–1993”, CAIN Web Service of the University of Ulster at Magee. Web site: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk

  17. 17.

    In particular, around the time of the peak of IRA violence, there was an atmosphere at the global level that successful insurgency was a possibility.

  18. 18.

    Italics added.

  19. 19.

    According to Taylor, “volunteers had no problem in finding out how to go about joining. They would approach a senior republican in the area and drop a word on his ear” (Taylor 1999b: 89).

  20. 20.

    Capitals in the original.

  21. 21.

    The Real IRA was responsible for the Omagh bomb in 1998, an event that by then undermined the IRA’s compromise to ceasefire.

  22. 22.

    Elections results are mainly taken from the site: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections, a database sponsored by the University of Ulster at Magee. The elections considered are local government, Westminster, regional, and European. The CAIN project web site has also been a source for a detailed chronology of the events that took place.

  23. 23.

    The Irish Free State became a Republic in 1949 and by then Dublin was presumably more concerned about their new status than about the situation in Belfast. In the middle of the tension of violent demonstrations, local IRA leadership expected to receive support from Dublin. While some arms were handled, the Irish Army did not cross the border toward Northern Ireland. In Dublin, two factors seem to have caused this refusal of support. On the one hand, the then President of Ireland, Lynch, believed that keeping distance with the IRA in Northern Ireland would lead to a voluntary withdrawal of Britain from the island. On the other hand, IRA Belfast Brigade leadership was seduced by Marxist theories, highly disapproved by Dublin (O Heithir 1997). In the end, this caused the IRA to split in late 1969 into Officials and Provisionals (Provos), opposed toward the policy in regard to the use of force and political abstention.

  24. 24.

    For simplicity, from now on I will use the term IRA in order to refer to the Provisional IRA.

  25. 25.

    Sutton Index of Deaths includes data since 1969 to 1998. Update of the book “An Index of Death from the Conflict in Ireland 1969–1993”, CAIN Web Service of the University of Ulster at Magee. Web site: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk

  26. 26.

    Westminster proposed a different solution in 1973, which excluded paramilitary groups on both sides in the negotiations. Only the North and South government and Northern Ireland constitutional powers signed the Sunningdale Agreement, which attempted to establish “a legitimate set of governmental institutions based on ‘power-sharing’ and the ‘Irish dimension’”(Bew et al. 1997: 39).

  27. 27.

    Meanwhile, bombing campaigns took place in Northern Ireland and Britain.

  28. 28.

    In 1985, when the British Government and the Irish Republic signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which enabled the latter to legitimately participate in internal affairs in Northern Ireland. This negotiation was bilateral, leaving aside once again the two paramilitary groups, and raising serious protests among Unionists.

  29. 29.

    They maintained the policy of abstentionism for Westminster seats.

  30. 30.

    The stalemate was due to the absence of loyalist paramilitary organizations in the round of negotiations.

  31. 31.

    “The Path to Peace”, by The Irish Times, at: www.ireland.com

  32. 32.

    SF was now included after the declaration of cessation of fire. The same applies to loyalist extremists.

  33. 33.

    This arrangement has prompted Horowitz to question whether this results in the institutionalization of the opposition in the cabinet.

  34. 34.

    They obtained 18% of the votes.

  35. 35.

    There were also local government elections, but we’ll focus in the Westminster election, since the local government follows the pattern marked by the Westminster elections.

  36. 36.

    BBC News, Northern Ireland: 1998–2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/northern_ireland/newsid_539000/539391.stm

  37. 37.

    Electoral results are taken from Conflict Archive on the Internet, CAIN Project, Ulster University at Magee, Whyte, Nichollas, “Election results in Northern Ireland since 1973.” External link: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections

  38. 38.

    Ruohomaki, Jyrki. “Two elections, two contests: the June 2001 elections in Northern Ireland,” Democratic Dialogue, August 2001. At: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/dd/papers/elect.htm

  39. 39.

    BBC News, Northern Ireland: 1998–2001. IRA’s statement is dated as of May 31, 2001. The elections took place on June 7, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/northern_ireland/newsid_539000/539391.stm

  40. 40.

    Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, respectively

  41. 41.

    The Guardian, August 21, 2001

  42. 42.

    The loyalist paramilitary groups had just been “specified” (considered their ceasefires to be at an end) by the British government.

  43. 43.

    There were bombings attributed to the dissident Real IRA, but the bombs were mostly planted in London, thereby not directly affecting the local Northern Ireland population.

  44. 44.

    Clarke, Liam and Johnston, Kathry. Martin McGuinness. From Guns to Government, Mainstream Publishing Company, 2001, Ch. 19

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Curvale, C. (2018). Violence and Politics in Northern Ireland: IRA/Sinn Fein’s Strategy and the 2005 Disarmament. In: Christiano, T., Creppell, I., Knight, J. (eds) Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61070-2_11

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