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“Führer befiehl, wir folgen dir!” Charismatic Leaders in Extremist Groups

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Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions

Abstract

If we want to understand how extremist group ideologies are established, we have to comprehend the social processes which form the basis of the emergence and distribution of such beliefs. In our chapter, we present an innovative approach to examining these processes and explaining how they function: with the method of computer-based simulation of opinion formation, we develop heuristic explanatory models which help to generate new and interesting hypotheses. The focus is thereby not on individuals and their idiosyncrasies but on the dynamic mutual adaptation of beliefs in a group. These dynamics can produce an incremental establishment of “charismatic” opinion leaders and an increasing radicalization and alienation. A prototype of such a simulation model has produced promising first results which are presented and discussed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Russell Hardin does not like the term “trust ” in this context because he wants to reserve the use of this term for relations with “strong” ties (Hardin 2009, 26). Insofar we use a thin concept of trust which also includes relations which are impersonal but share important aspects with personal trust relations such as dependence or risk-taking. However, this is a terminological, not a substantial point of departure (cf. Baurmann 2010b).

  2. 2.

    The explanatory significance of such modeling is discussed in a special issue of Erkenntnis (vol. 70, no. 1, January 2009) “Economic Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?” with contributions among others by Nancy Cartwright, Till Grüne-Yanoff, Tarja Knuuttila and Robert Sugden.

  3. 3.

    For an application of this model to a “veritistic” issue cf. Betz et al. (2013).

  4. 4.

    In this prototype, we do not differentiate between the attribution of competence and veracity but subsume both under “competence”.

  5. 5.

    But in contrast to the Lehrer-Wagner model, the competence degrees are not used in our model as weights for averaging but only to select trustworthy persons.

  6. 6.

    Deffuant et al. (2002) and Deffuant (2006) refine the bounded-confidence model to study the dynamics of polarization and radicalization processes but they do not consider second-order opinions. The same applies to a recent publication by Hegselmann and Krause (2015) in which they explicitly deal with the dissemination of extremist beliefs but without including the formation of epistemic trust relations.

  7. 7.

    Technically the charismatic leader P5 is not removed from the simulation but becomes part of the mainstream.

References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Social Sciences, Heinrich-Heine-University Dusseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Michael Baurmann & Rainer Cramm

  2. Institute of Philosophy, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany

    Gregor Betz

Authors
  1. Michael Baurmann
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  2. Gregor Betz
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  3. Rainer Cramm
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

    Thomas Christiano

  2. Political Science, George Washington University, Washington, District of Columbia, USA

    Ingrid Creppell

  3. Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

    Jack Knight

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Model

The model describes the collective opinion formation in a group of n persons (G = {1, …, n}) in discrete time steps (t = 0, 1, …). Each person i ∈ G at a given point of time t has precisely one first-order opinion, x i (t) ∈ (with j = 1, …, n), and n second-order opinions, y {i,j}(t) ∈ [0.1] (with j = 1, …, n). The set V i (t) of all group members who are trusted by person i at time t is defined as:

$$ {V}_i(t):= \left\{j\in G:\left(\left|{x}_i(t)-{x}_j(t)\right|\le \epsilon\right)\wedge \left({y}_{i,j}(t)\ge {y}_{i,i}(t)\right)\right\}. $$
(1)

whereby ε ∈ ℝ is a confidence parameter. The first- and second-order opinions of a person i are modified according to the following dynamic rules

$$ {x}_i\left(t+1\right)=\frac{1}{\left|{V}_i(t)\right|}\sum_{k\in {V}_i(t)}{x}_k(t) $$
(2)
$$ {y}_{i,j}\left(t+1\right)=\frac{1}{\left|{V}_i(t)\right|}\sum_{k\in {V}_i(t)}{y}_{k,j}(t). $$
(3)

Appendix 2: Numeric Specification of the Simulation Experiments

A simulation experiment is numerically completely specified by

  • the group size n,

  • the confidence interval ε,

  • the initial first-order opinions

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}\hfill {x}_1(0)\hfill \\ {}\hfill \vdots \hfill \\ {}\hfill {x}_n(0)\hfill \end{array}\right), $$

the initial second order opinions

$$ Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{ccc}\hfill {y}_{1,1}(0)\hfill & \hfill \dots \hfill & \hfill {y}_{1,n}(0)\hfill \\ {}\hfill \vdots \hfill & \hfill \ddots \hfill & \hfill \vdots \hfill \\ {}\hfill {y}_{n,1}(0)\hfill & \hfill \dots \hfill & \hfill {y}_{n,n}(0)\hfill \end{array}\right). $$

  • Emergence of extremist groups (Fig. 1 )

    • Group size: n = 10,

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.33,

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.9\\ {}0.6\\ {}0.55\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right). $$

  • Emergence of extremist groups (Fig. 2 )

    • Group size: n = 10,

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.33,

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.9\\ {}0.6\\ {}0.55\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1& 0.1\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.9& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right). $$

  • Stability of extremist groups, endogenous stable situation with charismatic leader (Fig. 3, t = 0)

    • Group size: n = 10,

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.25,

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.6\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.7& 0.05& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.65& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6\\ {}0.3& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.9& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.3& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.8& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.3& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.8& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.3& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.9& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right). $$

  • Stability of extremist groups, without charismatic leader (Fig. 3, t >0)

    • Group size: n = 10,

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.25,

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.6\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.7& 0.05& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.65& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6\\ {}0.3& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.3& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.3& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.4& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.3& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.4& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right) $$

  • Stability of extremist groups, endogenous stable situation with charismatic leader (Fig. 4, t = 0)

    • Group size: n = 10,

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.25,

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ X(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.6\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.8\\ {}0.8\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),Y(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.7& 0.05& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.65& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6\\ {}0.7& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.9& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.7& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.8& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.7& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.8& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.7& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.9& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right). $$

  • Stability of extremist groups, without charismatic leader (Fig. 4, t > 0)

    • Group size: n = 10

    • Confidence interval: ε = 0.25

    • Initial first- and second-order opinions:

$$ \mathbf{X}(0)=\left(\begin{array}{c}0.6\\ {}0.9\\ {}0.8\\ {}0.8\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\\ {}0.5\end{array}\right),\mathbf{Y}(0)=\left(\begin{array}{cccccccccc}0.7& 0.05& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.65& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6& 0.6\\ {}0.7& 0.8& 0.45& 0.45& 0.3& 0.2& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3\\ {}0.7& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.4& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.7& 0.55& 0.5& 0.5& 0.4& 0.35& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4& 0.4\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\\ {}0.1& 0.3& 0.3& 0.3& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5& 0.5\end{array}\right). $$

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Baurmann, M., Betz, G., Cramm, R. (2018). “Führer befiehl, wir folgen dir!” Charismatic Leaders in Extremist Groups. In: Christiano, T., Creppell, I., Knight, J. (eds) Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61070-2_10

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