Levels of Computational Explanation

Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 128)

Abstract

It is widely agreed that one can fruitfully describe a computing system at various levels. Discussion typically centers on three levels: the representational level, the syntactic level, and the hardware level. I will argue that the three-level picture works well for artificial computing systems (i.e. computing systems designed and built by intelligent agents) but less well for natural computing systems (i.e. computing systems that arise in nature without design or construction by intelligent agents). Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been too hasty to extrapolate lessons drawn from artificial computation to the much different case of natural computation.

Keywords

Levels of explanation Representation Syntax The computational theory of mind Intentionality Functionalism Abstraction Bayesianism 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I presented an earlier version of this material at the 2015 annual meeting of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy, held at the University of Delaware. I am grateful to all participants for their feedback, especially Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Powers, and William Rapaport. Thanks also to Tyler Burge and Mark Greenberg for many helpful discussions of these ideas.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

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