Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

How to Identify and Assess a Foreign Policy?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Foreign Policy Analysis

  • 4592 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter focuses on an essential prerequisite for every FPA, namely, identifying a foreign policy so that it can be grasped and explained. This stage is often neglected and constitutes the Achilles’ heel of several studies, which are so preoccupied with the decision-making process that they overlook the foreign policy itself. Yet, it is crucial for analysts to carefully define the policy that they aim to explain. To define is to interpret. In other words, by defining, the researcher attributes a meaning that will, in turn, influence the type of explanation sought. This chapter focuses on five benchmarks that provide the basis for a comparative approach, including the goals, mobilized resources, instruments, process and outcomes. As this chapter makes clear, identifying benchmarks is not difficult; it is access to comparable data for research that poses problems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Alden, C., and C.R. Hughes. 2009. Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy. China Quarterly 199: 563–584.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alderson, K. 2001. Making Sense of State Socialization. Review of International Studies 27 (3): 415–433.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., and D. Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1): 33–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, S.H. 2005. The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure. International Interactions 31 (2): 117–138.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (3): 255–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aras, D. 2011. Similar Strategies, values Outcomes: year Appraisal of the Efficacy of Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy with Syria and Northern Iraq. The Journal of Strategic Studies 34 (4): 587–618.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aron, R. 1962. Peace and War Between Nations. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Art, R.J. 1996. American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force. Security Studies 5 (4): 7–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Art, R.J., and P.M. Cronin, eds. 2003. The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Art, R.J., and R. Jervis, eds. 2005. International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson Longman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ashford, E. 2017. What is Trump’s ‘America First’ Doctrine?, Cato Institute, January 31. https://www.cato.org/blog/what-trumps-america-first-doctrine.

  • Atkinson, C. 2010. Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006. Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (1): 1–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bak, D., and G. Palmer. 2010. Testing the Biden assumptions: Leader, Tenure, Age and International Conflict. Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (3): 257–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldwin, D.A. 1985. Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1989. The Paradoxes of Power. New York: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1999. The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice. International Security 24 (3): 80–107.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bapat, N.A., and B.R. Kwon. 2015. When Sanctions Are Effective? Bargaining and Enforcement Framework. International Organization 69 (1): 131–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barnett, M., and R. Duvall. 2005. Power in International Politics. International Organization 59 (1): 39–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baum, M.A. 2004a. Circling the Wagons: Soft News and Isolationism in American Public Opinion. International Studies Quarterly 48 (2): 313–338.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2004b. Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric and the Domestic Politics of hearing Costs in US Foreign Policy Crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6): 603–631.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2004c. How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope. Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2): 187–226.

    Google Scholar 

  • BBC News. 2013. David Cameron Speech: UK and the EU, January 23. http://www.BBC.com/news/UK-politics-21158316.

  • Bearce, D., and S. Bondanella. 2007. Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization and Member – State Interest Convergence. International Organization 61 (4): 703–733.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bendor, J., T. Moe, and K. Shotts. 2001. Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program. American Political Science Review 95 (1): 169–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bickerton, C. 2010. In Functionality had Foreign Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda? European Integration 32 (2): 213–227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Billings, R.S., and C.F. Hermann. 1998. Problem Identification in Sequential Policy Decision Makings. In Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. D.A. Sylvan and J. Voss, 53–79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blanchard, M.F., and N.M. Ripsman. 2008. A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft. Foreign Policy Analysis 4 (4): 371–398.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blechman, B.M., and S.S. Kaplan. 1978. Strength Without War: US Armed Force as a Political Instrument. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolks, S.M., and D. Al-Sowayel. 2000. How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Political Research Quarterly 53 (2): 241–265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowen, M.G. 1987. The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas gold Decision Errors? Academy of Management Review 12 (2): 52–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braithwaite, A. 2005. Location, Location, Location...Identifying Conflict Hotspots. International Interactions 31 (3): 251–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bremer, S.A. 1993. Advancing the Scientific Study of War. International Interactions 19 (1): 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brockner, J., and J.Z. Rubin. 1985. Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts. New York: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, R. 2002. Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works and When. Security Studies 1 (1): 11–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B., and A. Smith. 2007. Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2): 251–284.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueno de Mesquita, B., and A. Smith. 2009. A Political Economy of Aid. International Organization 63 (2): 309–340.

    Google Scholar 

  • Busby, J.W. 2007. Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry. International Studies Quarterly 51 (2): 247–275.

    Google Scholar 

  • Callahan, D. 1998. Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict. New York: Hill and Wang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cao, X. 2009. Network of Intergovernmental Organizations and Convergence in Domestic Economic Policies. International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1095–1130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carment, D.P., P. James, and Z. Taydas. 2006. Who Intervenes?: Ethnic Conflict and Interstate Crisis. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, C. 2007. Setting the Advocacy Agenda. International Studies Quarterly 51 (1): 99–120.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carter, D.B. 2015. The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups. International Studies Quarterly 59 (3): 461–476.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cederman, L.E., and K.S. Gleditsch. 2004. Conquest and Regime Change: year Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democratic Peace. International Studies Quarterly 48 (3): 603–629.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chapnick, A. 2000. The Canadian Middle Power Myth. International Journal 55 (2): 188–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Checkel, J.T. 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. International Organization 55 (3): 553–588.

    Google Scholar 

  • Checkel, J.T. 2003. Going Native in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions. Comparative Political Studies 36 (2): 209–231.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chollet, D. 2016. Obama’s Red Line, Revisited, PoliticoMagazine, http://www.Politico.com/Magazine/story/2016/07/Obama-Syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059.

  • Christensen, T.J. 1996. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino – American Conflict, 1947–1958. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cladi, L., and M. Webber. 2011. Italian Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Period: A Neoclassical Realist Approach. European Security 20 (2): 205–219.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, D.H., T. Nordström, and W. Reed. 2008. Substitution Is in the Variance: Resources and Foreign Policy Choice. American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 763–773.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, M., J.G. March, and J.P. Olsen. 1972. A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice. Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1): 1–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colaresi, M.P., and W.R. Thompson. 2002. Strategic Rivalries, capabilities Conflict and Crisis Escalation. Journal of Peace Research 39 (3): 263–287.

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins, S. 2009. Can America Financial Freedom? Assessing US Democracy Promotion through Economic Statecraft. Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (4): 367–389.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, A.B. 2011. Challenging Contemporary Notion of Middle Power Influence. Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (3): 317–336.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford, T.W. 2011. Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics. International Security 35 (4): 155–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crumm, E. 1995. The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics. Journal of Peace Research 32 (1): 313–330.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cull, N.J. 2008. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Danforth, N. 2016. Thank Goodness There’s No Obama Doctrine, Foreign Policy, January 12. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/12/thank-goodness-theres-no-obama-doctrine/.

  • Dannreuther, R. 2011. Understanding the Middle East Peace Process: A Historical Institutionalist Approach. European Journal of International Relations 17 (2): 187–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daoudi, M.S., and M.S. Dajani. 1983. Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dashti-Gibson, J., P. Davis, and B. Radcliff. 1997. On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis. American Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 608–618.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeWitt, D.B. 2000. Directions in Canada’s International Security Policy. International Journal 55 (2): 167–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diez, T. 2005. Constructing the Self and Changing Others. Millennium 33 (3): 613–636.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downes, A.B., and J. Monten. 2013. Forced to be Free? Why Foreign Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization. International Security 37 (4): 90–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downes, A.B., and L.A. O’Rourke. 2016. You can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate relations. International Security 41 (2): 43–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, G.W., and D.M. Rocke. 1994. Conflict, Agency and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal – Agent Problem Goes to War. American Journal of Political Science 38 (2): 362–380.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doxey, M. 1972. International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa. International Organization 26 (3): 527–550.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreher, A., P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Thiele. 2008. Does US AID buy one General Assembly Votes? A Gregated Analysis. Public Choice 136 (1): 139–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyer, D.R. 2010. One Outcome Leads to Another: after Spirals and the Sino-Vietnamese War. Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (4): 297–315.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyer, I. and N. Popescu. 2014. Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?, European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.files.ethz.ch/ISN/186485/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.PDF.

  • Drezner, D. 1999. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?, Foreign Affairs, July/August. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy.

  • Drury, A.C. 1998. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Journal of Peace Research 35 (7): 497–509.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drury, A.C., and Y. Li. 2006. US Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights. Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2): 307–324.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duchêne, F. 1972. Europe’s Role in World Peace. London: Fontana.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dulin, A., and J. Merckaert. 2009. Gains: Who Benefits from the Crime? Paris: CCFD Earth Solidarity.

    Google Scholar 

  • Durward, R., and L. Marsden, eds. 2016. Religion, Conflict and Military Intervention. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Early, B.R. 2011. Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions. Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (4): 381–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Alliance and Trade with Sanctioned States. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (3): 547–572.

    Google Scholar 

  • East, M.A. 1973. Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models. World Politics 25 (4): 556–576.

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterly, W. 2006. White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: Penguin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elliott, K.A., and G.C. Hufbauer. 1999. Same Song, Same chorus? Economic Sanctions in the 1990’s. American Economic Review 23 (1): 403–408.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eyre, D., and M. Suchman. 1996. Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons. In The Culture of National Security, ed. P. Katzenstein, 79–113. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fearon, J.D. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577–592.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3): 379–414.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002. Selection Effects and Deterrence. International Interactions 28 (1): 5–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferris, W. 1973. The Power Capabilities of Nation-States: International Conflict and War. Lexington: Lexington Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore, M. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore, M., and K. Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52 (4): 887–917.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fioretos, O. 2011. Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. International Organization 65 (2): 367–399.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fordham, B.O. 2011. Who Wants to Be a Major Power. Journal of Peace Research 48 (5): 587–603.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fordham, B.O., and V. Asal. 2007. Billiard Ball or Snowflakes? Major Power Prestige and the International Diffusion of Institutions and Practices. International Studies Quarterly 51 (1): 31–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankel, J. 1970. The National Interest. New York: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freedman, L. 1989. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freyburg, T. 2015. Transgovernmental Networks as year Apprenticeship in Democracy? Socialization into Democratic Governance through Cross-national Activities. International Studies Quarterly 59 (1): 59–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frieden, J. 1988. Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940. International Organization 42 (1): 59–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gecelovsky, P. 2009. Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy. Canadian Foreign Policy 15 (1): 77–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gehring, T., and E. Ruffing. 2008. When Arguments Prevail Over Power. Global Environmental Politics 8 (2): 123–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • George, A.L. 1991. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • George, A.L., and R. Keohane. 1980. The Concept of National Interests : Uses and Limitations. In Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy, ed. A. George, 217–237. Boulder: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giumelli, F. 2011. Coercing, Constraining and Signaling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War. Colchester: ECPR Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2016. The Obama Doctrine, The Atlantic, April. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.

  • Goldsmith, B., Y. Horiuchi, and T. Inoguchi. 2005. American Foreign Policy and Global Opinion. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (3): 408–429.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldstein, J. 1988. Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy. International Organization 42 (1): 179–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenhill, B. 2010. The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms. International Studies Quarterly 54 (1): 127–145.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guzzini, S. 2004. The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 10 (4): 533–568.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haas, E.B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, R. 1997. Moral Authority as a Power Resource. International Organization 51 (4): 591–622.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampson, F.O., and D.F. Oliver. 1998. Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine. International Journal 53 (3): 379–406.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansel, M., and K. Oppermann. 2016. Counterfactual Reasoning in Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of German Nonparticipation in the Libya Intervention of 2011. Foreign Policy Analysis 12 (2): 109–127.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey, F.P. 2012. Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heng, Y.-K. 2002. Unraveling the War on Terrorism: A Risk – Management Exercise in War Clothing? Security Dialogue 33 (2): 227–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hensel, P.R. 1994. One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816–1986. Journal of Peace Research 31 (3): 281–298.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1999. An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry. Conflict Management and Peace Science 17 (4): 175–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2002. The More Things Change... Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict. Conflict Management and Peace Science 19 (1): 27–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herek, G.M., I.L. Janis, and P. Huth. 1987. Decision Making during International Crisis: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (2): 203–226.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, M.G. 1980. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders. International Studies Quarterly 24 (1): 7–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, C.F. 1990. Changing race: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly 24 (1): 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, M.G. 2001. How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework. International Studies Review 3 (1): 47–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, M.G., and C.F. Hermann. 1989. Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry. International Studies Quarterly 33 (4): 361–387.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, C.F., J.G. Stein, B. Sundelius, and S.G. Walker. 2001a. Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions. International Studies Review 3 (2): 133–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hermann, M.G., T. Preston, B. Korany, and T.M. Shaw. 2001b. Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals. International Studies Review 3 (2): 83–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill, C. 1990. European Foreign Policy: Power block, Civilian Model – or Flop? In The Evolution of year International Actor, ed. R. Rummel, 31–55. Boulder: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirschman, A.O. 1980. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsh, M. 2011. Obama Has No Doctrine. The Atlantic, March 29. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/obama-has-no-doctrine/73171/.

  • Hoagland, J. 1994. Why Clinton Improvises, Washington Post, p. C1, September 25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hufbauer, G. 2007. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hufbauer, G., J. Schott, and K. Elliott. 1990. Economic Sanctions Revisited: Supplemental Case Histories. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • IGIHE. 2012. Kagame: Rwanda’s Priorities Focus on Development, Not Illicit Foreign Ventures, August 30, http://en.igihe.com/politics/Kagame-Rwanda-s-priorities-focus-on-development.html.

  • Izumikawa, Y. 2013. To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics. Security Studies 22 (3): 498–531.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, R. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jakobsen, P.V. 2012. Reinterpreting Libya’s WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Divide Carrot-Coercion. Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (4): 489–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Janis, I.L. 1982. Escalation of the Viet Nam War: How Could It Happen? In Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, ed. L. Irving, 2nd ed., 97–130. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M., and S.P. Paldam. 2006. Can the New Aid-Growth Models be Replicated? Public Choice 127 (1): 147–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joachim, J. 2003. Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs and Women’s Rights. International Studies Quarterly 47 (2): 247–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, C. 1984. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. Belmont: Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaarbo, J. 2003. Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas. International Studies Review 5 (2): 156–163.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaempfer, W.H., and A.D. Lowenberg. 1988. The Theory of International Economic Sanctions. American Economic Review 78 (4): 786–793.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1999. Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 37–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, H. 1966. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplowitz, D.R. 1998. Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: US Sanctions against Cuba. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katzenstein, P.J. 1976. International Relations and Domestic Structures. International Organization 31 (4): 1–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1977. Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy. International Organization 31 (4): 879–920.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelley, J.W. 2004. International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions. International Organization 58 (3): 425–457.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, P. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R.O., and J. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kevlihan, R., K. DeRouen Jr., and G. Biglaiser. 2014. Is US Humanitarian Aid Primarily Based on Need or self-interest? International Studies Quarterly 58 (4): 839–854.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindleberger, C. 1981. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy. International Studies Quarterly 25 (2): 242–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • King, G., R.O. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingdon, J.W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirshner, J. 1995. Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China. European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 53–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klotz, A. 1995. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knecht, T., and M.S. Weatherford. 2006. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The courses of Presidential Decision Making. International Studies Quarterly 50 (3): 705–727.

    Google Scholar 

  • König, T., and J. Slapin. 2004. Bringing Parliaments Back In. Journal of Theoretical Politics 16 (3): 357–393.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krasner, S. 1977. US Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness. International Organization 31 (4): 635–671.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krebs, R.R., and P.T. Jackson. 2007. Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric. European Journal of International Relations 13 (1): 35–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krotz, U. 2010. Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France-Germany and Beyond (1963–2009). Foreign Policy Analysis 6 (2): 147–185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuusisto, R. 1998. Framing the Wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Definitions of the Western Power Leaders in Action. Journal of Peace Research 35 (5): 603–620.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuziemko, I., and E. Werker. 2006. How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Journal of Political Economy 114 (5): 905–930.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lahiri, S., and P. Raimondos-Möller. 2000. Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation. Economic Journal 110 (462): C62–C79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lai, B. 2003. Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post – Cold War Period, 1991–1996. Journal of Peace Research 40 (1): 103–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lai, B., and D. Morey. 2006. Impact of Regime Type of the Influence of US Foreign Aid. Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (4): 385–404.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lam, S.L. 1990. Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals: A Critical assessment. Japan and the World Economy 2 (3): 239–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamborn, A.C. 1991. The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France and Germany. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laurance, E.J. 1990. Events Data and Policy Analysis. Policy Sciences 23 (1): 111–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lebow, R.N., and J. Gross Stein. 1989. Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics 41 (2): 208–224.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lepgold, J., and T. McKeown. 1995. Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis. Political Science Quarterly 110 (3): 369–384.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, D.H. 2016. When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral intervention on Election Results. International Studies Quarterly 60 (2): 189–202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, J.S. 2008. Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of George Alexander. Political Psychology 29 (4): 537–552.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lieber, R.J. 2012. Power and Willpower in The American Future: Why The United States Is Not Destined To Decline. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linden, R.H. 2000. Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the Puzzle of Peace. International Studies Quarterly 44 (1): 121–145.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———., ed. 2002. Norms and Nannies. The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindsay, J.M. 1986. Trade Sanctions have Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination. International Studies Quarterly 30 (2): 153–173.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lobell, S., N. Ripsman, and J. Taliaferro. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lundborg, P. 1998. Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange. Economics & Politics 10 (2): 127–142.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mabee, B. 2011. Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: the Origins of the National Security Council Revisited. Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (1): 27–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maizels, A., and M.K. Nissanke. 1984. Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries. World Development 12 (9): 879–900.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandel, R. 2006. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maoz, Z. 1989. Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1990. Framing the National Interests: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings. World Politics 43 (1): 77–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, L.A. 1992. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mastanduno, M., D. Lake, and G. Ikenberry. 1989. Towards a Realist Theory of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly 33 (4): 457–474.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGillivray, F., and A.C. Stam. 2004. Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy and the Duration of Economic Sanction. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2): 154–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meernik, J. 1996. United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy. Journal of Peace Research 33 (4): 391–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meernik, J., E. Krueger, and S.C. Poe. 1998. Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War. The Journal of Politics 60 (1): 63–85.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, J.E. 1983. Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Election of 1949. Diplomatic History 7 (1): 35–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mintz, A., and S. Redd. 2003. Framing Effects in International Relations. Synthesis 135 (1): 193–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, S.M., and B.C. Prins. 1999. Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 169–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitzen, J. 2005. Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres. American Political Science Review 99 (3): 401–417.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, P.M. 1977. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Los Angeles: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, C.T., and G. Palmer. 1997. A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation. International Interactions 22 (3): 225–244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, L.C., and V. Schwebach. 1995. Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. International Interactions 21 (3): 247–263.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgenthau, H. 1948. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———., 2005 [1948], Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McGraw-Hill Education; 7th edition.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morin, J.F. 2011. The Life-Cycle of Transnational Issues: Lessons from the Access to Medicines Controversy. Global Society 25 (2): 227–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morin, J.F., and G. Gagne. 2007. Explaining the Lateralism Paradox of the Investment Plan. International Journal of Political Economy 36 (1): 53–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morin, J.F., and R. Gold. 2010. Consensus-Seeking, Distrust and Rhetorical Action. European Journal of International Relations 16 (4): 563–587.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. An Integrated Model for Legal Transplantation: The Diffusion of Intellectual Property Law in Developing Countries. International Studies Quarterly 58 (4): 781–792.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller, H.M. 2004. Arguing, Bargaining and All That. European Journal of International Relations 10 (3): 395–435.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nadelmann, E. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization 44 (4): 479–526.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nasra, S. 2011. Governance in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring Small State Influence. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (2): 164–180.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newnham, A. 2000. More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkage in German Ostpolitik from Bismark to Kohl. International Studies Quarterly 44 (1): 73–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nicolaidis, K., and R. Howse. 2003. This is My EUtopia...: Narrative as Power. In Integration in an Expanding European Union, ed. J.H.H.H. Weiler, I. Begg, and J. Peterson, 341–366. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nooruddin, I. 2002. Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy. International Interactions 28 (1): 59–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nye, J.S. 1990. The Changing Nature of World Power. Political Science Quarterly 105 (2): 177–192.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs 1 (2): 192–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 94–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nye, J. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Onuf, N. 2001. Speaking of Policy. In Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, ed. V. Kubalkova, 77–95. Armonk: Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ozkececi-Taner, B. 2006. Reviewing the Literature on Sequential/Dynamic Foreign Policy Decision Making. International Studies Review 8 (5): 545–554.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmer, G., S.B. Wohlander, and T.C. Morgan. 2002. Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability. Journal of Peace Research 39 (1): 5–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pape, R.A. 1997. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security 22 (2): 90–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paquin, J. 2010. A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paquin, J., and P. Beauregard. 2015. US transatlantic leadership after Iraq. Cooperation and Conflict 50 (4): 510–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Payne, R.A. 2001. Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction. European Journal of International Relations 7 (1): 37–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peksen, D., and A.C. Drury. 2010. Coercive Corrosive Gold: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. International Interactions 36 (3): 240–264.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pelc, K.J. 2010. Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its Role in US Trade Policy, 1975–2000. International Organization 64 (1): 65–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pevehouse, J.C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside – International Organizations and Democratization. International Organization 56 (3): 515–549.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, D.L. 2012. Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. 1993. When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change. World Politics 45 (4): 595–628.

    Google Scholar 

  • Poe, S.C., and J. Meernik. 1995. US Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. Journal of Peace Research 32 (4): 399–411.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posen, B.R. 1993. Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power. International Security 18 (2): 80–124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell, C. 2004. The Craft of Diplomacy. Wilson Quarterly 28 (3): 60–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prins, B.C. 2001. Domestic Politics and Interstate Disputes: Examining US MID Involvement and Reciprocation, 1870–1992. International Interactions 26 (4): 411–438.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rai, K.B. 1980. Foreign aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly, 1967–1976. Journal of Peace Research 17 (3): 269–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., and A. Subramanian. 2008. Aid and Growth. Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4): 643–665.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ray, J., and A. Vural. 1986. Power Disparities and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes. International Interactions 12 (4): 315–342.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reeve, R. 2002. Policing International Trade in Endangered Species, The CITES Treaty and Compliance. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Regan, P. 2000. Substituting Policies during US Interventions in Internal Conflicts: A Little of This, a Little of That. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (1): 90–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reiter, D. 1999. Military Strategy and the Outbreak of International Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (3): 366–387.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ripsman, N.M., J.W. Taliaferro, and S.E. Lobell. 2016. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Risse, T. 2000. Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics. International Organization 54 (1): 1–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Risse-Kappen, T. 1994. Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalition, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War. International Organization 48 (2): 185–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roper, S.T., and L.A. Barria. 2007. Gatekeeping versus Allocating in Foreign Assistance. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2): 285–304.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rose, G. 1998. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51 (1): 144–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosecrance, R., and A.A. Stein, eds. 1993. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenau, J.N. 1968. Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy gold Field? International Studies Quarterly 12 (3): 296–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1980. The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. London: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenau, J.N., and G.H. Ramsey. 1975. External and Internal types of Foreign Policy Behavior, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign. Policy Studies 3: 245–262.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russett, B., and J.R. Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schafer, M., and S. Crichlow. 2002. The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making. International Studies Quarterly 46 (1): 45–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schimmelfennig, F. 2000. International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment. European Journal of International Relations 6 (1): 109–139.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55 (1): 47–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier. 2004. Governance by Conditionality. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 661–679.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schimmelfennig, F. 1998. NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation. Security Studies 8 (2): 198–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, C.J. 2011. Weak States and Internationalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations. International Studies Quarterly 55 (2): 331–355.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schraeder, P., S. Hook, and B. Taylor. 1998. Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flow. World Politics 50 (2): 294–323.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schrodt, P.A. 1995. Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis. In Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, ed. L. Neack, J. Hey, and P. Haney, 145–166. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schultz, K. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict Over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. International Organization 64 (2): 281–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweller, R.L. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sechser, T.S. 2010. Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power. International Organization 64 (3): 627–660.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sechser, T.S., and M. Fuhrmann. 2016. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sell, S.K. 2003. Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge and. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Senese, P.D. 1996. Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1): 133–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2005. Territory, Contiguity and International Conflict. American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 769–779.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simmons, B., F. Dobbin, and G. Garrett. 2006. Introduction: The International dissemination of Liberalism. International Organization 60 (4): 781–810.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sjursen, H., ed. 2006. What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 170–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slapin, J. 2006. Who Is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences. European Union Politics 7 (1): 61–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, S. 1986. Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview. Review of International Studies 12 (1): 13–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snow, A.R., and R.D. Benford. 1998. Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. International Social Movement Research 1 (2): 197–217.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snow, N., and P.M. Taylor, eds. 2009. Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J. 1991. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, R.C., H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin. 2002 [1962]. Foreign Policy Decision Making. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Staw, B.M. 1981. The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action. Academy of Management Review 6 (4): 577–587.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steele, B. 2007. Making Words Matter: The Asian Tsunami, Darfur and Reflexive Discourse in International Politics. International Studies Quarterly 51 (4): 901–925.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strand, J.R., and J.P. Tuman. 2012. International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission. Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (4): 409–430.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sullivan, P.L., B.F. Tessman, and X. Li. 2011. US Military Aid and Container State Cooperation. Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (3): 275–294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taber, C. 1989. Power Capability Indexes in the Third World. In Power in World Politics, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, ed. R. Stoll and M. Ward, 29–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taliaferro, J.W. 2004. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarrow, S. 1989. Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements and Cycles of Protest. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Telo, M. 2007. Europe: A Civilian Power? New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomz, M. 2007. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. International Organization 61 (4): 821–840.

    Google Scholar 

  • Trumball, W.N., and H.J. Wall. 1994. Estimating Aid – Allocation Criteria with Panel Data. Economic Journal 104 (425): 876–882.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuchman, B. 1962. The Guns of August. New York: Ballantine Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ungerer, C. 2007. The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy. Australian Journal of Politics & History 53 (4): 538–551.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Evera, S. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vasquez, J.A. 1995. Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction or Territoriality. Journal of Peace Research 32 (3): 277–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Furstenberg, G.M. 1991. Scoring the Success of Sanctions. Open Economies Review 2 (3): 305–313.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R.H. 2000. Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3): 469–484.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang, T.Y. 1999. US Foreign Aid and a Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 199–210.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weldes, J. 1996. Constructing National Interests. European Journal of International Relations 2 (3): 275–318.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1999. Constructing National Interest: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Minneapolis. Minneapoli: Minnesota University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, B. 1999. The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis. European Journal of International Relations 5 (1): 37–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolfers, A. 1962. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zakaria, F. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zelikow, P. 1994. Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again. International Security 18 (4): 143–171.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zeng, K. 2002. Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America’s Aggressive Unilateral Trade Policy. International Studies Quarterly 46 (1): 93–115.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Université Laval, QC, Canada

    Jean-Frédéric Morin & Jonathan Paquin

Authors
  1. Jean-Frédéric Morin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jonathan Paquin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Morin, JF., Paquin, J. (2018). How to Identify and Assess a Foreign Policy?. In: Foreign Policy Analysis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61003-0_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation