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How the Gulf Cooperation Council Responded to the Arab Spring

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Abstract

The uprising that erupted at the end of 2010 and spread to most of the Arab countries did not bring spring to the Middle East and North Africa region, as it was hoped at the beginning. International, regional, and local powers have all been tested in their sincerity of supporting the will of the people, their social and political demands and choices vis-à-vis their own national and global interests. After eight years, there is no actor or institution that is able to bring spring to the region; however, history records all the efforts or sets put up by all the actors. Despite the fact that its reputation falls behind some of its members and also that it suffers from internal crisis, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a subregional intergovernmental organization started to play more and more of a significant role diplomatically and economically in the region, especially after the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, in view of the challenges posed by regional unrest and the history of the organization, it is unlikely the organization will play a more active role. This study attempts to make a critical assessment of the GCC’s performance as a subregional organization during the regional turmoil and afterwards.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The motivating factors behind the foundation of the GCC were related to security. Saudi Arabia called for the weapons for the Gulf’s armed forces to be provided by a single supplier in order to have coordinated armies at all levels, and also called for a the deployment of a joint military force when necessary. Oman called for the creation of a joint naval force to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The last proposal was a call to address common regional threats directed at the Gulf states. These three proposals were shared before the official establishment of the GCC, although not mentioned in the charter (Al Hassan, 2014, p. 11).

  2. 2.

    For a detailed account of GCC economic developments see: Khalid Shams Abdulqader, GCC’s Economic Cooperation and Integration: Achievements and Hurdles, in Gulf Cooperation Council’s Challenges and Prospects, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 31 March 2014, pp. 34–46 and Houcine Boughanmi, Ahmed Al-Shammakhi,and Alessandro Antimiani, Deeper Integration or Wider Integration?: the case of Gulf Cooperation Council, Journal of Economic Integration 31(2): 206–233. June 2016.

  3. 3.

    For a summary of GCC common actions, see: The Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf. Secretariat General. Information Affairs Sector. The GCC: Process and Achievement/Information Affairs Sector. 8th Ed. Riyadh: Secretariat General, 2014.

  4. 4.

    GCC troops dispatched to Bahrain to maintain order. (2011, March 15). Al Arabiya. Retrieved from https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/14/141445.html

  5. 5.

    Bahrain ‘asks for Gulf help’ (2011, March 14). Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/bahrain/2011/03/201131454020610721.html

  6. 6.

    Gulf states launch $20 billion fund for Oman and Bahrain. (2011, March 10). Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-fund/gulf-states-launch-20-billion-fund-for-oman-and-bahrain-idUSTRE7294B120110310

  7. 7.

    GCC statement: Gulf countries response to letter from Yemen president. (2015, March 26). The National. Retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/uae/gcc-statement-gulf-countries-response-to-letter-from-yemen-president-1.4831

  8. 8.

    UN: Yemen faces world’s worst cholera outbreak. (2017, June 25). Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/yemen-faces-world-worst-cholera-outbreak-170625041932829.html

  9. 9.

    Saudi king congratulates Egypt’s new interim president. (2013, July 4). Al Arabiya. Retrieved from http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/07/04/Saudi-king-congratulates-Egypt-new-interim-president.html

  10. 10.

    Gulf Arab states close Syria embassies: GCC. (2012, March 16). Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-gcc/gulf-arab-states-close-syria-embassies-gcc-idUSBRE82F08V20120316

  11. 11.

    UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain recall their ambassadors from Qatar. (2014, March 5). Gulf News. Retrieved from http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-recall-their-ambassadors-from-qatar-1.1299586

  12. 12.

    Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain cut ties to Qatar. (2017, June 5). Al Jazeera.Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/saudi-arabia-uae-egypt-bahrain-cut-ties-qatar-170605031700062.html

  13. 13.

    Qatar: Decision to cut ties violates our sovereignty. (2017, June 6). Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/qatar-decision-cut-ties-violates-sovereignty-170605213912421.html

  14. 14.

    What are the 13 demands given to Qatar? (2017, June 23). Gulf News. Retrieved from http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatar-crisis/what-are-the-13-demands-given-to-qatar-1.2048118

  15. 15.

    Gulf States must tackle Muslim Brotherhood threat: UAE. (2012, October 8). Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-brotherhood/gulf-states-must-tackle-muslim-brotherhood-threat-uae-idUSBRE8970SD20121008

  16. 16.

    Muslim Brotherhood cited in Oman plot. (1994, August 30). UPI. Retrieved from http://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/08/30/Muslim-Brotherhood-cited-in-Oman-plot/6767778219200/

  17. 17.

    Leaked UAE emails: Saudi Arabia came close to ‘conquering’ Qatar. (2017, September 17). Middle East Eye. Retrieved from http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-came-close-conquering-qatar-new-leaked-emails-show-1491607860

  18. 18.

    Trump claims he can mediate ‘quick deal’ to end Gulf crisis. (2017, September 7). Middle East Eye. Retrieved from http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-kuwait-emir-sabah-highlight-qatar-dispute-assad-and-palestine-1848079796

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Akkaya, G.N. (2019). How the Gulf Cooperation Council Responded to the Arab Spring. In: Çakmak, C., Özçelik, A.O. (eds) The World Community and the Arab Spring. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60985-0_6

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