Abstract
Kuwait’s foreign policy in the Arab Spring was to maintain its support of various Arab governments financially and diplomatically and appear to be active within the Gulf region and beyond. Its response was geared towards foreign policy by press release, since the moves it made were less substantial than the headlines indicated. Previously, its status as a small Gulf state did not act as a limit to its foreign policy options, but its history has made it wary of overt involvement in events that could spill over into its domestic sphere and produce unmanageable results.
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- 1.
The book’s publication date indicates that it reached the bookshelves before the August invasion. In such a perfect moment, it clearly captures the historical trend of Kuwaiti foreign policy up to that time.
- 2.
These are in pro-Shia documentaries where they are hoping to demonstrate their resistance to Saudi pressure. This phenomenon has also been noted in Qatar and Bahrain.
- 3.
A formal security pact was not a part of the original GCC Charter and only in 2000 did the majority of the nations in the GCC propose and approve such an agreement. Kuwait, as of 2015, had not signed the agreement, citing concerns about sovereignty and potential overreach by other GCC member states that have a stricter Muslim Sharia interpretation.
- 4.
Kuwait also appears at times to have a foreign policy of ensuring that Saudi Arabia is not able to dominate the GCC and the decision-making process. There had already been unprecedented open rebuke from Saudi Arabia for Kuwait’s token response to the Bahraini crisis, and Kuwait would certainly be in a position to be a spoiler and denier of Saudi plans.
- 5.
One Kuwaiti parliamentarian did suggest the renaming of a street, Hassan Al-Banna, to something not associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. While the reality of the passion cannot be denied, it is likely that this very vocal expression was allowed to be given free rein in order to provide some headline attention and signal national anger. The fact that the street remains named after the Muslim Brotherhood founder shows the negotiable nature of this complaint.
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News & Media
al-Najjar, A., & al-Najjar, A.-R. (2011, May 16). Kuwait “Will Not Allow” Iranian Ships to Approach Bahraini Coast. Kuna News Agency (Kuwait Government Run).
Blair, D. (2011, April 19). Bahrain Dilemma Exposes Tensions. Financial Times.
Consulate Talks Kuwaiti Citizen Out of Jihadi Motive. (2014, April 5). Arab Times.
Envoy Delivers Message from Kuwaiti Emir to Syrian President. (2009, September 3). BBC Monitoring Middle East-Political.
GCC Chief Condemns Iran’s Continuing Interference with GCC Affairs. (2011, April 2). Kuna News Agency (Kuwait Government Run).
Kuwaiti Support for Bahrain Praised. (2011, April 6). Bahrain News Agency (BNA).
Murphy, B., & Khalifa, R. (2011, March 15). Offensive Frightens Many in Bahrain. Charleston Daily Mail.
Prime Minister Discusses Ties with Syrian F.M. (2009, August 28). Right Vision News.
Syria Approves $105.7m Kuwaiti Financial Loan. (2010, December 21). Daily the Pak Banker.
Teargas Used on Protesters. (2011, February 21). The Gold Coast Bulletin (Australia).
Toumi, H. (2011, February 25). Stateless Protesters to Be Freed. Gulf News (United Arab Emirates).
hToumi, H. (2013, March 13). Kuwait Emir Stresses Gulf Unity. Gulf News (United Arab Emirates).
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Bowden, J. (2019). Foreign Policy by Stealth: Kuwait and the Arab Spring. In: Çakmak, C., Özçelik, A.O. (eds) The World Community and the Arab Spring. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60985-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60985-0_17
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