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Clubs, Matching, etc.

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Abstract

We provide a cursory overview of club models, which also deal with an endogenous partition of the population into groups. We identify common and distinguishing features between club models and household models. We further elaborate on two-sided pairwise matching, a special case of group formation in the absence of commodity markets. The effect of active commodity markets on equilibrium existence and welfare is investigated.

  • Club models and household models are not nested.

  • The general framework encompasses matching, assignment games and hedonic coalitions.

  • In the presence of active commodity markets, stable matching and market clearing need not obtain simultaneously.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Hans Gersbach

  2. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    Hans Haller

Authors
  1. Hans Gersbach
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  2. Hans Haller
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Correspondence to Hans Gersbach .

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Gersbach, H., Haller, H. (2017). Clubs, Matching, etc.. In: Groups and Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60516-6_9

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