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Related Work

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Abstract

Becker considers social and economic traits of households and families in a model of mating and matching, without consumption externalities. Collective rationality in the sense of Chiappori allows for consumption externalities. Various alternative approaches and pertinent empirical findings are discussed.

  • We contrast various approaches.

  • We provide evidence against the unitary modeling of households.

  • We provide evidence for and against collective rationality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The equilibrium analysis of Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) is motivated by Becker’s approach, views marriage and labor markets as mutually related and models marriage as an exchange of household labor between spouses.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Hans Gersbach

  2. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    Hans Haller

Authors
  1. Hans Gersbach
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  2. Hans Haller
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Correspondence to Hans Gersbach .

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Gersbach, H., Haller, H. (2017). Related Work. In: Groups and Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60516-6_10

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