Becker considers social and economic traits of households and families in a model of mating and matching, without consumption externalities. Collective rationality in the sense of Chiappori allows for consumption externalities. Various alternative approaches and pertinent empirical findings are discussed.
We contrast various approaches.
We provide evidence against the unitary modeling of households.
We provide evidence for and against collective rationality.
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