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  • Hans GersbachEmail author
  • Hans Haller
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Abstract

Becker considers social and economic traits of households and families in a model of mating and matching, without consumption externalities. Collective rationality in the sense of Chiappori allows for consumption externalities. Various alternative approaches and pertinent empirical findings are discussed.

  • We contrast various approaches.

  • We provide evidence against the unitary modeling of households.

  • We provide evidence for and against collective rationality.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Management, Technology and EconomicsETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

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