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Flags of Convenience and Port State Control

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Book cover Seaports in International Law

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Abstract

Globalization had a strong impact not only on seaports, but also on national merchant fleets.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Chapter 3.

  2. 2.

    The International Transport Workers’ Federation, a major transnational trade union which is very active in the maritime and port sectors, lists as States and territories keeping convenience registers Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Gibraltar, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands Antilles, North Korea, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga and Vanuatu, but also Germany and France for their additional registers (International Transport Workers’ Federation 2016). The most well-known convenience registers are the Panama (BBC 2014) and the Liberia one (LISCR 2016).

  3. 3.

    See Chap. 11.

  4. 4.

    Art. 94, par. 3–4.

  5. 5.

    Art. 247, par. 1.

  6. 6.

    Chapter 8.

  7. 7.

    Dotinga and Kwiatkowska (editors) (2001), p. 40; FAO (2002), Chap. 4; Sands (2012), p. 410; Zwinge (2011).

  8. 8.

    The Panama Maritime Authority claims that “the Panama Registry is in charge of managing the world’s largest ship registry, with over 8000 registered vessels which accounts for 218 million GT [gross tonns], representing 18% of the world fleet” (Panama Maritime Authority 2015).

  9. 9.

    International Maritime Organization (2016).

  10. 10.

    International Chamber of Shipping (2016).

  11. 11.

    The tanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast of Britanny on March 16, 1978 (The International Tankers Owners Pollution Federation Limited 2014). Brittany was so unlucky to be affected also by the sinking of the tanker Erika on December 12, 1999 (Euronews 2012). Finally, the tanker prestige sank off the Spanish Bay of Biscay on November 19, 2002 (BBC 2002). All the three ships were flying a flag of convenience, and the Erika had also been certified by the prestigious Italian corporation RINA (RINA Services s.p.a., 2016), despite its old age (Chrisafis 2008).

  12. 12.

    Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom West Germany. Since 1991 Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, and Slovenia also adhered.

  13. 13.

    Paris MoU (2016a).

  14. 14.

    International Maritime Organization (1991).

  15. 15.

    Argentine Naval Prefecture (2012). The Parties to the Viña del Mar Agreement are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

  16. 16.

    Tokyo MOU (2016). The Parties to the Tokyo MoU are Australia, Canada, Chile, China (including Hong Kong), Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, South Korea, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. Given the traffic volumes of the Asian seaports (see above, Chap. 11), the Tokyo MoU is probably the most important one in practical terms.

  17. 17.

    CMOU (2010). The Parties to the Caribbean MoU are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, the Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Bermuda, Dominica, Great Britain (for the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands), Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands (including Curaçao), Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

  18. 18.

    Mediterranean MoU (2014). The Parties to the Mediterranean MoU are Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (as Palestinian Authority).

  19. 19.

    Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (2014).

  20. 20.

    Abuja MoU (2012). The Parties to the Abuja MoU are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Senegal, South Africa, and Togo.

  21. 21.

    Black Sea MOU (2016). The Parties to the Black Sea MoU are Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

  22. 22.

    Riyadh MoU on PSC (2015). The Parties to the Riyadh MoU are Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.

  23. 23.

    United States Coast Guard (2016).

  24. 24.

    Setting aside all the other oddities detected in PSC MoUs, the prevailing doctrine holds that executive agreements are pleno jure international agreements, which should be registered with the United Nations: Brandon (1953), p. 52; Elias (1974), pp. 222ff.; McNair (1961), p. 181, albeit with some limitations; Rosenne (1970), pp. 402ff.

  25. 25.

    See Chap. 11.

  26. 26.

    The issue of the exact nature and definition of international comity—a term which is used with very different meaning, some of which related to private international law—cannot be dealt with here.

  27. 27.

    Churchill and Lowe (1993), p. 80; Dunlap (1996), p. 14; Kasoulides (1993), p. 25; Molenaar (1998), p. 193; Ozcayir (2004), pp. 86ff; Quadri (1939), p. 91; Treves (1995), p. 38.

  28. 28.

    Section 1 of the Paris MoU; Section 1 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 1 of the Tokyo MoU; Section 1 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 1 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 1 of the Abuya MoU; Section 1 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 1 of the Riyadh MoU.

  29. 29.

    Section 2 of the Paris MoU; Section 2 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 2 of the Tokyo MoU; Section 2 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 2 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 2 of the Abuya MoU; Section 2 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 2 of the Riyadh MoU.

  30. 30.

    Section 3 of the Paris MoU; Section 3 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 3.3ff. of the Tokyo MoU; Section 3 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 3 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 3 of the Abuja MoU; Section 3 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 3 of the Riyadh MoU.

  31. 31.

    Section 3.4ff. of the Paris MoU; Section 3.10ff. of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 3.7ff. of the Tokyo MoU; Section 3.7.1ff. of the Caribbean MoU; Section 3.6.3ff. of the Mediterrean MoU; Section 3.4.3 of the Abuja MoU; Section 3.6.4ff. of the Black Sea MoU; Section 3.14ff. of the Riyadh MoU.

  32. 32.

    Section 4 of the Paris MoU; Section 4 of the Abuja MoU.

  33. 33.

    Section 7 of the Paris MoU; Section 6 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 6 of the Tokyo MoU; Section 6 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 6 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 8 of the Abuja MoU; Section 7 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 7 of the Riyadh MoU.

  34. 34.

    Section 8 of the Paris MoU; Section 7 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 7 of the Tokyo MoU; Section 8 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 7 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 10 of the Abuja MoU; Section 9 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 9 of the Riyadh MoU. Most MoU have been amended, especially in their Technical Annexes.

  35. 35.

    Bang (2008).

  36. 36.

    Abuja MoU ( 2012).

  37. 37.

    Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE (2016).

  38. 38.

    Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE (2016), p. 4.

  39. 39.

    Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE (2016), p. 5.

  40. 40.

    Port of Rotterdam (2016).

  41. 41.

    Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2016).

  42. 42.

    Annex 9, n. 3 of the Paris MoU; Annex 1, n. 2.4 of the Viña del Mar Agreement; Section 3.1 of the Tokyo MoU; Section 3.1 of the Caribbean MoU; Section 3.2.1 of the Mediterranean MoU; Section 3.3 of the Abuja MoU; Section 3.1.2 of the Black Sea MoU; Section 3.2 of the Riyadh MoU. It is significant that the clear grounds rule, which is found only in the Annexes of the Paris MoU, was moved to the main text in all the subsequent instruments, as if the need was felt to emphasize its importance as a guarantee for the ship.

  43. 43.

    Paris MoU (2016b).

  44. 44.

    Annex 1, paragraph 2.

  45. 45.

    Annex 1, paragraph 3.

  46. 46.

    Annex 1, paragraph 5.

  47. 47.

    Annex 1, paragraph 10.

  48. 48.

    Annex 1, paragraph 8.

  49. 49.

    Annex 1, paragraph 24.

  50. 50.

    Fraser (2010).

  51. 51.

    Amnesty International and Greenpeace Netherlands (2012), p. 54.

  52. 52.

    Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2016).

  53. 53.

    United Nations (2009).

  54. 54.

    District Court of Amsterdam (2010a).

  55. 55.

    District Court of Amsterdam (2010b).

  56. 56.

    District Court of Amsterdam (2010c).

  57. 57.

    Amsterdam Court of Appeals (2011).

  58. 58.

    District Court of Amsterdam (2010d).

  59. 59.

    District Court of Amsterdam (2010e).

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Casagrande, M. (2017). Flags of Convenience and Port State Control. In: Seaports in International Law. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60396-4_14

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