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India’s Strategic Think Tank: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses

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Abstract

The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) was established in the context of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, when the Indian government demanded the creation of an independent think tank dedicated to strategic affairs. The major difficulty with which IDSA has been dealing since its early years lies in the non-cooperativeness of both the Indian armed forces and civilian bureaucracy. This lack of cooperation mainly arises from the bureaucracy’s fear of IDSA’s “contaminating effect” on its own structure and the prevailing mistrust between the different parties. In the post–Cold War scenario, the situation has slightly improved as a consequence of the retirement of some governmental officials and of part of the military personnel who had a significant role in IDSA. Meanwhile, IDSA focuses its activity on policy research, training, and public education, expanding its research foci beyond traditional national defense issues into some unconventional threats facing India. This chapter highlights several factors that might affect IDSA’s institutional autonomy. Firstly, IDSA is entirely funded by the Ministry of Defense. Secondly, resource scarcity debilitates the balance between maintaining research independence and respecting the government’s security concerns. By enhancing network-building, public dissemination, policy research, and interaction with government, IDSA will be able to play its due role in the future.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    George K Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992).

  2. 2.

    For a brilliant institutional biography of IDSA and the circumstances leading to its birth and growth as a think tank of repute in the Indian setting, see K. Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” Strategic Analysis, Vol 35, No 4, July 2011, 719–738.

  3. 3.

    Daniel Markey, “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software,’” Asia Policy 8 (2009): 73–96, restricted access at http://www.nbr.org/Publications/Asia_policy/AP8/AP8_Markey_India.pdf.

  4. 4.

    For example, the criticism of government policies leading to the 1962 war with China, and later in early 1971 the Institute’s analyses of the situation in East Pakistan, its implications for India, and recommendations to the government for conclusive action, were not received well in the corridors of power. Similarly, the scholars of the Institute had dissenting views on defense management, nuclear issues, and India’s relationship with the United States, which was not always in tune with the position of the government of the time.

  5. 5.

    The emergency years (1975–1977) had a constricting impact on the functioning of the Institute and led to divisions within its executive council (EC). There was a move to encourage one of the EC members, a reputed academic and a vocal opponent of the emergency, to resign from the EC, apparently under pressure from certain quarters in the government, which was resented by IDSA members. Ultimately, the concerned member, even though he was asked to continue, did resign, taking exception to that very move. This incident was the only one where an aborted attempt was made to influence IDSA’s EC. However, this was an exception and in no way affected the independence and autonomy of the Institute.

  6. 6.

    As per Art 3 (i) and (ii), Memorandum of Association Rules and Regulations, IDSA, New Delhi.

  7. 7.

    Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 727.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    The journal can be accessed at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20#.UrgZUfQW3sE or http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis.

  10. 10.

    As a measure of success of the Institute’s electronic outreach strategy, IDSA’s website drew more than 1 million visitors, 2.2 million page views, and more than 80 million hits in 2013. As per the leading web analytics service provider Alexa’s traffic estimates, based on data from its global traffic panel, IDSA has even overtaken some of the leading think tanks like Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

  11. 11.

    Murray Weidenbaum, “Measuring the Influence of Think Tanks,” Society 47 (2010): 135, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12115-009-9292-8#page-1.

  12. 12.

    Subrahmanyam, “IDSA in Retrospect,” 719–738.

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Gupta, A. (2019). India’s Strategic Think Tank: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. In: McGann, J.G. (eds) Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Powers. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60312-4_12

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