Advertisement

Co-utility pp 153-166 | Cite as

Aspects of Coalitions for Environmental Protection Under Co-utility

  • Dritan OsmaniEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Systems, Decision and Control book series (SSDC, volume 110)

Abstract

The game theoretic modeling of coalitions for environmental protection within the framework of a new concept of co-utility [8] is analysed. The co-utility concept can be described by two elements. Firstly, agents can improve their payoffs by collaborating with each other. Secondly, the outcome of collaboration is stable. The similarity of co-utility with common concepts of coalition stability for environmental protection is shown. But the co-utility concept is more extensive and can serve as an umbrella in all applications where agents have room for simultaneous improvements of payoffs. The development from a myopically stable outcome to a farsightedly stable outcome is discussed.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Support from the Templeton World Charity Foundation (grant TWCF0095/AB60 “CO-UTILITY”) is gratefully acknowledged. The views in this paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Templeton World Charity Foundation.

References

  1. 1.
    Barrett, S.: Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 46, 878–894 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Barrett, S.: Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Batjes, J, Goldewijk, C.: The IMAGE 2 Hundred Year (1890–1990) Database of the Global Environment (HYDE). Report No. 410100082, RIVM, Bilthoven (1994)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Botteon, M, Carraro, C.: Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries: burden-sharing and carbon leakage. In: Ulph, A. (ed.) Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Chander, P.: The gamma-core and coalition formation. Int. J. Game Theory 35(4), 379–401 (2007)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Chander, P., Tulkens, H.: The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. Int. J. Game Theory 26(3), 379–401 (1997)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cline, W.: Econ. Glob. Warm. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC (1992)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Domingo-Ferrer, J., Martínez, S., Sánchez, D., Soria-Comas, J.: Co-utility: self-enforcing protocols for the mutual benefit of participants. Eng. Appl. Artif. Intell. 59, 148–158 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Eyckmans, J., Tulkens, H.: Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem. Resour. Energy Econ. 25, 299–327 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Fankhauser, S.: Protection vs retreat: the economic costs of sea level rise. Environ. Plan. A 27, 299–319 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Finus, M., van Ierland, E., Dellink, R.: Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game. Econ. Gov. 7, 271–291 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Hammitt, J.K., Lempert, R.J., Schlesinger, M.E.: A sequential-decision strategy for abating climate change. Nature 357, 315–318 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Kattenberg, A., Giorgi, F., Grassl, H., Meehl, G.A., Mitchell, J.F.B., Stouffer, R.J., Tokioka, T., Weaver, A.J., Wigley, T.M.L.: Climate models - projections of future climate. In: Houghton, J.T., et al. (eds.) Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1996)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Leggett, J., Pepper, W.J., Swart, R.: Emissions scenarios for the IPCC: an update. In: Houghton, J.T., Callander, B.A., Varney, S.K. (eds.) Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment, vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Link, P.M., Tol, R.S.J.: Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation: an application of FUND. Port. Econ. J. 3, 99–114 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Maier-Reimer, E., Hasselmann, K.: Transport and storage of carbon dioxide in the ocean: an inorganic ocean circulation carbon cycle model. Clim. Dyn. 2, 63–90 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    McGinty, M.: International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 59, 45–62 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Mendelsohn, R., Morrison, W., Schlesinger, M.E., Andronova, N.G.: Country-specific market impacts of climate change. Clim. Chang. 45, 553–569 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Osmani, D.: A note on computational aspects of farsighted coalitional stability (revised version). Working Paper, FNU-194 (2015)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Osmani, D.: Computational and conceptual aspects of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework. Working Paper, Co-Utility Project. Templeton World Charity Foundation, Grant TWCF0095 /AB60 CO-UTILITY (2016)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Osmani, D., Tol, R.S.J.: Towards farsightedly stable international environmental agreements. J. Public Econ. Theory 11(3), 455–492 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Osmani, D., Tol, R.S.J.: The case of two self-enforcing international environmental agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries. Comput. Econ. 36(2), 93–119 (2010)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Osmani, D., Tol, R.S.J.: Towards farsightedly stable international environmental agreements: part two (revised version). Working Paper, FNU-149 (2015)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Rubio, J.S., Ulph, U.: Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 58, 223–263 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Shine, K.P., Derwent, R.G., Wuebbles, D.J., Morcrette, J.J.: Radiative forcing of climate in climate change. In: Houghton, J.T., Jenkins, G.J., Ephraums, J.J. (eds.) The IPCC Scientific Assessment, vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Tol, R.S.J.: The damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive calculations. Environ. Res. Econ. 5, 353–374 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Tol, R.S.J.: The damage costs of climate change towards a dynamic representation. Ecol. Econ. 19, 67–90 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Kyoto, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness: an application of FUND, In: A Multi-Model Evaluation, Energy Journal Special Issue on the Costs of the Kyoto Protocol, pp. 130–156 (1999a)Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Spatial and temporal efficiency in climate change: an application of FUND. Environ. Res. Econ. 58(1), 33–49 (1999b)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change. Ecol. Econ. 36(1), 71–85 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Estimates of the damage costs of climate change - part 1: benchmark estimates. Environ. Res. Econ. 21, 47–73 (2002a)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Estimates of the damage costs of climate change - part 2: benchmark estimates. Environ. Res. Econ. 21, 135–160 (2002b)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Welfare specifications and optimal control of climate change: an application of FUND. Energy Econ. 24, 367–376 (2002c)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 34.
    Tol, R.S.J.: Multi-gas emission reduction for climate change policy: an application of FUND. In: Energy Journal in Volume: Multi-Greenhouse Gas Mitigation and Climate Policy. Special Issue 3 (2006)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    W.R.I. World Resources Database.: World Resources Institute, Washington, DC (2000–2001)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Engineering and MathematicsUniversitat Rovira i VirgiliTarragona, CataloniaSpain

Personalised recommendations