Co-utility pp 33-48 | Cite as

On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency

  • Salvador BarberàEmail author
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno
Part of the Studies in Systems, Decision and Control book series (SSDC, volume 110)


We survey a number of results regarding incentives and efficiency that have been recently added to the social choice literature, and we establish parallels and differences with the concepts and results obtained so far by co-utility theory. Our main purpose is to facilitate the convergence between researchers who end up dealing with similar issues in response to rather different motivations and backgrounds.



S. Barberà acknowledges financial support through grants ECO2014-53052-P and SGR2014-515, and Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). D. Berga acknowledges the support from grants ECO2016-76255-P, ECO2013-45395-R and 2014-SGR-1360. B. Moreno acknowledges financial support from grants and ECO2014-53767. D. Berga and B. Moreno thank the MOMA network under project ECO2014-57673-REDT.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Salvador Barberà
    • 1
    Email author
  • Dolors Berga
    • 2
  • Bernardo Moreno
    • 3
  1. 1.MOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Barcelona GSEBellaterra, CataloniaSpain
  2. 2.Departament d’EconomiaUniversitat de GironaGirona, CataloniaSpain
  3. 3.Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Departamento de Teoría e Historia EconómicaUniversidad de MálagaMálagaSpain

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