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Efficient Compilers for After-the-Fact Leakage: From CPA to CCA-2 Secure PKE to AKE

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Book cover Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10342))

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Abstract

The goal of leakage-resilient cryptography is to construct cryptographic algorithms that are secure even if the adversary obtains side-channel information from the real world implementation of these algorithms. Most of the prior works on leakage-resilient cryptography consider leakage models where the adversary has access to the leakage oracle before the challenge-ciphertext is generated (before-the-fact leakage). In this model, there are generic compilers that transform any leakage-resilient CPA-secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme to its CCA-2 variant using Naor-Yung type of transformations. In this work, we give an efficient generic compiler for transforming a leakage-resilient CPA-secure PKE to leakage-resilient CCA-2 secure PKE in presence of after-the-fact split-state (bounded) memory leakage model, where the adversary has access to the leakage oracle even after the challenge phase. The salient feature of our transformation is that the leakage rate (defined as the ratio of the amount of leakage to the size of secret key) of the transformed after-the-fact CCA-2 secure PKE is same as the leakage rate of the underlying after-the-fact CPA-secure PKE, which is \(1-o(1)\).

We then present another generic compiler for transforming an after-the-fact leakage-resilient CCA-2 secure PKE to a leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol in the bounded after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK (BAFL-eCK) model proposed by Alawatugoda et al. (ASIACCS’14). To the best of our knowledge, this gives the first compiler that transform any leakage-resilient CCA-2 secure PKE to an AKE protocol in the leakage variant of the eCK model.

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Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the reviewers for their helpful comments. Part of this work was initiated when the first author was visiting R. C. Bose Centre for Cryptology and Security, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata during the Summer of 2016. The first and the third author are grateful to the project “Information Security Education and Awareness Program” of Ministry of Information Technology, Government of India.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India

    Suvradip Chakraborty & C. Pandu Rangan

  2. Cryptology and Security Research Unit (CSRU), R. C. Bose Centre for Cryptology and Security, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India

    Goutam Paul

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  1. Suvradip Chakraborty
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  3. C. Pandu Rangan
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Correspondence to Goutam Paul .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Josef Pieprzyk

  2. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Suriadi Suriadi

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Chakraborty, S., Paul, G., Rangan, C.P. (2017). Efficient Compilers for After-the-Fact Leakage: From CPA to CCA-2 Secure PKE to AKE. In: Pieprzyk, J., Suriadi, S. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10342. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60055-0_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60055-0_18

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