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The Spread of Terrorism: Libya I, Sudan I, Afghanistan/Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIL, Lebanon

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The Evolution of UN Sanctions

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Abstract

The confrontation with terrorism is an asymmetric global war, involving many different forms of intervention, including an ever-evolving multilateral network of counterterrorism organizations, instruments, and mechanisms. In essence it is a militarized-intelligence response that leverages UN sanctions as a tool of economic warfare . Terrorism is considered a class of violence separate from that committed by other insurgents, and deserving of far more robust investments in treasure and blood. Terrorists are deemed to be ineligible for considerations of extenuating historic causes and wrongs as routinely afforded to other risk actors and perpetrators of political violence , even when they have inflicted far bloodier casualties. Usually imposed in response to particularly brutal terrorist assaults, counterterrorism sanctions remain suspended between punitive-retributive and coercive-reformative policies rather than offering a distinct and peaceful alternative to the unilaterally driven, global war on extremist political violence. In particular the Al Qaida / ISIL regime is not positioned to leverage coercive policy purposes, measures are not short-term or temporary and the interventions are not designed to reconcile conflict parties, with the possible exception of the Taliban regime. UN sanctions contribute to the sprawling, generational warfare feeding and fueling the global jihad that Osama bin Laden , other Al Qaida and ISIL leaders, and their Shura Council envisioned all along.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the Summary of Information Regarding US Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities on its website on 1 July 2016, see: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-and-publications/214-reports-publications-2016/1392-summary-of-information-regarding-u-s-counterterrorism-strikes-outside-areas-of-active-hostilities (accessed 23 November 2016).

  2. 2.

    See House of Lords/House of Commons; Joint Committee on Human Rights; The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing, Second Report of Session 2015–2016; HL Paper 141 HC 574; published on 10 May 2016 by authority of the House of Lords and House of Commons.

  3. 3.

    Enrico Carisch’s interview on 1 Oct 1996 in the US High Security Penitentiary in Allenwood, PA and subsequent exchanges of letters with Edwin Wilson .

  4. 4.

    See for deeper explorations, for example: Clara Portela, “Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions: Libya I ,” (Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), Watson Institute for International Studies, 2012), p. 5; and David Cortright et al., “Taming terrorism: Sanctions against Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan ,” in The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 108–109.

  5. 5.

    See letters issued under S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309, and S/23317.

  6. 6.

    UNSC S/RES/731, paras. 1–3.

  7. 7.

    Cortright et al., p. 138.

  8. 8.

    UNSC S/RES/748, para. 4.

  9. 9.

    UNSC, S/RES/748, paras. 4 and 6.

  10. 10.

    UNSC, S/RES/748, para. 5.

  11. 11.

    UNSC, S/RES/748, para. 6.

  12. 12.

    UNSC, S/RES/748, para. 9.

  13. 13.

    UNSC S/RES/883, para. 3.

  14. 14.

    UNSC , S/RES/883, para. 4.

  15. 15.

    UNSC , S/RES/883, para. 5; Portela, p. 13.

  16. 16.

    UNSC , S/RES/883, para. 6.

  17. 17.

    UNSC , S/RES/883, para. 16.

  18. 18.

    UNASOG was not connected to the Libya sanctions or the investigations into the Pan Am or UTA bombings. Its mandate was to monitor the withdrawal of Libya from the Aouzou Strip in Chad. Refer to United Nations Security Council (UNSC ), S/RES/910, (14 Apr. 1994); United Nations Security Council (UNSC ), S/RES/915, (4 May 1994).

  19. 19.

    Cortright et al., p. 112.

  20. 20.

    The formal name of the Helms Burton Act is HR 927/Public Law 104-114 of the 104th Congress on 12 March 1996.

  21. 21.

    See the EU publication under Joint Action 1996/668/CFSP (OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, p. 7) at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0ahUKEwiH5vD2wMfQAhUKRCYKHRp1DF8QFggjMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Feeas.europa.eu%2Farchives%2Fdocs%2Fcfsp%2Fsanctions%2Fdocs%2Fmeasures_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEBnUyGu5f2Ul8oEdo0ED08hZ5WOg (accessed 26 November 2016).

  22. 22.

    “The Lockerbie Cases before the International Court of Justice ,” (International Court of Justice (ICJ), n.a.).

  23. 23.

    Note that when Libya first presented to the ICJ in 1992, the Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. The ICJ decision came only a couple of weeks after Resolution 748 , suggesting that the ICJ deferred to the Council. For more on the discussion of ICJ authority, refer to Bernd Martenczuk, “The Security Council, the International Court and judicial review: what lessons from Lockerbie ?” European Journal of International Law, vol. 10, no. 3 (1999); Ian Hurd, “The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003,” International Organization, vol. 59, no. 03 (2005).

  24. 24.

    Cortright et al., p. 118.

  25. 25.

    For instance, refer to letters submitted to the Council in 1997 by Libya and other countries in Libya’s defense: S/1997/35; S/1997/273; S/1997/497; and S/1997/529.

  26. 26.

    UNSC S/RES/1192, para. 2.

  27. 27.

    UNSC , S/RES/1192, paras. 8 and 9.

  28. 28.

    United Nations Security Council (UNSC ), Report of the Secretary General submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) and paragraph 8 of Resolution 1192 (1998a), (S/1999/726), (30 Jun. 1999), paras. 18–22.

  29. 29.

    O’Sullivan, p. 185.

  30. 30.

    United Nations.

  31. 31.

    Cortright et al., p. 113.

  32. 32.

    O’Sullivan, pp. 196–197; Cortright et al., p. 115.

  33. 33.

    Portela, pp. 11–12.

  34. 34.

    O’Sullivan, pp. 206–207.

  35. 35.

    O’Sullivan, p. 197; Portela, p. 16.

  36. 36.

    O’Sullivan, pp. 211–212; Portela, pp. 17–18.

  37. 37.

    Stephen Engelbert with Michael R. Gordon, New York Times ; Germans Accused of Helping Libya Build Nerve Gas Plant; January 1, 1989; and Serge Schmemann; New York Times; Bonn Relents Somewhat on US Charges; January 12, 1989.

  38. 38.

    Cortright et al., p. 117.

  39. 39.

    Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, p. 121.

  40. 40.

    Security Council Letter 1996, Annex I.

  41. 41.

    Security Council Letter 1996, letter.

  42. 42.

    Security Council Letter 1996, paras. 11, 52, and 53 of Annex III.

  43. 43.

    Security Council Letter 1996, letter.

  44. 44.

    UNSC S/RES/1044, para. 4.

  45. 45.

    UNSC S/RES/1044, para. 7.

  46. 46.

    Secretary General, para. 20.

  47. 47.

    UNSC S/RES/1054, para. 3.

  48. 48.

    UNSC S/PV.3660, pp. 23–24.

  49. 49.

    Cortright and Lopez , p. 123.

  50. 50.

    UNSC S/RES/1070, para. 3.

  51. 51.

    Secretary General S/1996/940, paras. 9, 11, 13, and 14.

  52. 52.

    O’Sullivan, p. 266; Niblock, pp. 207–208.

  53. 53.

    O’Sullivan, p. 266; Cortright and Lopez , pp. 124–125.

  54. 54.

    O’Sullivan, pp. 260–264.

  55. 55.

    The suspects in the assassination attempt, including its leader Mustafa Hamza, were delivered to Egypt in 2005 (reportedly by Iran ) to stand trial for the assassination attempt on Mubarak as well as involvement in the assassination of Anwar El-Sadat and other assassination attempts in Egypt. They were found guilty and sentenced to death. United Nations Security Council (UNSC S/PV.4384, (28 Sept. 2001), para. 3; Charron et al., p. 3; Galal Nassar, “The Hamza connection,” Al Ahram Weekly Online, 13–19 January 2005, no. 725 (2005). <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/725/eg5.htm> (accessed 21 Jun. 2014).

  56. 56.

    UNSC S/RES/1076, paras. 4–5.

  57. 57.

    UNSC S/RES/1214, para. 13.

  58. 58.

    UNSC S/RES/1267, paras. 4(a) and 6.

  59. 59.

    UNSC S/RES/1267, para. 4(b).

  60. 60.

    UNSC S/RES/1267, paras. 2 and 14.

  61. 61.

    Cortright et al., pp. 129–130; Barbara Crossette, “U.S. steps up pressure on Taliban to Deliver Osama bin Laden “ (19 Oct. 1999). <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/19/world/us-steps-up-pressure-on-taliban-to-deliver-osama-bin-laden.html> (Accessed 12 August 2014); Kathy Gannon, “Bin Laden may stay in Afghanistan ,” (2 Nov. 1999). <https://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-naturAlresources-st/water-in-conflict/41469.html> (accessed 12 August 2014).

  62. 62.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 5.

  63. 63.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 6.

  64. 64.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 7.

  65. 65.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 8(a)(b).

  66. 66.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 14.

  67. 67.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 8(c).

  68. 68.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 10.

  69. 69.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 11.

  70. 70.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 12.

  71. 71.

    UNSC S/RES/1333, para. 15.

  72. 72.

    Secretary General Report S/2001/241, paras. 36–39.

  73. 73.

    United Nations Security Council (UNSC S/RES/1363, (30 Jul. 2001), paras. 3–4.

  74. 74.

    UNSC S/RES/1368 preamb, para. 3.

  75. 75.

    UNSC S/RES/1373, para 1.

  76. 76.

    UNSC S/RES/1373, para 2–3.

  77. 77.

    UNSC S/RES/1373, para 6.

  78. 78.

    Bush 2011.

  79. 79.

    UNSC S/RES/1386, paras. 1 and 10.

  80. 80.

    UNSC, S/RES/1386, para. 3.

  81. 81.

    UNSC S/RES/1390, paras. 1–2.

  82. 82.

    UNSC S/RES/1452, paras. 1, 2, and 4.

  83. 83.

    Zarate ; p. 37–39.

  84. 84.

    Zarate , 2013.

  85. 85.

    The most aberrant example of opinionated intelligence and neoliberal wishful thinking was often based on writings by Laurie Mylroie who attempted to link terrorist acts with Saddam Hussein , for example, in her book “The War against America —Saddam Hussein and the World Trade Center ” attacks—A study of revenge, of which the second revised edition with a foreword by former CIA director R. James Woolsey was published by Regan Books and the American Enterprise Institute (2001).

  86. 86.

    For detailed case descriptions see the website of the Rendition Project at: https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/arar.html (accessed 7 December 2016).

  87. 87.

    Weschler, p. 35; Charron , p. 168.

  88. 88.

    UNSC S/RES/1455, para. 4.

  89. 89.

    UNSC S/RES/1617), para. 2.

  90. 90.

    UNSC S/RES/1617, para. 4.

  91. 91.

    UNSC S/RES/1617, para. 2.

  92. 92.

    UNSC S/RES/1526, para. 6.

  93. 93.

    UNSC S/RES/1730, paras. 1–2.

  94. 94.

    UNSC S/RES/1822, (30 Jun. 2008); UNSC S/RES/1735, (22 Dec. 2006).

  95. 95.

    UNSC S/RES/1904, paras. 20–21.

  96. 96.

    1267 Monitoring Team S/2011/245, paras. 14–20.

  97. 97.

    Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1989 (2011).

  98. 98.

    For an excellent research on the Tora Bora Battle and the political background story see: Yaniv Barzilai; 102 Days of War: How Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaida & the Taliban Survived 2001; 2014 Edition Hardcover; self-published by Yaniv Barzilai—1672.

  99. 99.

    Chandler and Gunaratna; pp. 37–38.

  100. 100.

    For a detailed analysis of post 9/11 Al Qaida see the writings of Michael Scheuer, first chief of the CIA bin Laden unit from 1996 to 1999. Osama bin Laden ; Oxford University Press, 2011; Chapter 6—Survivor and Planner. Scheurer published initially under the pseudonym Anonymous the book Through our enemies’ eyes; Brassey’s Inc, 2003; and Imperial Hubris—Why the West is losing the War on Terror, Brassey’s Inc, 2004.

  101. 101.

    Michael Scheuer writes in Osama bin Laden about the management of IS : (The foregoing) is one of the few instances in the history of bin Laden and Al Qaeda in which their handling of a problem, from recognition of its existence to its resolution, can be confidently tracked. It makes several things apparent: that Bin Laden was the guiding hand; that Al Qaeda is a functioning, hierarchical organizations with clear command-and-control capabilities; that communication from Al Qaeda headquarters to the field may be challenging but is not impossible; that patience, perseverance, and reserves of skilled cadre remain organizational hallmarks, and that there is no trace of takfirism in either rhetoric or operations. p. 152.

  102. 102.

    1267 Monitoring Team Report S/2011/245, Footnote 34 on p. 24.

  103. 103.

    UNSC S/RES/2170, para. 8.

  104. 104.

    UNSC S/RES/2170, paras. 10–12.

  105. 105.

    UNSC S/RES/2170, para. 14.

  106. 106.

    UNSC S/RES/2170, para. 19 and Annex.

  107. 107.

    Potential legal and health issues resulting from the military use of depleted uranium projectiles and munitions have led to a serious international debate, including studies by national and international courts after these types of weapons were used very widely during the Gulf War and the NATO air campaign over the Serbian-Kosovo conflict in the 1990s. A particular concern with depleted uranium in incendiary ammunition is that in some applications residues of copious amounts of dust that is very difficult to contain poses severe health effects if inhaled by civilians, long after the weapon has exploded. Soldiers and civilians suffering from “Gulf War” syndrome claim a connection with depleted uranium.

  108. 108.

    Fact-Finding Mission S/2005/203, para. 15.

  109. 109.

    Fact-Finding Mission S/2005/203, paras. 60–64.

  110. 110.

    UNSC S/RES/1595, para. 1.

  111. 111.

    UNSC S/RES/1636, paras. 5, 11, and 12.

  112. 112.

    Safa, p. 34.

  113. 113.

    These assassinations included Bassel Fleihan, Lebanon ’s Minister of Economy and Trade, April 2005; Samir Kassir, political journalist, June 2005; and, George Hawi, politician, June 2005.

  114. 114.

    UNSC S/RES/1644, (15 Dec. 2005), paras. 3–4.

  115. 115.

    UNSC S/RES/1644, paras. 5–7.

  116. 116.

    UNDPA. “Lebanon .” United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/lang/en/main/activities_by_region/middle_east/lebanon (Accessed 7 May 2014).

  117. 117.

    UNSC S/RES/1701, para. 15.

  118. 118.

    UNSC S/RES/1701, para. 11(e)(f).

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  1. Compliance and Capacity Skills International, New York, NY, USA

    Enrico Carisch, Loraine Rickard-Martin & Shawna R. Meister

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  1. Enrico Carisch
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Carisch, E., Rickard-Martin, L., Meister, S.R. (2017). The Spread of Terrorism: Libya I, Sudan I, Afghanistan/Taliban, Al Qaeda and ISIL, Lebanon. In: The Evolution of UN Sanctions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5_12

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