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Diary of a Default

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Abstract

Describes the (day-by-day) events surrounding the Stop of the Exchequer, from April 1667, just prior to George Downing becoming secretary, to default itself in the year 1672 until the final resolution 34 years later. Presents a list of all the goldsmith-bankers who were creditors of the Crown and concludes with a careful analysis of the internal rate of return (IRR) from the collateralized treasury orders (CTOs) during the 1672–1706 period, when they were finally merged into the national debt.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Lowndes and Gill (1931).

  2. 2.

    And ten weeks after the infamous John Wilmot (Earl of Rochester) had eloped with Elizabeth Malet and got married at a chapel in Knightsbridge.

  3. 3.

    Another notable (but unrelated) event, which took place around the same time, was the attendance of the first woman, Margaret Cavendish—poet, writer, scientist and philosopher—at a meeting of the Royal Society (founded in 1662).

  4. 4.

    See Beresford (1925), p. 217.

  5. 5.

    In fact, you can read digitized versions of the minutes online at http://www.british-history.ac.uk. The full State Papers are available (by subscription) at http://gale.cengage.co.uk/state-papers-online-15091714.aspx and provide access to both the calendar and the manuscripts. Both locations are a virtual goldmine of information for English history buffs.

  6. 6.

    See Lee (1965), p. 130, for example.

  7. 7.

    Some early American history aficionados might recognize his name from Albermarle County in North Carolina, which is actually named after the Duke. He was one of the original eight Lords Proprietors of the Province of Carolina, which just goes to prove that he did have a diversified investment portfolio. See Isenberg (2016) for more on him, along with the philosopher John Locke, and their role in Colonial America. The county eventually dissolved and merged with others in the vicinity.

  8. 8.

    See Hutton (1989), p. 299, or Lee (1965), pp. 128–150, or Beresford (1925), Chap. 12, as well as the Calendar of Treasury Books (1668), for most of the references in this section.

  9. 9.

    See the comment by Pepys, who purchased a copy of Leviathan in September 1668 and comments about the increasing price of the book in the secondary market once the bishop’s ban restricted supply.

  10. 10.

    See Pepys (1997), p. 648.

  11. 11.

    My source for this claim is Grayling (2016).

  12. 12.

    The source for most of the material in this section comes from Hutton (1986). Some say that the English were forced to make a treaty with the French, before the Dutch beat them to it.

  13. 13.

    See Hutchsinson (2016) for a recent telling of the story.

  14. 14.

    Manuscript 29553, folio 358, and reproduced in Browning (1966). Note that the author of the letter, Langhorne, was apparently an important and well-known Catholic, which might have clouded (slightly) his recollection of the matter.

  15. 15.

    Dated January 6, 1672.

  16. 16.

    Page 93.

  17. 17.

    Published in Iddesleigh (1887), p. 252.

  18. 18.

    In fact, there is an argument to be made that the Day the King Defaulted was actually on December 18, 1671, although I will discuss the exact timing and calendar dates competing for anniversary mentions, later on.

  19. 19.

    See Haley (1968), p. 294.

  20. 20.

    Entry for March 12, 1672.

  21. 21.

    See Melton (1986), pp. 120–222, for more on this.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, the seminal article by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in which they use a game theoretic model to describe the process of a “run on the bank” and the need for government-based deposit insurance to avoid banks runs.

  23. 23.

    See Shin (2009) for a detailed analysis of the Northern Rock bank run within the context of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework. That article also discusses the rather peculiar fact that the queues to pull out money started only after the Bank of England announced (September 13, 2007) that it would provide emergency liquidity support to Northern Rock.

  24. 24.

    See the book The World’s First Stock Exchange, by Petram (2014). See also Goetzmann and Jorion (1999).

  25. 25.

    See Koudijs (2016). His study focuses on a period in the late eighteenth century, but the mail and post system was in place by the late 1660s. See also Koudijs (2015) for related work on insider trading during the same period.

  26. 26.

    Source: State Papers Domestic, Car. II, 302, No. 39.

  27. 27.

    See W. G. S. Dibden (1965) for more on this.

  28. 28.

    Thanks to Peter Koudijs at Stanford University for providing this information and related references.

  29. 29.

    Reported in the annals of Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England (1937), Vol. 3, pp. 94–107.

  30. 30.

    I would like to thank Rabbi Jeremy Milevsky, spiritual leader of the B’nei Torah congregation in Toronto, for bringing this technical permit to my attention.

  31. 31.

    The lineage for Lord Chancellor was Clarendon to Bridgeman to Shaftesbury.

  32. 32.

    Not to distract, but the Dutch were having convulsions of their own, and Prime Minister de Witt (together with his brother) was lynched by a mob, bringing an end to a distinguished career.

  33. 33.

    Shaftesbury’s attention was now focused on giving anti-Catholic speeches in parliament and he was no longer part of the in-crowd at court.

  34. 34.

    Danby arm-twisted the corporation of the City of London into lending money by threatening that otherwise he wouldn’t disband the Army (which the City loathed and feared).

  35. 35.

    See Turnor (1677).

  36. 36.

    The source for the material in this section about bankruptcy and debtors’ prison is primarily from Cohen (1982) and partially from Jones (1979).

  37. 37.

    This is as per Danby’s estimate reported in the CTB on February 8, 1677, and also reproduced by Horsefield (1982) in Table 1.

  38. 38.

    Page 338.

  39. 39.

    Horsefield (1982) on p. 523 claims that Chandaman’s figures were missing £43,000 in interest payments, which is why I’ll conduct a “sensitivity analysis” around these numbers.

  40. 40.

    Horsefield (1982) claims that Chandaman’s (1975) figures on p. 338 are missing some £43,000 in interest that was actually paid to the bankers prior to 1688. If we add it (evenly) to the cash flows in Table 6.2, the internal rate of return increases to 19 basis points, or 0.19%.

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Milevsky, M.A. (2017). Diary of a Default. In: The Day the King Defaulted. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59987-8_6

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