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Privacy-Preserving k-time Authenticated Secret Handshakes

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10343))

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Abstract

Secret handshake allows a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time authenticate each other anonymously. A straightforward approach to design an unlinkable secret handshake protocol is to use either long-term certificate or one-time certificate provided by a trusted authority. However, how to detect the misusing of certificates by an insider adversary is a challenging security issue when using those approaches for unlinkable secret handshake. In this paper, we propose a novel k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH) protocol where each authorized user is only allowed to use the credential for k times. We formalize security models, including session key security and anonymity, for k-ASH, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some computational problems which are proved hard in the generic bilinear group model. The proposed protocol also achieved public traceability property if a user misuses the k-time credential.

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61602396, 61572303), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant GK201702004.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing and Information Technology, Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

    Yangguang Tian, Shiwei Zhang, Guomin Yang & Yi Mu

  2. School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an, 710062, China

    Yong Yu

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  1. Yangguang Tian
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  2. Shiwei Zhang
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  3. Guomin Yang
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  4. Yi Mu
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Correspondence to Yangguang Tian .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Josef Pieprzyk

  2. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Suriadi Suriadi

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Tian, Y., Zhang, S., Yang, G., Mu, Y., Yu, Y. (2017). Privacy-Preserving k-time Authenticated Secret Handshakes. In: Pieprzyk, J., Suriadi, S. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10343. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_16

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-59870-3

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