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The Spanish Kidney Exchange Model: Study of Computation-Based Alternatives to the Current Procedure

  • Miquel Bofill
  • Marcos Calderón
  • Francesc Castro
  • Esteve Del AceboEmail author
  • Pablo Delgado
  • Marc Garcia
  • Marta García
  • Marc Roig
  • María O. Valentín
  • Mateu Villaret
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10259)

Abstract

The problem of incompatible pairs in living-donor kidney transplant can be solved using paired kidney exchange, i.e., two incompatible patient-donor pairs interchange donors, creating a cycle, which can be extended to three or even more pairs. Finding a set of cycles that maximizes the number of successful transplants is a complex task.

The Organización Nacional de Trasplantes (ONT) is responsible for donation and transplantation processes in Spain. In this paper we compare the current ONT heuristic finding-cycles procedure with an integer programming approach by means of a true-data-based empirical simulation. The obtained results show that, although the two methods provide quite different solutions, they both exhibit weak and strong points.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Work partially supported by grants TIN2015-66293-R (MINECO/FEDER, UE), TIN2016-75866-C3-3-R, TIN2013-48040-R and MPCUdG2016/055 (UdG).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Miquel Bofill
    • 1
  • Marcos Calderón
    • 3
  • Francesc Castro
    • 1
  • Esteve Del Acebo
    • 1
    Email author
  • Pablo Delgado
    • 2
  • Marc Garcia
    • 1
  • Marta García
    • 2
  • Marc Roig
    • 1
  • María O. Valentín
    • 2
  • Mateu Villaret
    • 1
  1. 1.Departament d’Informàtica, Matemàtica Aplicada i EstadísticaUniversitat de GironaGironaSpain
  2. 2.Organización Nacional de TrasplantesMadridSpain
  3. 3.TAISAPozuelo de AlarcónSpain

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