Abstract
The referendum of October 1st 2017 on Catalan Secession and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Catalonia were the culmination of the grave political and constitutional crisis in Spain started in September 11th 2012 by Catalan authorities. The referendum was both unilateral and illegal. The law on such Referendum was passed by Catalan Parliament on 6th September without any agreement with Catalan opposition parties and the Spanish government. The Constitutional Court suspended and later annulated the law. In this Chapter we refer to the contradiction of such Referendum on Secession with democratic and legal guarantees according to Spanish Constitutional, theoretical and European (Venice Commission) standards.
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- 1.
Later in this chapter I will refer in greater detail to the differences between the concepts of referendum, popular consultation, popular consultation without referendum and participative process, used by the promoters of the consultation. For now it is sufficient to point out that for Catalan and Basque nationalists popular consultation is used as a generic term that can include: (a) the formal binding referendum, and (b) other kind of non-binding consultations without the requirements of the Spanish Constitution for referendum (at territorial level it requires the authorization of the National Government) but also meaning a formal vote. However, according to Spanish constitutional law, popular consultation includes referendum, binding or consultative, and other kind of consultations without vote.
- 2.
The first report of the Advisory Council for the National Transition (Consell Assessor per a la Transició Nacional) published on 2013 establishes five ways to exercise the right to decide. Beyond constitutional reform (1), the report envisages the following legal paths: (2) the non-binding referendum set forth in Article 92 of the Spanish Constitution and developed by the Organic Law 2/1980, on referendums, that should be called by the Spanish Congress after the petition of the President of the Spanish Government; (3) the delegation by the Spanish Parliament to the Catalan government of the competence on authorization of referendums (Article 149.1.32 Spanish Constitution); (4) the non-binding referendum established by the Catalan Law 4/2010, on popular consultation through referendums; and (5) the so called non-referendum popular consultation that was to be approved later by the Catalan Parliament through the Law 10/2014, 27 September.
- 3.
Two questions were asked: first, do you want Catalonia to become a State; and second, do you want it to become an independent State. Results show that around a third of the Catalan population took part in the process. Of these, 80% favoured independence. According to official data, 2,305,290 Catalans voted. In favour of independence (Yes+Yes) 1, 861,753 votes (80.76%); 232,182 (10.07%) in favour of a State (Yes+No); and 104,772 (4.54%) against both options, which means in favour of status quo. See: http://web.gencat.cat/ca/actualitat/detall/20141110_participacio-resultats.
- 4.
As has been said, the 2015 elections show that pro-independence parties (the new coalition Junts pel Si composed of Convergència and Esquerra Republicana, and CUP) did not achieve a majority in votes (only 48%). Yet, due to the electoral system they achieved an overall majority of seats in the Parliament (62+10).
- 5.
The Constitutional Affairs Commission rejected (24 votes against and 1 in favour) the amendment of Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution Draft, advanced by the Basque nationalist MP F. Letamendía. Such an amendment foresaw a procedure to exercise the right to self-determination (with the organization of a referendum called by a regional Parliament and with the favourable voting of all affected provinces). During the debate, the main arguments used to reject it were the following: 1. That Spain is not a confederation, not even a federation; 2. Spanish people as a whole are the sovereign power; and 3. The principle of unity and indivisibility of the nation. Besides, MPs argued that the public international law regime of the right to self-determination does not grant any right to entities within democratic and fully representative States, like the one Spain was trying to create. See Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales. Congreso de los Diputados, 91, 16 June 1978, 3427–3435.
- 6.
See: Articles 151.1, 151.2, 152.2 and fourth transitory disposition of the Spanish Constitution.
- 7.
This is what has been argued in Castellà Andreu (2016), pp. 561–592.
- 8.
- 9.
I have referred to that in Castellà Andreu (2014), pp. 829–830. From a different perspective, Jaria I Manzano (2015) distinguishes between a first moment to verify or confirm the Catalan will in favour of secession, in accordance with the Spanish constitutional order, and a second moment of “inevitable” constitutional rupture.
- 10.
See the work Vírgala Foruría (2017), where this type of clause is considered adequate to face the difficult appeasement of the Basque and Catalan nationalisms within the Spanish constitutional order. Also Aláez Corral (2015), who refers interchangeably to right to and procedure of secession, the aim of such a clause would be to “channel the right to external self-determination” of the affected territories. Therefore, it should have a unilateral nature and it would be organized in two stages: initiative by a 2/3 of the regional Parliament, two years period to negotiating an alternative to secession and referendum that would require a qualified majority, that “could be” 2/3 of the population affected. In the event of rejection, the referendum could only be organized again after a certain lapse of time: 16–18 years (169 ff).
- 11.
Recently CEO (Political Opinion Barometer of the Catalan Government) of 30 March 2017, pp. 9–10, showed the following results if there were more than two options for the future of Catalonia: Independent State is favoured by 37.3%, Federal State by 21.7%, current situation by 28.5% and Region of Spain by 7% (less autonomy). See http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/index.html.
- 12.
- 13.
E.g. the First Report of the Advisory Council for National Transition published on 25 July 2013 and included in Consell Assessor (2014). The Report cites several times as an authoritative source the general rules of the Code of Good Practices on referendums of the Venice Commission but not the opinions for constitutional and secession referendums (see footnotes 24, 25 and 26). See: p. 69, 76, 84, 95, 109, 163 and 166 of the Report. A critical assessment of the references to the Venice Commission in López Basaguren (2016), pp. 172–177.
- 14.
Lastly MP Joan Coscubiela (Catalunya Si que es pot), Plenary Seating Parlament Catalonia 27 April 2017, See http://www.parlament.cat/document/trancripcio/211509.pdf.
- 15.
Above all, in the Code of Good Practice on Referendums: CDL-AD (2007)008rev. And recently the Compilation of Venice Commission opinions and reports concerning referendums, CDL (2017)002.
- 16.
CDL-AD (2010)001, Report on Constitutional Amendment.
- 17.
2005 Opinion on Montenegro, which is reiterated in the 2014 Crimea opinion. Both are cases of secession of a territory from the State it used to belong to. And both cases have been dealt with by the Venice Commission specifically. See: CDL-AD (2005)041 Opinion on the Compatibility of the Existing Legislation in Montenegro concerning the Organization of Referendums with Applicable International Standards; and CDL-AD (2014)002 Opinion on “whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 constitution is compatible with constitutional principles”, n. 25.
- 18.
CDL-AD (2015)014 Joint Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, n. 25. This is a joint Opinion with OSCE, in relation to constitutional referendums, but we understand it can also be applied to referendums on secession.
- 19.
As was stated in the Montenegro Opinion, “to pass this test of legitimacy the referendum must be conducted in accordance with minimum standards of legality and good electoral practice…” See CDL-AD (2005)041, cit., n. 11.
- 20.
“It is to be stressed that the use of referendums should comply with the national constitutional system as a whole. As a main rule, a referendum on constitutional amendment should not be held unless the constitution explicitly provides for this…”, CDL-AD (2010)001, Report on Constitutional Amendment, cit., n. 185. This is stressed in CDL-AD (2015)014 Joint Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, cit. n. 26.
- 21.
“Representative democracy is certainly as legitimate as direct democracy on issues such as these [constitutional amendment], and may often be the more suitable procedure for in-depth discussion and evaluation”, Report on Constitutional Amendment, cit., n. 185. As the Venice Commission has recalled “There is no international (or European) standard on the extent which should be given (or not) to instruments of direct democracy at national, regional or under-regional level. Nor is there a standard imposing their mere existence. What can be said is that there is a trend to extend them, especially at the infra-national level, which has always been a laboratory for innovations in the field of democracy. (…) These instruments of direct and participatory democracy should be seen as complementing representative democracy. ‘Parliamentary democracy supported by free and fair elections ensuring representativeness, (political) pluralism, and the equality of citizens’, is the core, but not the only aspect, of the democratic process”. See: CDL-AD (2015)009, Opinion on the Citizens’ bill on the regulation of public participation, citizens’ bills, referendums and popular initiatives and amendments to the Provincial Electoral Las of the Autonomous Province of Trento (Italy) n. 81.
- 22.
In the referred joint Opinion with OSCE, the Venice Commission warns “against constitutional referenda without a prior qualified majority vote in Parliament”. See: CDL-AD (2015)014 Join Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, n. 25.
- 23.
CDL-AD (2010)001, Report on Constitutional Amendment, cit., n. 183.
- 24.
Opinion on Montenegro, See CDL-AD (2005)041, n. 16.
- 25.
See the Opinion CDL-INF (2001)023. Interim Report of the Constitutional situation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, n. 24. The 2005 Opinion on Montenegro is stressed, cit., n. 16: “To make possible the holding of a fair and democratic referendum, and to enable the outcome of a referendum to be accepted as legitimate both in Serbia and Montenegro and in the international community at large…”
- 26.
See: CDL-AD (2015)014 Joint Opinion on the draft law “on introduction of changes and amendments to the Constitution” of the Kyrgyz Republic, cit., n. 27. This is an observation valid for any constitutional referendum.
- 27.
Code of Good Practice on Referendums, CDL-AD (2007)008rev, n. III.7. In relation to constitutional referendums, the Commission admits that many constitutions foresee certain quorums, See CDL-AD (2010)001, Report on Constitutional Amendment, ns. 49–50.
- 28.
In the 2005 Montenegro Opinion the Commission argues in favour of a rule requiring a qualified majority of those voting. See CDL-AD (2005)041, ns. 29, 34, 37. As is well known, in the referendum on secession a minimum turnout of 50% and 55% of affirmative votes were required.
- 29.
“The principle of the sovereignty of the people allows the latter to take decisions only in accordance with the law. The use of referendums must be permitted only where it is provided for by the Constitution or a statute in conformity with the latter, and the procedural rules applicable to referendums must be followed”. CDL-AD (2007)008rev, Code of Good Practice on Referendums, n. 26. This idea is pointed out in several opinions, i.e. CDL-INF (2001)023, Interim Report of the Constitutional situation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, n. 17, cit.: “Democracy cannot be reduced to a simple reflection of the popular will. In a State respecting the principles of the Council of Europe decisions have to be taken in accordance with the Law…”, and CDL-INF (2000)013, Opinion on the Constitutional amendments concerning legislative elections in the Republic of Slovenia, pp. 3–4 “This is all the more so as the referendum cannot be regarded as an exercise of sovereign power by the people, but rather it is the expression of the will of the people by a means regulated within the framework of the Constitution.”
- 30.
See CDL-AD (2014)002, cit. n. 10.
- 31.
“The timeframe of one month between the publication of the draft Constitution and the date of the referendum was extremely short”, CDL-AD (2007)045, n. 57. Opinion on the constitutional situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.
- 32.
In the abovementioned Opinion on Montenegro. See CDL-AD (2005)041, n. 16.
- 33.
“The unity of content between the various proposals should be ensured, in order to avoid any falsification of the voters’ intention”. See CDL-AD (2015)009, n. 62. Opinion on the Citizens’ bill on the regulation of public participation, citizens’ bills, referendums and popular initiatives and amendments to the Provincial Electoral Las of the Autonomous Province of Trento (Italy). In this opinion it refers to advisory referendums, but it can be applied to any type of referendums.
- 34.
Opinion on Montenegro, CDL-AD (2005)041, cit., ns. 12, 14, 15 and 17. Many of these provisions are to be found for any type of referendum in CDL-AD (2005)028, Opinion on Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1704 (2005) on Referendums: towards good practices in Europe. And later they are incorporated in the Good Practices Code on referendums, CDL-AD (2007)008rev, n. 1.3.1.
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Acknowledgements
This paper is a result of the activities of the Study Group on Democracy and Constitutionalism (GEDECO. Consolidated research group by the Catalan Government in 2014, SGR 1597, and confirmed in 2017) and of the Project funded by MINECO DER2015-68160-C3-3-P “Interaction between representation and participation in the legislative decision-making”.
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Castellà Andreu, J.M. (2019). Constitution and Referendum on Secession in Catalonia. In: López-Basaguren, A., Escajedo San-Epifanio, L. (eds) Claims for Secession and Federalism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59707-2_23
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