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Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Singleton Congestion Games

  • Tobias Harks
  • Veerle TimmermansEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10328)

Abstract

We devise the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium for atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and player-specific affine cost functions. Our algorithm is purely combinatorial and computes the exact equilibrium assuming rational input. The idea is to compute a pure Nash equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable singleton congestion game in which the players can only split their demands in integral multiples of a common packet size. While integral games have been considered in the literature before, no polynomial time algorithm computing an equilibrium was known. Also for this class, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm and use it as a building block for our main algorithm.

Keywords

Polynomial Time Algorithm Packet Size Full Version Strategy Profile Strategy Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of MathematicsUniversity of AugsburgAugsburgGermany
  2. 2.Department of Quantitative EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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