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International Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization

IPCO 2017: Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization pp 442–454Cite as

Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Singleton Congestion Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 10328))

Abstract

We devise the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium for atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and player-specific affine cost functions. Our algorithm is purely combinatorial and computes the exact equilibrium assuming rational input. The idea is to compute a pure Nash equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable singleton congestion game in which the players can only split their demands in integral multiples of a common packet size. While integral games have been considered in the literature before, no polynomial time algorithm computing an equilibrium was known. Also for this class, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm and use it as a building block for our main algorithm.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, University of Augsburg, 86135, Augsburg, Germany

    Tobias Harks

  2. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Veerle Timmermans

Authors
  1. Tobias Harks
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  2. Veerle Timmermans
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Veerle Timmermans .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne - EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Friedrich Eisenbrand

  2. University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Jochen Koenemann

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Harks, T., Timmermans, V. (2017). Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Singleton Congestion Games. In: Eisenbrand, F., Koenemann, J. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10328. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59250-3_36

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59250-3_36

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59249-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-59250-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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