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On the Duty of Cooperation, Consistency and Influence in the External Relations of the Euro-Zone: Representation of EU and EU Member States in the International Monetary Fund

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 8))

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Abstract

The question of unified representation by the euro area in international financial institutions has been discussed more or less since the introduction of the common currency. In 2015 the Commission adopted a new proposal for a Council decision laying down measures in view of progressively establishing unified representation of the euro area in the IMF. This paper introduces the IMF and its key functions in light of the EU Member State competence division. Second, it discusses the IMF decision-making structures and EU participation in them following the 2010 IMF governance reforms. It explores the current arrangements for ensuring EU coherence and the current proposals for their improvement in light of the broader legal framework relating to external competence, with a focus on EU influence and its meaning in the IMF context. The Commission proposal focuses largely on the political justifications relating to unified representation while disregarding the legal arguments that would support the objective. While focusing on unified representation of the euro area, the proposal disregards the question of Member States outside the euro. Finally, the paper argues that the mechanisms of unified representation should build on the realistic understanding that often there will not be a common position, and there might not even be justified reasons to aim for one.

I thank Daniel Wyatt for research assistance, and Marise Cremona, Joni Heliskoski and Tuomas Saarenheimo for discussions and comments on an earlier draft. I also thank the experts at the Finnish permanent mission in Geneva and at the EU for answering my queries concerning some of the practical arrangements.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    De la Rochère (1999), p. 445.

  2. 2.

    Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 1997, para. 46.

  3. 3.

    Vienna European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11 and 12 December 1998, para. 15.

  4. 4.

    See European Commission, COM (1998) 637 final.

  5. 5.

    Louis (2013), p. 193.

  6. 6.

    International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF, Statement by Guido Mantega, Minister of Finance, Ministerio de Fazenda, Brazil, 16 April 2011, https://www.imf.org/External/spring/2011/imfc/statement/eng/bra.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), paras. 14–16.

  7. 7.

    International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF, Statement by Guido Mantega, Minister of Finance, Ministerio de Fazenda, Brazil, 20 April 2013, https://www.imf.org/External/spring/2013/imfc/statement/eng/bra.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), para. 14.

  8. 8.

    Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 227.

  9. 9.

    European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision laying down measures in view of progressively establishing unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund, COM (2015) 603 final.

  10. 10.

    European Commission, COM (2015) 603 final.

  11. 11.

    European Council, European Council meeting (17 and 18 December 2015) Conclusions, EUCO 28/15, 18 December 2015, para. 14.

  12. 12.

    See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 6 April 2016 on a proposal for a Council Decision laying down measures in view of progressively establishing unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund (CON /2016/22).

  13. 13.

    European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union Launching a European Debate, COM (2012) 777 final.

  14. 14.

    European Commission, The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  15. 15.

    European Commission, A roadmap for moving towards a more consistent external representation of the euro area in international fora, COM (2015) 602 final.

  16. 16.

    European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision laying down measures in view of progressively establishing unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund, COM (2015) 603 final.

  17. 17.

    See Hillion (2008).

  18. 18.

    The Convention drafting the provisions also discussed specifically the issue of European representation in IFIs. See The European Convention Praesidium, EU External Action, CONV 161/02, 3 July 2002. The Treaty included Article 111(4) TEC, which enabled the Council to decide on a joint position “at international level as regards issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union and on its representation, in compliance with the allocation of powers laid down in Articles 99 and 105”. No measures were adopted on that legal basis.

  19. 19.

    The European Convention Praesidium, EU External Action, CONV 161/02, 3 July 2002, discusses how “[t]here is widespread acknowledgement amongst Europe’s citizens of the potential benefits to be gained when the European Union acts collectively on the global stage. At the same time, there is criticism that the Union’s international impact currently falls short of what might reasonably be expected given its economic weight, its high degree of internal integration and the resources collectively at its disposal.”

  20. 20.

    European Commission, Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, COM (2006) 278 final.

  21. 21.

    Article 2 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30.

  22. 22.

    See however Articles 208 and 212 TFEU relating to development cooperation and technical assistance, which specifically refer to how the “Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other” and how the “Union’s operations and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other”.

  23. 23.

    On this, see Heliskoski (2010) and Larik (2018).

  24. 24.

    Jørgensen et al. (2011), p. 612.

  25. 25.

    Cremona (2011), p. 58.

  26. 26.

    Wessel (2011), p. 17 et seq.

  27. 27.

    Wessel (2011), p. 17 et seq.

  28. 28.

    European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), para. 17.

  29. 29.

    Wessel (2011) p. 18.

  30. 30.

    Council of the European Union, EU Statements in multilateral organisations – General Arrangements, 15901/11, 22 October 2011, para. 2.

  31. 31.

    Council of the European Union, EU Statements in multilateral organisations – General Arrangements, 15901/11, 22 October 2011, para. 3.

  32. 32.

    See Council of the European Union, EU Statements in multilateral organisations – General Arrangements – United Kingdom Statement, 15855/11 ADD2, 21 October 2011. See also Council of the European Union, EU Statements in multilateral organisations – General Arrangements – German Statement, 15855/11 ADD3, 22 October 2011.

  33. 33.

    See Wessel (2011).

  34. 34.

    Leino and Salminen (2017).

  35. 35.

    Leino and Salminen (2017).

  36. 36.

    The ECB Statute also includes a specific provision on International cooperation in Article 6, which empowers the ECB to decide how the ESCB is to be represented in the field of international cooperation involving the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, and to participate in international monetary institutions, without prejudice to Article 138 TFEU. In fact, some authors have promoted the membership of the ECB in the IMF—a somewhat odd suggestion considering that it is not an organization for central banks but for states. See Horng (2005).

  37. 37.

    The expansive wording of these purposes has enabled the IMF to weather challenges posed by “diverse economic circumstances”, see Lasta (2000), p. 512.

  38. 38.

    See Smaghi (2004).

  39. 39.

    Article II, section 2 of the IMF AoA.

  40. 40.

    Smaghi (2004), p. 203 regarding comments about Europe being overrepresented.

  41. 41.

    For a full list of voting shares post-2010 reform see IMF, Quota and voting shares before and after implementation of reforms agreed in 2008 and 2010 (in percentage shares of total IMF quota), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  42. 42.

    For example the US Congress did not approve the reforms until December 2015. See IMF, Press release No. 15/573, 18 December 2015.

  43. 43.

    See IMF, Press release No. 16/25, 27 January 2016.

  44. 44.

    The IMF is tasked with surveillance responsibilities and member countries with compliance responsibilities pursuant to Article IV, section 3 of the IMF AoA.

  45. 45.

    For the most recent one concerning the euro area, see IMF Country Report No. 16/219, July 2016.

  46. 46.

    IMF, Press release No. 13/79, 15 March 2013.

  47. 47.

    IMF, Finland: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2016 Article IV Mission, 4 October 2016, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/10/03/MS100416-Finland-Staff-Concluding-Statement-of-the-2016-Article-IV-Mission (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  48. 48.

    CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, para. 63.

  49. 49.

    This conclusion is founded on data that can be found in the IMF Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) Database, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/mona/Country.aspx (last accessed 1 March 2017). Since 2000 there have been altogether 170 programs funded by the IMF.

  50. 50.

    CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2009:84, para. 30 et seq.

  51. 51.

    CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, para. 63.

  52. 52.

    On this, see Heliskoski (2010), p. 150.

  53. 53.

    On this, see Brandner and Grech (2009), p. 11.

  54. 54.

    Article XII, section 2(b) of the IMF AoA; Brandner and Grech (2009), p. 11.

  55. 55.

    See IMF, Factsheet: A guide to committees, groups and clubs, 26 September 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  56. 56.

    Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 224.

  57. 57.

    Section 11 of the IMF By-Laws. For the Executive Board, sections C10 and C11 of the Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund.

  58. 58.

    For a full exploration of consensus-based decision-making at the IMF see, Van Houtven (2002), pp. 20–31.

  59. 59.

    Van Houtven (2002), pp. 20–31.

  60. 60.

    Article XII, section 3(a) of the IMF AoA.

  61. 61.

    Prior to the 2010 reforms, the five countries with the largest IMF quotas could appoint their Executive Director. The remaining Executive Directors were elected by the countries unable to appoint their own Executive Director.

  62. 62.

    IMF Finance Department, Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 45, Fifth Edition 1988, p. 4.

  63. 63.

    See Decision No. 11875 (99/1), 21 December 1998; substituted by Decision No. 12925 (03/1), 27 December 2002; as amended by Decision No. 13414 (05/01), 23 December 2004, Decision No. 13612 (05/108), 22 December 2005, and Decision No. 14517 (10/1), 5 January 2010; Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 224.

  64. 64.

    See Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 227.

  65. 65.

    See, DNB, IMF governance reform: open economies have a place at the table, DNBulletin, 17 October 2012, http://www.dnb.nl/en/news/news-and-archive/dnbulletin-2012/dnb279658.jsp (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  66. 66.

    International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF, Statement by Guido Mantega, Minister of Finance, Ministerio de Fazenda, Brazil, 13 October 2012, https://www.imf.org/External/AM/2012/imfc/statement/eng/bra.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 3.

  67. 67.

    See Wouters et al. (2014).

  68. 68.

    See Smaghi (2004), p. 247.

  69. 69.

    The IMF AoA previously included a provision prohibiting the election of Executive Directors representing more than 9%, see Brandner and Grech (2009), p. 9.

  70. 70.

    See e.g., Hervé 2012 p. 11 et seq.; Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad%20euifigovernance.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 11 et seq.

  71. 71.

    For a reference to the earlier practices, see European Commission, COM (2015) 602 final, para. 4.1(a).

  72. 72.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 12.

  73. 73.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 11 et seq.

  74. 74.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 10.

  75. 75.

    Hervé (2012), p. 8 et seq.

  76. 76.

    Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 225.

  77. 77.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 9.

  78. 78.

    Wouters and Van Kerckhoven (2013), p. 225; Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 9.

  79. 79.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 9.

  80. 80.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 9.

  81. 81.

    European Parliament, External Representation of the Euro Area, IP/A/ECON/FWC/2010_19, May 2012, p. 36.

  82. 82.

    Eurodad, European Coordination at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund: A Question of Harmony?, January 2006, p. 12.

  83. 83.

    European Commission, COM (2015) 602 final; European Commission, COM (2015) 603 final.

  84. 84.

    See also Cremona (2011), p. 59.

  85. 85.

    Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.

  86. 86.

    European Commission, COM (2015) 603 final.

  87. 87.

    European Commission, COM (2015) 603 final.

  88. 88.

    See e.g. ECB, The external representation of the EU and EMU, ECB Monthly Bulletin 05/2011.

  89. 89.

    See CJEU, opinion 2/91, Convention N° 170 of the International Labour Organization, ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para. 36.

  90. 90.

    See Hillion (2009).

  91. 91.

    CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258.

  92. 92.

    See Heliskoski (2010), p. 159 (emphasis in original).

  93. 93.

    CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2009:84, para. 28.

  94. 94.

    Den Hertog and Stroß (2013), p. 388. Even the powers falling under CFSP must be exercised in a “manner consistent with Community law”: “Consequently, while it is for Member States to adopt measures of foreign and security policy in the exercise of their national competence, those measures must nevertheless respect the provisions adopted by the Community in the field of the common commercial policy provided for by Article 113 of the Treaty”. CJEU, case C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com v HM Treasury and Bank of England, ECLI:EU:C:1997:8, paras. 24–26.

  95. 95.

    See CJEU, case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2005:341, para. 58; CJEU, case C-433/03, Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2005:462, para. 64.

  96. 96.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, paras. 103–105. For a discussion, see Casteleiro and Larik (2011).

  97. 97.

    Heliskoski (2010), p. 154.

  98. 98.

    Further on this, see Heliskoski (2010).

  99. 99.

    See CJEU, case C-370/12, Pringle v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756; and more recently, CJEU, joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P, Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701, para. 52: “It should be recalled that, as is apparent from the statement by the Eurogroup of 27 June 2012, the Commission and the ECB were entrusted with the task of negotiating with the Cypriot authorities a macro-economic adjustment programme to be set out in the form of a memorandum of understanding. When the Commission and the ECB participated in the negotiations with the Cypriot authorities, provided their technical expertise, gave advice and provided guidance, they acted within the limits of the powers granted to them by Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. Participation of the Commission and the ECB, as envisaged by that provision, in the procedure resulting in the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 April 2013 does not enable the latter to be classified as an act that can be imputed to them.”

  100. 100.

    CJEU, opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, ECLI:EU:C:1979:224, para. 60.

  101. 101.

    A study on the “External representation of the Euro Area” commissioned in 2012 by the European Parliament proposes that the ESM could be used in the longer run as the institution channelling the fiscal aspects of euro states’ relations with the IMF, for example by merging their quotas in the ESM and through representation at the IMF by its Managing Director. European Parliament, External Representation of the Euro Area, IP/A/ECON/FWC/2010_19, May 2012, p. 30.

  102. 102.

    On this, see e.g. Leino and Saarenheimo (2017).

  103. 103.

    CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258, para. 63.

  104. 104.

    Opinion by AG Tesauro to CJEU, case C-53/96, Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV, ECLI:EU:C:1991:539, para. 21.

  105. 105.

    See Opinion by AG Tesauro to CJEU, case C-53/96, Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice, ECLI:EU:C:1991:539, fn. 33, referring to the WTO context and matters governed by the TRIPs Agreement.

  106. 106.

    Hillion (2009), p. 20.

  107. 107.

    See Heliskoski (2010).

  108. 108.

    Heliskoski (2010), p. 159.

  109. 109.

    Membership in the Basel Committee is limited to the central banks of nine EU states, the ECB and the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

  110. 110.

    Participation in the FSB is limited to national authorities from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the ECB.

  111. 111.

    CJEU, case C-25/94, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:1996:114, para. 7, section 2.3: “Where an agenda item deals with matters containing elements both of national and of Community competence, the aim will be to achieve a common position by consensus. If a common position can be achieved:—the Presidency shall express the common position when the thrust of the issue lies in an area outside the exclusive competence of the Community. Member States and the Commission may speak to support and/or to add to the Presidency statement. Member States will vote in accordance with the common position;—the Commission shall express the common position when the thrust of the issue lies in an area within the exclusive competence of the Community. Member States may speak to support and/or add to the Commission’s statement. The Commission will vote in accordance with the common position.” For further discussion concerning the FAO case, see Heliskoski (2000).

  112. 112.

    On this, see also the court’s recent ruling in CJEU, case C-660/13, Council v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2016:616.

  113. 113.

    CJEU, joined cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:702, paras. 46–48 and 61.

  114. 114.

    See CJEU, case C-28/12, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:282.

  115. 115.

    See, e.g., Wouters et al. (2012), p. 6.

  116. 116.

    The Economist, World to Europe: If you must hog G20 seats, could you at least talk less? 28 March 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/03/too_many_europeans_g20 (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  117. 117.

    At the heads of state level the EU is represented in G20 by the President of the Commission and the President of the Council, whereas at the finance ministers level the EU is represented by the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, the rotating Council presidency and the Head of the ECB.

    See also Wouters et al. (2012), p. 5.

  118. 118.

    Debaere and Orbie (2013), p. 316. Wouters et al. (2012), p. 5.

  119. 119.

    European Commission, COM (2006) 278 final.

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  1. UEF Law School, Helsinki, Finland

    Päivi Leino

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  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, SaarbrĂĽcken, Germany

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  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-NĂĽrnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Christian Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of LĂĽneburg, LĂĽneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Leino, P. (2017). On the Duty of Cooperation, Consistency and Influence in the External Relations of the Euro-Zone: Representation of EU and EU Member States in the International Monetary Fund. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C., Terhechte, J., Ziegler, A. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58832-2_20

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