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Good Raw Materials Governance: Towards a European Approach Contributing to a Constitutionalised International Economic Law

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 8))

Abstract

The European Union is currently in the process of adopting a regulation on so-called “conflict minerals”. Against this background, the contribution provides some thoughts on this evolving European approach towards the promotion of good raw materials governance. For that purpose, it first assesses the concept of good global governance stipulated as one of the foreign policy objectives in Article 21 TEU with particular emphasis on its regulatory content and the respective scope of application. Subsequently, the contribution specifically addresses the normative steering relevance of this principle for the regulatory design of international trade in raw materials. In the third part an attempt will be made to outline and evaluate the respective EU governance processes aimed at translating the abstract concept of good governance into specific legal instruments and practices, thereby primarily taking recourse to the ongoing deliberations among EU institutions on the said conflict minerals regulation. Finally, the concluding section of the contribution provides a kind of bird’s-eye view on some of the expected implications of the European good raw materials governance for the future development of what is here referred to as a constitutionalised international economic law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See also already, e.g., Krajewski (2005), p. 92: “the common commercial policy was and still is the most important constitutional battleground for European external relations”.

  2. 2.

    On this perception see for example also Cottier and Trinberg (2015), para. 7.

  3. 3.

    Generally on the distinction between the contractual and the autonomous trade policy in the area of the EU common commercial policy see, e.g., Khan (2015), para. 17 et seq.; Oppermann et al. (2016), p. 653 et seq.; Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (2011), p. 963 et seq.

  4. 4.

    See thereto, e.g., Vedder (2013), p. 127 et seq.; Weiß (2014), p. 527.

  5. 5.

    Vedder (2013), p. 137, with further references.

  6. 6.

    Cremona (2004), p. 568: “the lengthy and wide-ranging list of external policy objectives […] is unlikely to bring about a greater policy focus”.

  7. 7.

    See the references provided by Larik (2016), p. 168.

  8. 8.

    See thereto for example also Tietje (2009), p. 19 et seq.; Hahn (2016), para. 5 et seq.; Bungenberg (2010), p. 128; Terhechte (2012), para. 7.

  9. 9.

    Meng (1997), p. 271 et seq.; Boor and Nowrot (2014), p. 241.

  10. 10.

    See also, e.g., Krajewski (2012), p. 297; Boysen (2014), p. 468 et seq.; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), paras. 37 et seq.

  11. 11.

    See for example GG, case T-512/12, Front Polisario/Council, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, para. 164 et seq.

  12. 12.

    See also, e.g., Dimopoulos (2010), p. 165; Herrmann and Müller-Ibold (2016), p. 647; Hahn (2016), para. 4; Tietje (2015a), p. 802; Krajewski (2016), p. 243.

  13. 13.

    See also for example Larik (2016), p. 154 et seq.; Dimopoulos (2010), p. 165; Krajewski (2016), p. 242; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), para. 24; Cremer (2016), para. 2.

  14. 14.

    Thereto among others also for example Terhechte (2012), para. 8; Lachmayer (2015), para. 11; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), para. 24; Krajewski (2016), p. 242.

  15. 15.

    Vedder (2013), p. 127.

  16. 16.

    Generally on the importance of this normative steering principle in the context of the Union’s common commercial policy see, e.g., Dimopoulos (2010), p. 165: “Last but not least, Article 21 TEU identifies multilateralism and good governance as basic objectives of EU external action. The recognition of these objectives plays a very significant role for the orientation of the CCP.”

  17. 17.

    See in particular World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth—A Long-Term Perspective Study, Washington D.C., November 1989; IMF, Good Governance—The IMF’s Role, approved by the IMF Executive Board on 25 July 1997, Washington D.C., August 1997. See thereto also, e.g., Wouters and Ryngaert (2005), p. 71 et seq.

  18. 18.

    For a more detailed assessment of these activities see for example Maldonado Pyschny (2013), p. 127 et seq.; Nowrot (2014), p. 571 et seq., each with further references.

  19. 19.

    Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, Council and Member States, Meeting within the Council, 28 November 1991, http://archive.idea.int/lome/bgr_docs/resolution.html (last accessed 1 March 2017), para. 5: “The Council stresses the importance of good governance. While sovereign States have the right to institute their own administrative structures and establish their own constitutional arrangements, equitable development can only effectively and sustainably be achieved if a number of general principles of government are adhered to: […]. The Community and Member States will support the efforts of developing countries to advance good governance and these principles will be central in their existing or new development cooperation relationships.” For subsequent recourses to this ordering idea see, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Implementation of the Resolution of the Council and of the Member States Meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, adopted on 28 November 1991, SEC(92) 1915 final of 21 October 1992; Commission of the European Communities, Democratization, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP States, COM (1998) 146 final of 12 March 1998, para. 12 et seq.; Commission of the European Communities, Governance and Development, COM (2003) 615 final of 20 October 2003, para. 2 et seq.

  20. 20.

    See thereto, e.g., Rudolf (2006), p. 1026 et seq.; Seppänen (2003), p. 123; Maldonado Pyschny (2013), p. 147 et seq.

  21. 21.

    OJ 2009 L 57/2. Generally on the role of good governance in the EU development policy see for example Kuon (2010), p. 17 et seq.; Hilpold (2002), p. 53 et seq.

  22. 22.

    OJ 1999 L 311/3.

  23. 23.

    OJ 2002 L 352/3.

  24. 24.

    OJ 2012 L 204/20.

  25. 25.

    OJ 2012 L 346/3.

  26. 26.

    OJ 2014 L 260/4.

  27. 27.

    OJ 2014 L 261/4.

  28. 28.

    OJ 2012 L 303/1. Generally on this steering instrument see, e.g., Turksen (2009), p. 927 et seq.

  29. 29.

    On this perception see, e.g., Verhey (2005), p. 66: “Many issues are discussed under the broad umbrella of ‘good governance’.” Kuon (2010), p. 252; Weiss and Steiner (2007), p. 1547.

  30. 30.

    Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Stocktaking on the Notions of “Good Governance” and “Good Administration”, CDL-AD(2011)009 of 8 April 2011, para. 66. See also for example Rudolf (2006), p. 1020: “In sum, these considerations show that despite some terminological uncertainties, central substantive elements of Good Governance are universally acknowledged irrespectable of the context in which the term is used.” Brown Weiss E, Sornarajah A, Good governance (last updated June 2013), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Online edition, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (last accessed 1 March 2017), para. 15: “However, it is possible to identify common elements of good governance, which are referenced by international institutions, non-governmental organizations, donor countries, and countries that are donees.”

  31. 31.

    On these normative elements of good governance see also, e.g., Brown Weiss E, Sornarajah A, Good governance (last updated June 2013), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Online edition, para. 15 et seq.; Esty (2006), p. 1530; Nowrot (2014), p. 581 et seq.

  32. 32.

    See for example Herdegen (2011), p. 230; Maldonado Pyschny (2013), p. 182.

  33. 33.

    See for example United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2 of 18 September 2000, para. 13: “good governance at the international level”; Commission of the European Communities, European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final of 25 July 2001, p. 10: “Five principles underpin good governance […] they apply to all levels of government – global, European, national, regional and local.” Final Report of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Accountability of International Organisations, 2004, www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9 (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 8 et seq.: “The principle of good governance (or of good administration), which is of an evolving nature, provides the necessary guidance as to the institutional and operational activities of an IO.” Brown Weiss E, Sornarajah A, Good governance (last updated June 2013), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Online edition, para. 63 et seq.

  34. 34.

    World Bank Policy on Access to Information of 1 July 2010, Introduction, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/391361468161959342/pdf/548730Access0I1y0Statement01Final1.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), para. 1.

  35. 35.

    Generally thereto for example Delbrück (2001), p. 1 et seq., with further references.

  36. 36.

    Commission of the European Communities, European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final of 25 July 2001, p. 10. See in this context also, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue—General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final of 11 December 2002; as well as Obradovic and Vizcaino (2006), p. 1049 et seq.

  37. 37.

    See in particular the influential characterization of global governance given by the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, 1995, p. 2 et seq.: “[…] the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. […] At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, multinational corporations and the global capital market. […] There is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances.” Moreover, e.g., Nowrot (2004), p. 5 et seq., with further references.

  38. 38.

    Generally on the regulatory technique of indirect obligations of conduct see already Nowrot (2015), p. 1165 et seq.; specifically on the importance of this approach in the present context Nowrot (2016a), p. 228 et seq.

  39. 39.

    OJ 2011 L 127/6.

  40. 40.

    OJ 2002 L 352/1444. Generally on the OECD Guidelines see OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 edition, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  41. 41.

    OJ 2012 L 354/3.

  42. 42.

    OJ 2014 L 161/3 (emphasis added).

  43. 43.

    Generally on the phenomenon of the so-called “natural resource curse” see for example WTO, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources, 2010, p. 91 et seq.; DeKoninck (2015), p. 134 et seq., each with numerous further references.

  44. 44.

    For a more in-depth assessment of this transnational steering regime see, e.g., Brouder (2009a), p. 849 et seq., with further references. For an overview and evaluation of other related normative instruments see for example Al Faruque (2006), p. 72 et seq.

  45. 45.

    See for example Article 280 of the EU-Georgia association agreement: “The Parties shall cooperate to enhance good governance in the tax area, with a view to the further improvement of economic relations, trade, investment and fair competition.” See also, e.g., the Resolution of the European Parliament of 10 February 2010 on promoting good governance in tax matters, OJ 2010 C 341E/94; European Commission, Tax and Development Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, COM (2010) 163 final.

  46. 46.

    See thereto as well as generally on the correlation between natural resources and civil wars Ross (2004), p. 35 et seq.; Smillie (2013), p. 1003 et seq.; as well as specifically with regard to the violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo more recently Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 26 November 2014, UN Doc. S/2015/19 of 12 January 2015, paras. 73 et seq. and 156 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Meessen (2015), p. 173.

  48. 48.

    Generally on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme see, e.g., Brouder (2009b), p. 969 et seq.; Meessen (2015), p. 173 et seq.; Vidal (2012), p. 505 et seq. On the role of the EU in this regime see, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds, OJ 2002 L 358/28; and Fernandez Arribas G, The European Union and the Kimberley process, CLEER Working Papers 2014/3, http://www.asser.nl/media/1645/cleer14-3_web.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 7 et seq.

  49. 49.

    UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1952 of 29 November 2010, para. 8, with reference to the Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 26 October 2010, S/2010/596 of 29 November 2010, para. 356 et seq. See also subsequently for example UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2198 of 29 January 2015, para. 20 et seq.

  50. 50.

    OECD Due Dilligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Second edition, November 2012, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 3.

  51. 51.

    Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203—July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1375 (2010), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017). The steering influence exercised by this legislation on the current EU initiative is for example illustrated by European Commission, SWD(2014) 53 final, pp. 8, 13 and passim; European Commission, Assessment of Due Dilligence Compliance Cost, Benefit and Related Effects on Selected Operators in Relation to the Responsible Sourcing of Selected Minerals, Final Report by Böhme K, Bugajski-Hochriegl P, Dos Santos M, September 2013, p. 9.

  52. 52.

    See thereto for example Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction: Dodd-Frank, SEC Regulations, and Legal Challenges, Congressional Research Service Report, April 2015, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43639.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 3 et seq.; Cullen (2016), p. 767 et seq.; Van Marter (2015), p. 297 et seq.; Schuele (2015), p. 769 et seq.; Schwartz (2016), p. 140 et seq., with further references to the respective proceedings and judgments.

  53. 53.

    For a more detailed description of the personal scope of application of this provision see, e.g., Nelson (2014), p. 227 et seq.

  54. 54.

    On the possibility to expand the list of covered conflict minerals and its derivatives based on a respective determination by the US Secretary of State see section 1502(e)(4)(B) Dodd-Frank Act.

  55. 55.

    For a more detailed analysis of section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act and its regulatory content see already Nanda (2014), p. 288 et seq.; Nelson (2014), p. 219 et seq.; Harline (2015), p. 441 et seq.; Factor (2014), p. 93 et seq., each with further references.

  56. 56.

    For a vivid description of the supply chain for conflict minerals see for example European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final of 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  57. 57.

    See also already Brackett et al. (2015), p. 75; Ochoa and Keenan (2011), p. 137; Prenkert and Shackelford (2014), p. 475.

  58. 58.

    Generally on the notion of “law-realization” as being distinct from the considerably narrower concept of “law enforcement” see Tietje (1998), p. 132 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Zerk (2006), p. 36.

  60. 60.

    Specifically with regard to section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act see thereto also, e.g., Ochoa and Keenan (2011), p. 138 et seq.

  61. 61.

    Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ 2014 L 330/1.

  62. 62.

    Resolution of the European Parliament of 7 October 2010 on failures in protection of human rights and justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo, P7_TA(2010)0350, para. 14.

  63. 63.

    See for example European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2011 on increasing the impact of EU development policy, P7_TA(2011)0320, para. 60: “Calls on the Commission to make a legislative proposal with a similar objective to the new US ‘Conflict Minerals Law’, namely to combat the illegal exploitation of minerals in developing countries, in particular in Africa, which fuels civil war and conflicts, and to ensure traceability of imported minerals in the EU market”. European Parliament resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, para. 45 et seq.

  64. 64.

    COM (2014) 111 final.

  65. 65.

    For a more in-depth evaluation of the 2014 Commission’s draft regulation see also already for example Brackett et al. (2015), p. 80 et seq.; Vyboldina (2015), p. 341 et seq.; Nowrot (2016a), p. 240 et seq.

  66. 66.

    On this definition see in principle also already OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Second edition, November 2012, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017), p. 13.

  67. 67.

    See thereto, e.g., Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final of 5 March 2014, p. 7; European Commission, SWD(2014) 52 final, p. 3; Conflict Minerals—An Evaluation of the Dodd-Frank Act and other Resource-Related Measures, Öko-Institut e.V., August 2013, p. 27; Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), Conflict Due Dilligence by European Companies, SOMO Paper, October 2013, p. 3; Veale (2013), p. 533 et seq.; Brackett et al. (2015), p. 74 et seq.; for a more optimistic perception see, however, also Schwartz (2016), p. 171 et seq.

  68. 68.

    European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final of 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  69. 69.

    See thereto already my critical evaluation in Nowrot (2016a), p. 243.

  70. 70.

    For a more detailed evaluation, also on the envisioned incentives for as well as control mechanisms in case of participation in this self-certification process, see for example Brackett et al. (2015), p. 80 et seq.; Nowrot (2016a), p. 243 et seq.; Schuele (2015), p. 772 et seq.

  71. 71.

    Generally on the Union’s ordinary legislative procedure see, e.g., Schütze (2015), p. 243 et seq.; Streinz (2016), p. 196 et seq.

  72. 72.

    See for example European Parliament resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, para. 46(a): “create a legally binding obligation for all upstream companies operating in the EU that use and trade natural resources sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas and all downstream companies that act as the first placer on the European market to undertake supply chain due diligence to identify and mitigate the risk of conflict financing and human rights abuse”.

  73. 73.

    Thereto as well as with regard to all other amendments see Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 20 May 2015 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, P8_TA(2015)0204.

  74. 74.

    On the respective voting at the initiative of the Chair of the INTA Committee, Bernd Lange, see PV 20/05/2015—10.7.

  75. 75.

    On the approach of institutional trilogues in the EU legislative procedures see European Parliament/Council/Commission, Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure, OJ 2007 C 145/5; as well as, e.g., Schütze (2015), p. 249 et seq.; Chalmers (2015), p. 322 et seq., with further references.

  76. 76.

    See European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press release of 16 June 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20160615IPR32320/20160615IPR32320_en.pdf (last accessed 1 March 2017); European Council/Council of the EU, EU Political Deal to Curb Trade in Conflict Minerals, Press release 342/16 of 16 June 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2016/06/16-conflict-minerals/ (last accessed 1 March 2017); European Commission, Press release IP/16/2231.

  77. 77.

    See European Commission, Press release IP/16/2231.

  78. 78.

    European Parliament resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, para. 46(c).

  79. 79.

    European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press release of 16 June 2016; see also for example already Directorate-General for External Policies, Briefing—EU Initiative on Responsibly Importing Minerals from Conflict-Affected Regions, December 2014, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_195, p. 6: “To help ‘responsible importers’ determine whether their sources are in conflict-affected or high-risk areas, the European Commission will establish an expert group.”

  80. 80.

    The fact that the respective list will likely be non-exhaustive gives rise to a number of legal issues that cannot be addressed in the course of this comparatively short contribution (and can, in any case, only be dealt with in a meaningful way once a new draft proposal for an EU regulation on conflict minerals has been published).

  81. 81.

    See also already Brackett et al. (2015), p. 83 et seq.; Nowrot (2016a), p. 241 et seq.

  82. 82.

    For a vivid description with regard to the potentially adverse effects of section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act see Brackett et al. (2015), p. 76: “The result could in fact exacerbate the harm the Conflict Minerals Rule is seeking to address by increasing smuggling, weakening governance, and depressing prices for ore. Together, these factors make the violation of human rights even more likely.”

  83. 83.

    European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press release of 16 June 2016.

  84. 84.

    For additional information see http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/conflict-free-smelter-program/ (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  85. 85.

    For respective information on this initiative see https://www.itri.co.uk/itsci/frontpage (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  86. 86.

    European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press release of 16 June 2016.

  87. 87.

    See also draft recital 13 in European Commission, COM (2014) 111 final, p. 4; European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final of 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  88. 88.

    European Commission, Press release IP/16/2231.

  89. 89.

    Mac Amhlaigh (2016), p. 173 et seq.

  90. 90.

    See thereto, e.g., Krajewski (2013), p. 68 et seq.; Tietje and Nowrot (2016), p. 1469 et seq.; Larik (2016), p. 55 et seq., each with further references.

  91. 91.

    Larik (2016), p. 88 et seq.: “This chapter shows that foreign policy objectives abound in contemporary constitutional law. They are not the exception, but rather the rule, both within and outside the EU.”

  92. 92.

    Vedder (2013), p. 143 et seq.

  93. 93.

    Generally on the idea of a constitutionalisation of the EU foreign (trade) policy on the basis of constitutional-like foreign policy objectives see also for example von Arnauld (2014), p. 54; Krajewski (2016), p. 248; Larik (2016), p. 125 et seq.

  94. 94.

    See in this connection specifically with regard to the EU also for example Vedder (2013), p. 144: “constitutional commitment to a value-based global governance”.

  95. 95.

    See thereto, e.g., Nowrot (2006), p. 457 et seq.; Nowrot (2016b), p. 187 et seq., each with numerous further references.

  96. 96.

    See for example Tietje and Nowrot (2016), p. 1469 et seq.; Krajewski (2013), p. 68 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Generally on the correlation between the considerably increased parliamentarisation of the EU common commercial policy on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty on the one hand and the effective realization of the EU (non-economic) foreign policy goals see, e.g., Krajewski (2013), p. 83 et seq.; Bungenberg (2010), p. 129 et seq.; Tietje (2009), p. 21.

  98. 98.

    See for example US Supreme Court, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, Judgment of 23 March 1964, 376 U.S. 398, 428 et seq. (1964): “There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power to expropriate the property of aliens. […] It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations.” International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, 3, 47 et seq.: “Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of international activities of corporations, in particular of holding corporations, which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the international plane. Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the facts shows that the law on the subject has been formed in a period characterized by an intense conflict of systems and interests.”

  99. 99.

    On this observation see also for example European Commission, Trade for All–Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, October 2015, p. 18: “Trade policy is more debated today than at any time in recent years, with many asking whether it is designed to support broad European interests and principles or the narrow objectives of large firms.”

  100. 100.

    Generally on the notion of “political law” see, e.g., Isensee (2014), p. 483 et seq.

  101. 101.

    Trebilcock (2015), p. 9. On the perception of international economic law as political law see also, e.g., Tietje (2015b), p. 3; Nowrot (2016c), p. 1 et seq.

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  1. University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 9, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Karsten Nowrot

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  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Christian Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Nowrot, K. (2017). Good Raw Materials Governance: Towards a European Approach Contributing to a Constitutionalised International Economic Law. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C., Terhechte, J., Ziegler, A. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58832-2_12

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