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A Multimodal Pragmatic Analysis of the Knowability Paradox

Chapter
Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 14)

Abstract

The Knowability Paradox starts from the assumption that every truth is knowable and leads to the paradoxical conclusion that every truth is also actually known. Knowability has been traditionally associated with both contemporary verificationism and intuitionistic logic. We assume that classical modal logic in which the standard paradoxical argument is presented is not sufficient to provide a proper treatment of the verificationist aspects of knowability. The aim of this paper is both to sketch a language \(\mathcal {L}_{\Box ,K}^{P}\), where alethic and epistemic classical modalities are combined with the pragmatic language for assertions \(\mathcal {L}^{P}\), and to analyse the result of the application of our framework to the paradox.

Keywords

Knowability Logic for pragmatics Multimodality 

Notes

Acknowledgements

\(^*\) We would like to thank the referees of the volume for their helpful comments and suggestions. The research of Daniele Chiffi is supported by the Estonian Research Council, PUT1305 2016-2018, PI: Pietarinen. Massimiliano Carrara’s research was conducted while he was in his sabbatical year.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FISPPA Department - Section of PhilosophyUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly
  2. 2.Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and GovernanceTallinn University of TechnologyTallinnEstonia
  3. 3.Freelance LogicianLecceItaly

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