Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism
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The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e. judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.
KeywordsMoral bayesianism Moral uncertainty Moral reasoning Conditionalization Commutativity The lottery paradox
This research has been supported by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant number:1042/13). I thank Richard Bradley, Christian List and two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions.
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