Future Directions and Conclusions

Abstract

This chapter explores future directions and makes some concluding remarks. It describes the expansion of the HOPE model in the USA and overseas, as well as identifying key issues for jurisdictions considering implementing the model and areas for future research.

Introduction

The findings presented in the HOPE collection necessarily beg the question ‘where to from here for HOPE?’ Overall, the findings suggest that the quest for a silver—or magic—bullet ¹ to reduce recidivism is likely to remained unfulfilled by HOPE. This is unsurprising, as ‘[i]t is simply not consistent with the research evidence to view rehabilitation programs as well-defined magic bullets, the right one of which, if found, will have a big impact on recidivism.’ ² The Centre for Justice Innovation in the UK similarly concluded recently that ‘[p]roblem-solving courts are not silver bullets. The impact they have on reoffending is positive but also modest, like any other evidence-based intervention.’ ³

Alm has always recognized that ‘HOPE is not magic and it’s not a miracle.’ ⁴ According to Hawken et al., ⁵ however, what Alm and the others involved in developing HOPE achieved was to inspire practitioners and policy-makers to rethink offender management generally and the role sanctions and incentives can play in motivating behavioral change . This, in turn, precipitated a ‘growing willingness to consider bold innovations to address nagging failures in corrections and the effort to involve all stakeholders in design, implementation, and evaluation.’ ⁶

Cullen, Pratt and Turanovic have described HOPE as

a correctional anachronism, better suited for the ideologically driven punitive era that the United States is leaving behind than for the emergent evidence-based era emphasizing offender rehabilitation and redemption that we are moving toward. ⁷

It is true that the mood in the USA in recent years appears—belatedly—to have shifted away from punitivity, ⁸ if mostly for fiscal, rather than moral, reasons, although the extent to which this continues under the Trump Administration remains to be seen. I share Cullen, Pratt and Turanovic’s desire for an era based on evidence, rehabilitation and redemption, even if there may at times be disagreement over what the evidence base indicates. I also readily acknowledge, as many of HOPE’s critics do, that even the best probation model in the world is not going to address the underlying causes of crime. As most criminologists doubtless know, and as reiterated recently by Schiraldi , ⁹ probation (and parole) clients experience a range of social problems, including limited education and job opportunities, inadequate housing, mental illness and substance abuse . In Schiraldi’s assessment, HOPE

allows policy makers and community corrections officials to rationalize that such factors are irrelevant and that it is possible merely to punish, albeit quickly and lightly, rather than to wade into problems that require more complex analysis and challenging solutions. ¹⁰

This argument is worth unpacking in two ways. Firstly, it should be clear by now that even if policy-makers choose, in spite of all the evidence, to ignore relevant causal factors, the same could not be said of Judge Alm and the probation officers and Hawaii. As the observations in Chap. 3 demonstrate, they were all too conscious of these harsh realities in their clients’ lives. At the same time, there is clearly a limit to what courts and probation services can do about structural issues that sit outside the purview of the criminal justice system. This is especially the case where such organizations are operating with limited resources.

Secondly, endorsement for a model like HOPE need not be at the expense of consideration of and investment in solutions to these complex problems. Indeed, Alm was actively involved in developing the justice reinvestment movement in Hawaii. ¹¹ Kleiman ¹² has also acknowledged the scope for money saved from SCF sanctions (and therefore inferentially, HOPE) to be redeployed into areas such as housing, education and employment. Hamilton et al. ¹³ also indicated their support for ongoing funding for community services programs, including anger management, vocational training and mental health.

In addition, conceptualizing HOPE through a TJ lens enables closer examination of and engagement with the social issues that bring people into the criminal justice system and, critically, the resources available and needed to address these underlying systemic issues. There is already evidence of these more expansive models starting to emerge. For example, the Alabama program based on HOPE discussed below explicitly extends the model beyond substance abuse treatment to support for mental health, job skills and education needs.

In a linked theme, Oleson ¹⁴ has expressed concern that the HOPE model still relies on the threat of a criminal sanction to address what many now accept to be a public health problem, namely substance abuse . Over half of the states in the USA have decriminalized or legalized possession of marijuana, with at least 10 more expected to do so in 2017. ¹⁵ In addition, António Guterres, the former President of Portugal who decriminalized the use of all drugs in Portugal in 2001, recently became Secretary-General of the United Nations. ¹⁶ These developments may presage broader changes in how, or even whether, people who use drugs are dealt with by the criminal justice system . However, a radical change to drug policy would be required to completely overhaul the justice system in the USA and most other countries. Furthermore, as President-elect, Donald Trump reportedly commended Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines, who has endorsed the extra-judicial killing of people suspected of using or selling drugs. ¹⁷ We therefore need to be pragmatic about what can be achieved, at least in the short- to medium-term.

Against this background, this chapter will provide some examples of other jurisdictions in the USA and internationally that are adopting the HOPE model. This will be followed by consideration of how to get HOPE ‘right,’ as well as some implementation challenges. The following section considers future research areas. The chapter and book then conclude with some reflections on the HOPE ‘product’ and its scope to contribute to new ways of thinking about the criminal justice system.

Extensions of HOPE

USA

By March 2017, HOPE-inspired programs were in operation in 32 states ¹⁸ and included 29 probation programs, four parole programs and one pre-trial program. There were also three prison programs using the HOPE model to seek to reduce the use of restrictive housing  and solitary confinement, as well as prisoner violence to staff and other inmates. ¹⁹ Hawken et al. ²⁰ also referred to programs in an Indian (Native American) nation; single-judge programs (e.g., Indiana); statewide efforts (e.g., Arizona); and state-level pilot programs in multiple jurisdictions (e.g., Michigan and Virginia).

Maricopa in Arizona has been trialling the Swift, Accountable, Fair Enforcement (SAFE) program with juveniles. Sally Duncan, the presiding judge, reportedly tells participants at the ‘orientation’ hearing: ‘I will always take into consideration your honesty when I decide what consequence to impose. But don’t tickle the dragon’s tail.’ Sanctions can include jail time, but the punishment ‘depends on each probationer’s situation.’ ²¹ In addition, successes, such as consistent negative tests and securing a job, are rewarded with gift cards, movie tickets and letters of praise. In this way, the SAFE program appears to be adopting more of the aspects of solution-focused courts generally. According to internal data, ²² after the first year, participants’ positive drug tests had decreased by 91% and new arrests fell by 73%.

Another noteworthy program is the Alabama version of HOPE Probation, which was described as being ‘like drug court,’ but also seeks to address ‘whatever problem a probationer has.’ ²³ Tim Jolley, the presiding judge, was quoted as saying: ‘If it’s a substance abuse problem, we can get them assessed for rehab. If it’s a mental health issue, we can get them counseling, while some might need help with job skills or education’. ²⁴ Jolley also observed that ‘[y]ou can get all kinds of meaning from the name. It offers hope for probationers, it’s a hope of keeping people out of prison.’

Hawken recently described the experiences in several jurisdictions that are ‘less interested in outright replications of HOPE [but] are weaving the principles of swiftness, certainty, and fairness into their own implementations.’ ²⁵ As set out by Hawken et al., ²⁶ these include a pilot by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in four locations with different sanctions (jail, halfway house, direct-intervention day reporting center and electronic home monitoring). ²⁷ In addition, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ‘is piloting SCF parole…as part of comprehensive reforms that include place-based supervision and individualized case management.’ ²⁸

Another program being undertaken by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is explicitly based on HOPE ²⁹ . It involves an SCF approach and a short stay in prison, mostly in a therapeutic community, followed by time in substance abuse treatment in a halfway house. Preliminary data discussed by Hawken ³⁰ show sizable reductions in positive drug tests (by 35%), returns to the in-prison phase (by 77%), expulsions from the program (by 43%) and arrests, especially for drug offenses (by 32%–65%). In addition, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ adoption of SCF principles in an in-prison setting has been associated with a 53% reduction in misconduct, in comparison with similar units without SCF sanctioning, and a 61% reduction on the previous year. Frontline staff have also reported reduced stress levels. ³¹ Furthermore, Hawken has noted that several SCF (not HOPE) ‘pilots [are] underway that do not include jail time among their responses to technical violations.’ ³²

Australia

Other than Hawken et al.’s brief mention of HOPE ‘or similar SCF programs’ ³³ being introduced in one Canadian province, ³⁴ the country that has gone the furthest in adopting the HOPE model is Australia. It should be noted at the outset that Australia has eight states and territories with responsibility for criminal justice. In addition, the Commonwealth (i.e., federal) Government has limited powers in relation to criminal matters, but more commonly exercises a coordinating role. Also, sentencing in Australia places significant emphasis on judicial discretion; judicial officers may therefore not embrace a model that significantly restricts their discretion. The size and low population density of Australia, as well as the fact that most prisons are operating at well over capacity, may also pose practical challenges. On the other hand, most Australian jurisdictions have adopted some form of drug court.

As set out in the Foreword, my own interest in and introduction to HOPE arose as a result of a presentation Kleiman gave in Australia in 2013. ³⁵ During this visit, Kleiman suggested in a public lecture at Griffith University in Queensland that HOPE ‘may be suitable in an Australian context as well.’ ³⁶ The HOPE model has since sparked considerable interest in Australia, in part due to a visit by Judge Alm in August 2015. ³⁷

Following Alm’s visit, the Northern Territory Department of Correctional Services ³⁸ scoped the viability of trialing a program modeled on HOPE and sent representatives from the Northern Territory Government to Hawaii to see HOPE in action. A steering committee was established in January 2016, chaired by a Supreme Court judge and including representatives from correctional services, police, policy, defense counsel and prosecutors. A 12-month pilot program, Compliance Management or Incarceration in the Territory (COMMIT), commenced in June 2016 and will be evaluated in 2017. The Northern Territory Government’s briefing on COMMIT states that

the program is not intended for low-level offenders or those who are just entering the criminal justice system and have limited experience in custody. This will not however disqualify an offender who has not previously served a term of imprisonment. ³⁹

The briefing also indicates that mental illness will not disqualify someone from participating in the program, but this should be determined on a case-by-case basis.

It should be noted that the Northern Territory is unusual in Australia, as it has an imprisonment rate of nearly 900 per 100000, compared with national rate of about 200. The Indigenous imprisonment rate is over 2700 per 100000, although this is not the highest in Australia—that dubious honor goes to Western Australia, which imprisons nearly 4000 Indigenous people per 100000, while the imprisonment rate for Indigenous men exceeds 7000 per 100000. ⁴⁰ The Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council recently discussed the concerns that might arise when subjecting Indigenous people to SCF sanctions. ⁴¹ I have also written previously about the need to ensure any HOPE program adopted in Australia is culturally appropriate for Indigenous people . ⁴² On the other hand, the Director of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research has written approvingly about the possibility of HOPE reducing Indigenous overrepresentation in Australian prisons. ⁴³ When I discussed the prospect of a pilot program in the Northern Territory with Alm, we considered how participation in a cultural awareness program could be used as a response to non-compliance and might help to reduce incarceration, but also acknowledged the challenges of making sure such a response is delivered in a way that is both swift and certain. The steering committee for the COMMIT pilot includes representatives from the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency and Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service. ⁴⁴ It is therefore to be hoped that the program is culturally appropriate for Indigenous participants.

The final report of the National Ice Taskforce, ⁴⁵ released in December 2015, recommended that the Commonwealth Government work with at least one state or territory government to pilot a SAC program for offenders on probation who have methamphetamine issues, drawing on lessons from the USA, including HOPE. In response, the Council of Australian Governments ⁴⁶ (which comprises all eight states and territories, as well as the Commonwealth Government) agreed that the Northern Territory would pilot the SCF model and share the results with other jurisdictions. The experience with COMMIT is therefore likely to attract significant interest and attention from all other Australian jurisdictions.

Based in part on my report to the ACT Government, ⁴⁷ the ACT Government invited Alm to visit in 2015. During his visit, Alm met with policy-makers, legal practitioners and judicial officers. The ACT Government has since established a working group (of which I am a member) to consider, inter alia, the feasibility of adopting a ‘swift, certain but fair program,’ with specific reference to HOPE.

There is also interest in SCF in the context of family violence in Victoria . As a result of a recommendation of the Victorian Royal Commission into Family Violence, the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council ⁴⁸ is currently examining the desirability of, and methods for accommodating, SCF approaches to family violence offenders within Victoria’s sentencing regime. The Council released a discussion paper in February 2017, in which it proposed several options that could be adopted, namely swift and certain prosecution of contravention of community correction orders (a form of intensive probation); increased use of judicial monitoring; expansion of alcohol exclusion powers; introduction of a new sentencing order for high-risk family violence offenders; and efforts to improve swiftness and certainty generally.

The Council posed 16 questions for discussion, including whether:

• there is sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of SCF approaches to warrant their adoption in Victoria;

• judicial monitoring should form part of any SCF approach to managing family violence; and

• sanctions under an SCF approach should be custodial and/or noncustodial.

Issues of procedural fairness and custodial capacity were also raised. Responses to the discussion paper were due by the end of March 2017, and the final report will be provided to the Victorian Government by September 2017.

New Zealand

In August 2016, a policy adviser in the New Zealand Department of Corrections wrote a paper in the Department’s Practice journal about HOPE and SCF. ⁴⁹ Hehir considered whether SCF would work in New Zealand, noting the high rate of substance abuse issues among prisoners, as well as the differences between the USA and New Zealand criminal justice systems . He also considered the legislative framework and the established use of alcohol detection bracelets in the New Zealand Drug Court. In addition, he noted the differences between USA and New Zealand sentencing practices, the latter being generally much more lenient. He also considered practical impediments, such as drug-testing capabilities and the location of prisons.

Hehir ultimately concluded that New Zealand should maintain a watching brief on other jurisdictions’ experiences with and future research on HOPE. However, he noted that ‘[i]n the world of correctional treatment—where programme effect sizes of 10% are considered world leading—a programme that reduces arrests and probation revocations by half must be seriously considered.’ ⁵⁰

UK

In 2012, Sherman and Neyroud described the RCT results in the HOPE evaluation as ‘very encouraging.’ ⁵¹ A 2014 report by a Kevin Lockyer, ⁵² a former prison governor, for the Policy Exchange think-tank explored SAC sentences, with specific reference to HOPE. As part of its 2015 election policy commitments, the UK Conservative Government announced its intention to pilot ‘Fast Sanctions and Testing (FAST) schemes… based on “swift and certain” punishment programmes operating across 18 US states.’ ⁵³ The program was depicted as being a ‘short, sharp shock’ and a ‘taste of justice,’ with references to ‘[s]imilar programmes of flash incarceration in Hawaii.’ It is not clear whether there have been any further steps to progress this initiative and there has since been a change of Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Justice.

Implementing HOPE

Getting HOPE ‘Right’

It is perhaps self-evident, but as Kleiman, Kilmer and Fisher have stated, ‘[v]ery few ideas work when not properly implemented.’ ⁵⁴ Alm has previously set out various versions of the steps to be taken in implementing HOPE. ⁵⁵ However, these should now be regarded as superseded, at least in Alm’s mind, by the guidance in the IBH ‘source.’ As Alm stated in his recent comment:

Rather than read what others think HOPE is, go to the source. The State of the Art report was written by Probation Section Administrator Cheryl Inouye and me, along with Dr Robert DuPont and his team at the Institute for Behavior and Health. We wrote it because we were concerned that some people were not understanding the HOPE strategy. Some saw HOPE as a sanctions-only program. They were missing and undervaluing the critical roles played by judges, probation and parole officers, and treatment providers in a successful HOPE initiative. We saw that misunderstanding in various court settings and academic journals, and we saw it at the BJA meeting of the HOPE DFE sites in August 2014. ⁵⁶

The IBH ⁵⁷ set out and explained 16 essential and three recommended elements. The following elements were seen as essential:

• shared leadership;

• integrating HOPE into the existing probation system;

• statutory conditions that allow sufficient jail terms for non-compliance with the conditions of probation;

• buy-in among key officials;

• staff training in HOPE principles;

• identifying the appropriate target population and the means to make referrals;

• a warning hearing by the judge;

• a drug-testing strategy with immediate results;

• the means to effect immediate arrest and take program participants into custody;

• expedited warrant service;

• the means to hold violation hearings swiftly;

• the means to for timely reporting to the court: probation officers’ violation reports and recommendations;

• a sanctions strategy that is consistent and proportionate;

• a continuum of treatment; and

• quality assurance for fidelity monitoring and feedback.

The three recommended but not essential elements described by the IBH were:

• a pilot period and the suggestion to start small;

• probation officers skilled in EBPs for recidivism reduction; and

• an evaluation component.

Alm explained that the use of EBPs is recommended, rather than essential, because

we did not want to discourage other jurisdictions from starting a HOPE initiative if they were really committed to it but had not yet been trained in EBP. We also recognized that a working alliance, alone, could achieve desirable effects without the full complement of EBP. ⁵⁸

However, he added: ‘If you are not already using EBPs, consider getting training and starting to do so. They have been proven to work.’ ⁵⁹ Alm also exhorted would-be HOPE-ers to find a champion, noting that ‘[c]hange is hard. Doing things a new way may be met with resistance and apathy, and a champion will be needed to lead the way.’ ⁶⁰ He reiterated that ‘HOPE may sound easy to do but is not…Finding a judge who is patient, who is willing to talk with and listen to probationers, and who will show that he or she cares is not easy but is needed’. He also highlighted the need to:

[u]nderstand that HOPE is not a substitute for all of the good EBP strategies (e.g., MI, COG[nitive skills], and RNR) your probation and parole officers are already using with their probationers. Those strategies are very important to HOPE’s success. ⁶¹

He concluded with the kind of advice one might imagine him giving to someone in his court:

Don’t be discouraged by nay-sayers…We …are all in the business of helping those under supervision to be rehabilitated and to succeed in life. We are committed to using all of the best approaches in that effort, and the HOPE strategy can help you achieve that goal. ⁶²

Hawken previously suggested that the things that ‘make HOPE work’ ⁶³ include:

• atmosphere, i.e., ensuring key players are enthusiastic about the principles underpinning the program;

• relationships: fostering mutual respect between the judge and probation officer and involving other key players from an early stage; and

• communication: learning from experience and modifying the program as necessary, as well as giving key players an opportunity to be involved in the change process.

It appears that at least the first of these appears not to have occurred in some of the HOPE DFE sites. There was also no scope for modifying the program to take into account the changes in how HOPE was implemented in Hawaii by the time the DFE sites adopted the HOPE model.

The findings of the process evaluations set out in Chaps. 4 and 5 should be borne in mind and will not be repeated in detail here. However, some of the lessons of other jurisdictions that have sought to implement HOPE are particularly instructive. For example, O’Connell, Brent and Visher ⁶⁴ suggested that communities, policy-makers and practitioners should consider offender characteristics, the availability of community services and supports, probation system philosophy and operational factors, as well as local community contexts in deciding what type of program to implement. In addition, Hamilton et al. ⁶⁵ discussed the need for training, to be delivered by subject matter experts, as well as weekly communication about the program and operational feedback on public safety and program effectiveness. They also affirmed the importance of continuing to invest in treatment, programs and services in the community and providing a broad range of services, such as anger management, vocational training and mental health services.

Challenges and Barriers

The process evaluations summarized in Chaps. 4 and 5 give some insight into the things that can go wrong when implementing programs of this nature. For example, Zajac et al. ⁶⁶ pointed to resource constraints, even with program grants; this may be exacerbated where programs are being established within existing budgets. There can also be issues with staffing and clashes with the existing culture, which could relate to anyone associated with the program, from judicial to offender cultures. For example, Zajac et al. noted some resistance from defense lawyers (who thought the model might not be in their clients’ best interests) and offenders themselves (who felt the regime would be too tough). In addition, the demands of the DFE process itself posed challenges, such as randomization and data collection.

In the DYT project, O’Connell, Brent and Visher ⁶⁷ experienced difficulties with judicial practices, client eligibility, logistics and cooperation with secure facilities. Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman were concerned (albeit in context of SCF, not HOPE specifically) about ‘slippage,’ ⁶⁸ i.e., loss of fidelity to the original model. They also highlighted the need for coordination and speed, in terms of ensuring that drug-testing is done quickly. Hamilton et al. ⁶⁹ identified workload issues, resource implications and changes to organizational culture as key challenges.

In the Australian context, the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council ⁷⁰ has identified questions of both principle and practice. In respect of the former, the Council questioned whether non-judicial officers having the authority to detain someone in these circumstances conflicts with both the principle of open justice and the presumption of innocence. The Council also identified a number of practical implications for court, correctional, law enforcement and other agencies. In particular, the Australian justice system does not have the option of local or county jails, so there is a significant issue as to how and where people serving short-term SCF sanctions should be housed.

In the context of England and Wales, Lockyer ⁷¹ identified a number of potential barriers to implementation, including the need to:

• change the way magistrates and others involved in sentencing operate to create a new model with greater degrees of specialization and increased flexibility;

• change the approach by offender managers responsible for ensuring compliance with community sentences; and

• encourage local ownership of innovation and the development of pilot approaches, rather than the traditional approach of top-down change.

Lockyer identified three main barriers to implementing the SCF approach at the sentencing stage in England and Wales: the need for due process; organizational issues; and cultural barriers. He also considered the potential impact on prisoner numbers and the challenges in managing such a population, given the lack of local ‘jails’ for short-term stays. As set out above, this is also likely to be a logistical issue in Australia.

According to Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman, the ‘implementation challenges of SAC are non-trivial, but the promise is enormous.’ ⁷² However, the need to tailor HOPE-style programs to the local context cannot be overstated. As Kleiman explained, albeit in relation to SCF, rather than HOPE, it ‘is not a single, homogeneous, manualized “program-in-a-box”.’ ⁷³ In a follow-up comment, Kleiman added:

If the question addressed was ‘Is HOPE a magical program-with-a-manual that will succeed everywhere if mindlessly replicated?’ Lattimore et al. show that the answer is ‘No, it isn’t.’ But that’s not a surprise to the people who have been out there doing this work; if asked that question, most would reply, ‘Of course not!’. ⁷⁴

Research

Alm and others have reiterated the need for more research. Hamilton et al . ⁷⁵ highlighted some specific issues that should be explored in future research , including:

• a greater variety of social costs and benefits (e.g., tax revenue generated through offender employment);

• population differences, in order to examine dosage and responsivity needs, especially for drug offenders;

• whether recidivism effects are short-term;

• the reduction in offender risk over time and both on and off supervision; and

• prosocial behaviors following supervision.

As set out in Chap. 2, there have been several changes to the HOPE model since the Hawken and Kleiman ⁷⁶ evaluation in 2009. It would therefore be of value to see the impact of the changed sanctioning regime and the introduction of early termination. In addition, Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman ⁷⁷ have noted that there is currently no empirical basis for referral to treatment occurring after three positive drug tests (rather than, say, two or four). They therefore suggested that future research examine this issue.

The Centre for Justice Innovation recently cautioned against the risk that solution-focused courts could lead to ‘benign over-dosing.’ ⁷⁸ The issue of dosage requires much more examination. If we continue to employ a medical metaphor, it may be that much more precise titration is required to determine what level of sanction is most effective for different offenders. Alm ⁷⁹ has maintained that the use of small doses of imprisonment is what gets offenders’ attention, while the sharp increase from a positive but admitted test (two days) to denial of a positive test (15 days) and absconding (30 days) are thought to reward honesty. However, Hawken recently described the reliance on a custodial response to motivate behavioral change as a ‘bone of contention.’ ⁸⁰ In particular, there has been no further research to test Alm’s hypothesis, while the sanctions in use in Hawaii by 2016 were lower than in HOPE’s original incarnation. Kleiman has written about how his ‘one contribution to this [HOPE] process’ ⁸¹ was to suggest that Alm try sanctions of two days for the first sanction, rather than a week, as he was then using, or six weeks, as another judge was doing. It emerged that this yielded the same results.

Wodahl, Boman and Garland ⁸² recently examined 800 violations committed by a random sample of probationers and parolees on intensive supervision and found that jail sanctions did not outperform the community-based sanctions. The findings from Washington State ⁸³ also show that good results can be achieved with noncustodial options for low-level violations. As Klingele has pithily observed, when ‘[g]ood parents…impose consequences on their children, they never use cages.’ ⁸⁴ She added that, although custody may be appropriate in some instances,

we must do better to develop noncustodial penalties that hold probationers accountable without impeding probationers’ ability to stay connected to the informal and prosocial influences of employment, family, and community that lead to long-term desistance from crime. ⁸⁵

In this context, it is important to note that the National Institute of Corrections is currently exploring the issue of ‘dosage probation.’ ⁸⁶ This approach, which was first proposed by Carter and Sankovitz in 2014, ‘suggests that the length of supervision should be determined by the number of hours of intervention necessary to reduce risk, rather than an arbitrarily (or customarily) established amount of time (e.g., 3 years…).’ ⁸⁷ Like many others in this field, this model uses a medical analogy: too little intervention and the patient receives little or no benefit, but too much treatment can be ineffective or even harmful. The model put forward by Carter and Sankovitz involves probation officers trained in EBPs and motivational interviewing . It also uses the possibility of early termination to motivate probationers. Pilot programs have been undertaken in California and Minnesota  and probationers were reportedly more motivated than under standard probation to address their criminogenic issues. They also perceived the probation officer as an ally. ⁸⁸ The National Institute of Corrections is currently funding the preparation of a white paper to examine this model in more detail; this is likely to have significant relevance for the further application of HOPE, given the overlap between the two models.

Over lunch in Hawaii, Alm and I discussed the possibility that an appropriate sanction for a young offender might include removing their cell phone for 24 hours. As discussed above, we also talked about the option of Indigenous cultural awareness programs as a mandated sanction in Australia. For those of us seeking a more moderate criminal justice response, the question now is how low can we effectively go.

As set out in Chap. 4, the long-term evaluation of HOPE ⁸⁹ indicated the program’s effectiveness with both native Hawaiians and female offenders. Hawken ⁹⁰ also cited unpublished research suggesting that racial disparities were reduced under SAC in Washington State. Overall, however, there has been little research on the specific impact of HOPE models on vulnerable groups, such as women and Indigenous or other ethnic minority offenders, as well as those with mental illness. More research is needed in these contexts, especially qualitative research to illuminate aspects not readily revealed through quantitative data, for example, differential impacts on family relationships and participants sense of cultural identity.

It is clear from the discussion in Chap. 3 that many HOPE probationers perceived Alm’s so-called daddy effect to be positive. This is perhaps unsurprising, given how closely Alm’s behavior accorded with what Pratt and Turanovic have described as good parenting:

[It] is a complex task, a task that entails not just swift punishment for problematic behavior, but also warmth and support, a heavy dose of positive reinforcement when kids do things well, and the careful teaching of prosocial cognitions, thinking patterns, and coping skills. ⁹¹

There is scope for more research on the applicability of effective parenting techniques to a criminal justice population, many of whom may have experienced neglectful and/or abusive parenting themselves.

In addition, there is a case for applying different research methodologies. For example, more detailed qualitative and observational research would enable further analysis of communication styles in court, as well as the nature of probation officers’ and other stakeholders’ interactions with participants in HOPE-style programs. Moreover, extensive qualitative research with participants on HOPE and standard forms of probation and parole would give additional insights into how HOPE is perceived by those most affected by it. Another potential research area would be with the family members of HOPE probationers (for example, spouses and children).

Future research with prosecution and defense lawyers, as well as correctional and law enforcement officers, would also help build understanding of the impacts of this model on other key stakeholders and the implications of this for perceptions that the criminal justice system is legitimate and fair.

Finally, it should be noted that many criminologists have critiqued the short-term nature of recidivism studies. As Nakamura and Bucklen have observed:

the focus on short-term recidivism when looking at the effect of correctional interventions may mask the possibility of longer-term effectiveness of these programs. The needs and deficiencies of offenders in the correctional system have typically developed and compounded over their lifetime, and it may not be realistic to expect such long-term problem behaviors to disappear immediately, even if the programs are truly effective. It is also possible that the effects could manifest in a more iterative manner, involving multiple attempts to ‘go straight’, which themselves are not a sign of failure but a necessary step toward desistance , similar to the process of quitting smoking or drug use in which minor slips and lapses are expected. ⁹²

An examination of HOPE’s impact through a desistance perspective would build on the understandings from Hawken et al.’s long-term study, which has been interpreted as evidence of both success and failure in sustaining long-term improvements. Linked with this, there is also scope for examining HOPE with reference to the Good Lives Model discussed in Chaps. 1 and 3. For example, research with participants in programs based on HOPE could shed light on the extent to which they perceive the program as assisting them with leading ‘good lives’ and ‘making good.’ ⁹³

Concluding Thoughts

Klingele has observed that there ‘is much about HOPE that deserves to be celebrated. It shows the power of local officials to bring about change and teaches that engagement in the lives of probationers can significantly affect their behavior.’ ⁹⁴ She went on to say, however, that these programs ‘should not become ends unto themselves. Instead…[they] should be used as tools to advance the larger goal of empowering probationers to desist from crime—to trade criminality and addiction for more mature, prosocial modes of living.’ ⁹⁵ This point is highly significant. Many of the critics of HOPE appear unwilling or unable to see the role programs like HOPE may play in assisting people involved with the criminal justice system to lead a different kind of life. Alm, by contrast, has always stated that the goal of HOPE is to help probationers lead better lives. ⁹⁶

One of the commentaries in the HOPE collection was by Vincent Schiraldi, ⁹⁷ now of Harvard Kennedy School and formerly the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Probation (DOP). His piece detailed why he was ultimately relieved that his attempts to implement a program based on HOPE in New York did not proceed. He set out the number of ways in which his department ‘was loosening the reins on its clients.’ ⁹⁸ DOP staff were retrained to ‘soften…the law-and-order tack…moving us away from the “trail’ em, nail’ em, and jail’ em” approach.’ ⁹⁹ Instead, they were

encouraged to engage with community members and clients to conduct health fairs; organize college tours; open waiting rooms to spoken word slams; paint and install murals in the neighborhood; plant trees and participate in neighborhood cleanups; and conduct turkey giveaways around the holidays. ¹⁰⁰

It would certainly be difficult to see how HOPE as (mis)represented might intersect with this, but anyone who has met Alm could probably visualize him enthusiastically joining in on all these activities. One line in Schiraldi’s comment indicates that he, like many others, has misunderstood the nature of HOPE: he asserted that ‘the entire rationale for the culture change we were undertaking…was that we should treat our probation clients the way any of us would want our sons or daughters treated if they were on probation.’ ¹⁰¹ And yet this kind of compassion and connection is exactly what HOPE is really about.

Cullen, Manchak and Duriez ¹⁰² suggested that because correctional ‘products’ affect human lives, they should be marketed with great care. They therefore called for a ‘bright warning label,’ listing HOPE’s potential limitations and risks. More recently, Cullen, Pratt and Turanovic ¹⁰³ claimed that a ‘recall notice’ should now be sent to all jurisdictions and any future use should come with a (presumably even brighter) warning label that HOPE can no longer be sold with the claim of being ‘evidence based.’

It is not only correctional ‘products’ that change lives—so do people. Farrall et al. ¹⁰⁴ have written about how people who had desisted from crime identified that their probation officers’ support had ‘sown the seeds’ of their later desistance. The TJ literature, in turn, acknowledges the positive impact of a caring judicial officer. ¹⁰⁵ Shapland , Farrall and Bottoms have suggested that promoting desistance may be about viewing offenders differently: not as outcasts, but as people to be brought back in and reintegrated. They recognized that this ‘may require almost a revolution in justice policy making and very different ways of thinking from practitioners in criminal justice.’ ¹⁰⁶ Arguably, HOPE can play a significant role in this long overdue revolution of care.

I have previously argued in response to Cullen, Manchak and Duriez's claim that ‘any such label should also make it clear that “this product [i.e., HOPE] is solution-focused and contains therapeutic jurisprudence”.’ ¹⁰⁷ Lattimore et al.’s analysis was based on a model which replicated only the SCF component of HOPE and ignored the caring aspect which underpinned HOPE in its original incarnation. The HOPE DFE findings therefore reflect an incomplete picture of the evidence base. It should be apparent by now that there is no need to recall HOPE, although it has been mislabeled all along. What is required instead is accurate packaging that clearly explains its therapeutic ingredients. Rather than giving up HOPE, we now need to not only adopt its (modestly) tough side, but also embrace the love.

Notes

• 1. See A. Gelb, cited in S. Duriez, F. Cullen and S. Manchak (2014), ‘Is Project HOPE creating a false sense of hope? A case study in correctional popularity,’ Federal Probation, 78: 57–70, 57; P. Lattimore et al. (2016a), ‘Outcome findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment: Is swift, certain, and fair an effective supervision strategy?’, Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1103–1141, 1131; D. Nagin (2016), ‘Project HOPE: Does it work?’, Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1005–1007, 1006; J. Oleson (2016), ‘HOPE springs eternal: New evaluations of correctional deterrence,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1163–1183, 1163.

• 2. M. Lipsey and F. Cullen (2005), ‘The effectiveness of correctional rehabilitation: A review of systematic reviews,’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 3: 297–320, 310.

• 3. Centre for Justice Innovation (2016), Problem-solving courts: An evidence review, v, 30.

• 4. S. Alm (2011), ‘HOPE for your probationers,’ The Judges’ Journal, 50: 18–21, 21.

• 5. A. Hawken et al. (2016), HOPE II: A follow-up to Hawaii’s HOPE evaluation, NIJ.

• 6. Ibid., 71.

• 7. F. Cullen, T. Pratt and J. Turanovic (2016), ‘It’s hopeless: Beyond zero-tolerance supervision,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1215–1227, 1223.

• 8. T. Clear and N. Frost (2014), The punishment imperative: The rise and failure of mass incarceration in America, New York University Press.

• 9. V. Schiraldi (2016), ‘Confessions of a failed “HOPE-er”,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1143–1153.

• 10. Ibid., 1151. For recent discussion of these issues, see also R. Corbett (2015), ‘The burdens of leniency: The changing face of probation,’ Minnesota Law Review, 99: 1697–1733; W. Kelly (2016), The future of crime and punishment: Smart policies for reducing crime and saving money, Rowman & Littlefield.

• 11. C. Blair (2016), ‘Judge Steve Alm is taking his message of “HOPE” to DC,’ Honolulu Civil Beat, 2 September http://www.civilbeat.org/2016/09/hawaiis-steve-alm-is-taking-his-message-of-hope-to-dc.

• 12. M. Kleiman (2011), ‘Justice reinvestment in community supervision,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 10: 651–659.

• 13. Z. Hamilton et al. (2015), Evaluation of Washington State Department of Corrections (WADOC) Swift and Certain (SAC) policy: Process, outcome and cost-benefit evaluation, Washington State University.

• 14. Oleson, n 1.

• 15. See NORML (2017), State info http://norml.org/states (viewed 31 January).

• 16. H. Alexander (2016), ‘Antonio Guterres confirmed as the next Secretary-General of the United Nations,’ The Telegraph, 6 October http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/.antonio-guterres-to-be-new-secretary-general-of-the-united-natio/.

• 17. K. Reilly (2016), ‘Rodrigo Duterte: Donald Trump endorsed deadly war on drugs as “the right way”,’ Time, 4 December http://time.com/4589671/rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump-antidrug-campaign/.

• 18. S. Alm, email communication to L. Bartels, March 15, 2017.

• 19. S. Alm (2016), ‘HOPE Probation: Fair sanctions, evidence-based principles, and therapeutic alliances,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1195–1214. See also A. Hawken (2016), ‘All implementation is local,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1229–1239; Hawken et al., n 5; M. Kleiman (2016a), ‘Swift-certain-fair: What do we know now, and what do we need to know?’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1185–1193.

• 20. Hawken et al., ibid.

• 21. M. Ye Lee Hee (2012), ‘Maricopa County SAFE program helps youths on probation,’ AZCentral.com, 18 June http://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120523maricopa-county-program-safe-helps-youths-probation.html.

• 22. Ibid.

• 23. Anonymous (2014), ‘“HOPE Probation” is newest court program,’ Advertiser Gleam, 6 August http://www.advertisergleam.com/news/local_news/hope-probation-is-newest-court-program/article_04966ca4-218e-11e4-a767-0017a43b2370.html.

• 24. Ibid.

• 25. Hawken, n 19, 1233.

• 26. Hawken et al., n 5.

• 27. Note, however, that Alm recently advised: ‘I understand that Ohio eventually had to drop the jail option as the U.S. Department of Justice learned that Ohio was a “pay-to-stay” state and they won’t (or at least did not used to) fund programs in that situation’: Alm, n 18.

• 28. Hawken et al., n 5, 28.

• 29. G. Mohr and R. Raemisch, ‘Restrictive housing: Taking the lead,’ Corrections Today, 77(2): 6–7.

• 30. Hawken, n 19.

• 31. Ibid.

• 32. Ibid., 1235.

• 33. Hawken et al., n 5, 24.

• 34. It is not entirely clear what program this refers to, but Hawken et al., ibid, and Hawken, n 19, both included data from the Criminal Organization High Risk Offender Unit (COHROU) program in Manitoba in their discussion of relevant programs. This program commenced in the 1990s, i.e., before and independently of HOPE. It includes some aspects that are similar to HOPE; for example, responses to violations are swift. However, the sanctions imposed are severe, with participants serving an average of 146 days (nearly five months) in custody for technical violations. Accordingly, a decision was taken not to include this program in Chap. 6 as an example of a program based on HOPE or SCF principles. For further discussion, see M. Weinrath, M. Doerkson and J. Watts (2015), ‘The impact of an intensive supervision program on high-risk offenders: Manitoba’s COHROU program,’ Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 57: 253–288.

• 35. Australian Institute of Criminology (2013), ‘Occasional seminar: Mark Kleiman, Towards smarter corrections,’ 26 February http://www.aic.gov.au/events/seminars/2013/kleiman.html.

• 36. Griffith University, Australia (2013), ‘Less crime and less punishment is possible,’ 1 March https://app.griffith.edu.au/news/2013/03/01/less-crime-and-less-punishment-is-possible/.

• 37. See L. Bartels (2016), ‘Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) Program: Looking through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens,’ QUT Law Review: Special Issue on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16: 30–49.

• 38. Northern Territory Department of Correctional Services (2016), Annual report 2015–2016.

• 39. Northern Territory Government, The COMMIT program overview, 2. See also Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, (2017), Swift, certain and fair approaches to sentencing family violence offenders: Discussion paper.

• 40. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016), Corrective services, Australia, September quarter.

• 41. Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, n 39.

• 42. L. Bartels (2015c), ‘Swift and certain sanctions: Is it time for Australia to bring some HOPE into the criminal justice system?’, Criminal Law Journal, 39: 53–66.

• 43. D. Weatherburn, Arresting incarceration: Pathways out of Indigenous imprisonment, AIATSIS Press.

• 44. Northern Territory Government, n 39.

• 45. Commonwealth of Australia (2015), Final report of the National Ice Taskforce.

• 46. Council of Australian Governments (2015), National ice action strategy, Commonwealth of Australia.

• 47. L. Bartels (2014), Literature review on intensive supervision orders: A report prepared for the ACT Justice and Community Safety Directorate, University of Canberra.

• 48. Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, n 39.

• 49. B. Hehir (2016), ‘Swift, certain and fair sanctions: An innovative new programme or false HOPE?’ Practice: The New Zealand Corrections Journal. http://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/research_and_statistics/journal/volume_4_issue_1_august_2016/swift%2c_certain_and_fair_sanctions_an_innovative_new_programme_or_false_hope.html.

• 50. Ibid.

• 51. L. Sherman and P. Neyroud (2012), Offender-desistance policing and the Sword of Damocles, Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 15.

• 52. K. Lockyer (2014), Swift and certain: A new paradigm for criminal justice, Policy Exchange.

• 53. M. Holehouse (2015), ‘Petty criminals face two nights in the cells under Conservative justice plans,’ The Telegraph, 14 April http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/11536622/Petty-criminals-face-two-nights-in-the-cells-under-Conservative-justice-plans.html.

• 54. M. Kleiman, B. Kilmer and D. Fisher (2014), ‘Response to Stephanie A. Duriez, Francis T Cullen, and Sarah M. Manchak: Theory and evidence on the swift-certain-fair approach to enforcing conditions of community supervision,’ Federal Probation, 78: 71–74, 72.

• 55. See, e.g., S. Alm (2010), HOPE—Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement: Benchmarks for success; S. Alm (2011), ‘HOPE for your probationers,’ The Judges’ Journal, 50: 18–21; S. Alm (2015a), ‘HOPE Probation and the new drug court: A powerful combination,’ Minnesota Law Review, 99: 1665–1696.

• 56. S. Alm (2016), ‘HOPE Probation: Fair sanctions, evidence-based principles, and therapeutic alliances,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1195–1214, 1211. Emphasis added.

• 57. See IBH (2015), State of the Art of HOPE Probation, 8–28.

• 58. Alm, n 56, 1212.

• 59. Ibid.

• 60. Ibid.

• 61. Ibid.

• 62. Ibid.

• 63. A. Hawken, cited in B. Pearsall (2014), ‘Replicating HOPE: Can others do it as well as Hawaii?’, NIJ Journal, 273: 1–5, 2.

• 64. D. O’Connell, J. Brent and C. Visher (2016), ‘Decide your time: A randomized trial of a drug testing and graduated sanctions program for probationers,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1073–1102.

• 65. Hamilton et al., n 13.

• 66. G. Zajac et al. (2015), ‘All implementation is local: Initial findings from the process evaluation of the Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement,’ Federal Probation, 79: 31–36; G. Zajac et al. (2016), ‘Implementation fidelity and experiences at four HOPE DFE sites’ (Paper presented at the 38th Association for Public Policy and Management Conference, Washington DC, 3 November).

• 67. O’Connell, Brent and Visher, n 64.

• 68. A. Hawken, S. Davenport and M. Kleiman (2014), Managing drug-involved offenders, NIJ, 47.

• 69. Hamilton et al., n 13.

• 70. Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, n 39. For earlier discussion of some of the challenges identified in the Australian context, see Bartels, n 42; K Warner (2013), ‘Sentencing review 2012–2013,’ Criminal Law Journal 37: 390–404.

• 71. Lockyer, n 52.

• 72. Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman, n 68, 4.

• 73. Kleiman, n 18, 1188.

• 74. M. Kleiman (2016b), ‘Comment on “Hawaii’s HOPE program gets a critical review,’ The Crime Report, 13 November http://thecrimereport.org/2016/11/11/hawaiis-hope-program-gets-a-critical-review/. See also Nagin, n 1.

• 75. Z. Hamilton et al. (2016), ‘Impact of swift and certain sanctions: Evaluation of Washington State’s policy for offenders on community supervision,’ Criminology and Public Policy, 15: 1009–1072.

• 76. See A .Hawken and M. Kleiman (2009), Managing drug involved probationers with swift and certain sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE, NIJ.

• 77. Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman, n 68.

• 78. Centre for Justice Innovation, n 3, 29.

• 79. Alm, n 18.

• 80. Hawken, n 19, 1235.

• 81. M. Kleiman (2015), ‘Substituting effective community supervision for incarceration,’ Minnesota Law Review, 99: 1621-1629, 1629. See also Hawken, Davenport and Kleiman, n 68; M. Kleiman (2013), ‘Smart on crime,’ Democracy, 28 http://www.democracyjournal.org/28/smart-on-crime.php?page=all.

• 82. E. Wodahl, J. Boman and B. Garland (2015), ‘Responding to probation and parole violations: Are jail sanctions more effective than community-based graduated sanctions?’, Journal of Criminal Justice, 43: 242–250.

• 83. Hamilton et al., n 75.

• 84. C. Klingele (2015), ‘What are we hoping for? Defining purpose in deterrence-based correctional programs,’ Minnesota Law Review, 99: 1631–1662, 1660.

• 85. Ibid.

• 86. G. Crawford (2017), ‘Dosage probation: A new prescription for corrections reform,’ Corrections Today, January/February: 24–26.

• 87. M. Carter and R. Sankovitz (2014), Dosage probation: Rethinking the structure of probation sentences, National Institute of Corrections, 3.

• 88. Crawford, n 86.

• 89. Hawken et al., n 5.

• 90. Hawken, n 19.

• 91. T. Pratt and J. Turanovic (2016), ‘Celerity and deterrence,’ in D. Nagin, F. Cullen and C. Jonson (eds.), Deterrence, choice, and crime: Contemporary perspectives—Advances in criminological theory, Transaction, 13–14.

• 92. K. Nakamura and K. Bucklen (2014), ‘Recidivism, redemption, and desistance: Understanding continuity and change in criminal offending and implications for interventions,’ Sociology Compass, 8: 384–397, 387. References omitted.

• 93. See S. Maruna (2001), Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives, American Psychological Association.

• 94. Klingele, n 84, 1634.

• 95. Ibid., 1631.

• 96. See, e.g., S. Alm, cited in Bartels, n 42, 64.

• 97. Schiraldi, n 9.

• 98. Ibid., 1145.

• 99. Ibid.

• 100. Ibid., 1145–1146.

• 101. Ibid., 1148.

• 102. F. Cullen, S. Manchak and S. Duriez (2014), ‘Before adopting Project HOPE, read the warning label: A rejoinder to Kleiman, Kilmer and Fisher’s Comment,’ Federal Probation, 78: 75–77, 75.

• 103. Cullen, Pratt and Turanovic, n 7, 1222–1223.

• 104. S. Farrall et al. (2014), Criminal careers in transition: Charting pathways through change, Willan Publishing.

• 105. See, e.g., J. Hueston and K. Burke (2016), ‘Exporting drug court concepts to traditional courts: A roadmap to an effective therapeutic court,’ Court Review, 52: 44–50. See also discussion in Chap. 3.

• 106. J. Shapland, S. Farrall and A . Bottoms (2016a), ‘Diversity or congruence: Sketching the future: An afterword,’ in J. Shapland, S. Farrall and A. Bottoms (eds.), Global perspectives on desistance: Reviewing what we known and looking to the future, Routledge, 291.

• 107. Bartels, n 37, 49.