Zusammenfassung
My paper is essentially concerned with Hans Reichenbach’s work on the theory of relativity, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A Priori, published in Berlin in 1920 insofar as it shows clearly his intellectual transition from neo-Kantianism to neo-positivism. Nevertheless, First is very briefly recalled Cohen’s main reflections on Einstein’s theory of relativity within the limits of the special theory. Indeed, since Cohen died in 1918, he did not have the time to take into account the main teachings from the general theory of relativity. So, Cohen was convinced that his interpretation of Einstein’s theory of relativity remained in accordance with Natorp who had written in 1910 that Einstein provides a confirmation of idealism: “Bestätigung des Idealismus”.
On the contrary, the rise of Einstein’s theory of relativity gave to Reichenbach the opportunity to recast his own philosophical point of view. To give an account of Reichenbach’s philosophical reception of Einstein theory of relativity, we will have to raise four questions: What were the links between Reichenbach and Cassirer? Which statements of the theory of relativity were in conflict with the Kantian a priori? What kind of discrepancies opposed Reichenbach to Kant? Is the recasting of apriorism a consequence of the theory of relativity?
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Notes
- 1.
Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 1914, rééd. Olms, 1997, § 39, p. 297.
- 2.
Cohen, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 1914, rééd. Olms, 1997, § 39, p. 296.
- 3.
Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig & Berlin, B.G. Teubner, 1910, p. 399 ff.
- 4.
Hans Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis A Priori, Berlin, Springer, 1920; English trans. by Maria Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1965, University of California Press. From now on, all quotations of this book will follow this translation with an abridged title: TRAK. See also another long and important paper of Reichenbach pulished in French 2 years later on the same topics and entitled: La signification philosophique de la théorie de la relativité, in Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger, XCIV, juillet-décembre 1922, pp. 5–61. Among a wide and important secondary literature, see particularly: Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Michael Friedman, A parting of the ways: Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger, Chicago, Open Court, 2000. Thomas Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity, Philosophy in Physics 1915–1925, Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of science, 2005. Don Howard, Einstein, Kant and the Origins of Logical Empiricism, in: Wesley Salmon and Gereon Wolters (eds.), Language, Logic and the Structures of Scientific Theories, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994, pp. 45–105. Don Howard, Einstein, General Relativity and the Contingent A Priori, 2010, in: Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a new Method, Chicago and Lasalle, IL. The Open Court, 70.
- 5.
Hans Reichenbach, The rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951, p. 48.
- 6.
Hans Reichenbach, The rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951, p. 72.
- 7.
Hans Reichenbach, Modern Philosophy of Science, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, et New York, Humanities Press, 1959. [Der gegenwärtige Stand der Relativitätsdiskussion, in Logos, X, 3, 1921; translated by Maria Reichenbach].
- 8.
Hans Reichenbach, Modern Philosophy of Science, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, et New York, Humanities Press, 1959 p. 25. [English translation by Maria Reichenbach].
- 9.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. I, Introduction, p. 4.
- 10.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, pp. 6–7.
- 11.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, p. 8.
- 12.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, p. 11.
- 13.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, note 6, p. 111: «[Natorp] […] believes that Einstein regards this velocity [of light] merely to be the highest velocity attainable for the time being. Therefore, Natorp’s attempt to save absolute time and to explain the contradictions in terms of the impossibility of its “empirical realization” cannot be considered successful either».
- 14.
Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig und Berlin, B.G. Teubner, 1910, p. 403.
- 15.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, p. 18.
- 16.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. II, p. 17.
- 17.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. III, p. 24.
- 18.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. III, p. 29.
- 19.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. III, p. 30.
- 20.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. III, p. 31.
- 21.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. III, p. 33.
- 22.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 37.
- 23.
Cf. See Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, Berlin, 1918, 19252, rééd. In Moritz Schlick, Gesamtausgabe, Band I/1, Springer, Wien, New York, Teil, I, § 5, p. 187; § 10, p. 252; Teil III, § 40, pp. 755–782.
- 24.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 40: “The attempt to regard an individual perception as a defined element of reality is not successful either. The content of every perception is far too complex to serve as an element of coördination”.
- 25.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 41.
- 26.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 43.
- 27.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 45.
- 28.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. IV, p. 47.
- 29.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. V, p. 48.
- 30.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. V, pp. 49–51.
- 31.
Quoted by Reichenbach, in TRAK, chap. V, p. 53. See Kant, Critique of pure reason, Ak III, 105; Ak IV, 74, § 14.
- 32.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. V, p. 60. Here, Reichenbach uses Hermann Minkowski’s expression—without quoting him. That expression can be found in a famous conference given in Köln on the 21st of September 1908 and published one year later under the following title: Raum und Zeit, in Jahrbuch der Math.-Ver., 18, September 1909.
- 33.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. V, p. 57.
- 34.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. V, p. 56.
- 35.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, p. 69.
- 36.
Quoted by Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, p. 71. See Kant: Critique of judgment, 1790, Introduction, V, Ak V, p. 185.
- 37.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, p. 72.
- 38.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, p. 72.
- 39.
See, Jules Vuillemin, Physique et Métaphysique kantiennes, Paris, PUF, 1955.
- 40.
In fact, Kant’s real starting point was the fundamental concepts of exact sciences such as they are in Newtonian mechanics, then he went back to the Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft; from there he went further to the Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes, and finally to the categories. Yes indeed, it would have been impossible for Kant to deduce from Aristotle’s categories the main concepts of Newtonian physics.
- 41.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, p. 73.
- 42.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VII, pp. 77–78.
- 43.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VII, p. 82.
- 44.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VII, p. 85.
- 45.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VII, p. 87: «We do not want to deny that experience contains rational elements. Indeed, the principles of coördination are determined by the nature of reason; experience merely selects from among all possible principles. It is only denied that the rational component of knowledge remains independent of experience. The principles of coordination represent the rational components of empirical science at a given stage».
- 46.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VII, p. 88.
- 47.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VIII, p. 98.
- 48.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VIII, pp. 100–101.
- 49.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VIII, p. 102.
- 50.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VIII, p. 103.
- 51.
Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VIII, p. 105.
- 52.
Cf. Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 59.
- 53.
See Torsten Wilholt, Conventionalism: Poincaré, Duhem, Reichenbach, in Philosophy of Science: the key thinkers, edited by J. R. Brown, London & New York, Bloomsbury, 2012, chap. 2.
- 54.
Reichebach, TRAK, p. 4, note 1.
- 55.
Cf. Hans Reichenbach, TRAK, chap. VI, VII, VIII.
- 56.
See Reichenbach, Causalité et induction, in Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, juillet-septembre, 1937, pp. 138–144.
- 57.
Cf. Einstein, On the Method of Theoretical Physics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, pp. 6–13.
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Seidengart, J. (2018). The Coordination of Phenomena in Scientific Knowledge According to Hans Reichenbach: The Case of Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. In: Damböck, C. (eds) Philosophie und Wissenschaft bei Hermann Cohen/Philosophy and Science in Hermann Cohen. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58023-4_7
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