Advertisement

When Do the Truth-Conditions of S Knows that p Change?

An Inquiry in the Conversational and Epistemic Mechanisms Involved in the Variations of Contexts
  • Stefano LeardiEmail author
  • Nicla Vassallo
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10257)

Abstract

The debate on epistemic contextualism has been mainly focused on the contextualist solutions to sceptical paradoxes, neglecting many questions that arise from the contextualist understanding of the semantic behaviour of knowledge ascriptions. One of those questions concerns the dynamics of contexts changes: it is not clear when contexts change and which conversational and epistemic mechanisms determine these variations. Here we will scrutinize four accounts of these mechanisms (Lewis’ view, the veto power view, the gap view, and the intentionalist view) identifying the virtues and the lacks of each position. We will conclude that Lewis’ view and the veto power view are both inadequate, and that the gap view provides the better account of the dynamics of contexts changes for it vindicates our intuition that in those cases where the conversational partners do not agree on which epistemic standard should be applied in their context they are contradicting one another.

Keywords

Contextualism Knowledge ascriptions Gap view Context Rule of attention Scoreboard semantics Conversational dynamics 

References

  1. Ashfield, M.D.: Against the minimalistic reading of epistemic contextualism: a reply to Wolfgang Freitag. Acta Anal. 28(1), 111–125 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Barke, A.: Epistemic contextualism. Erkenntnis 61(2–3), 353–373 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bianchi, C., Vassallo, N.: Epistemological contextualism: a semantic perspective. In: Dey, A., Kokinov, B., Leake, D., Turner, R. (eds.) CONTEXT 2005. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3554, pp. 41–54. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). doi: 10.1007/11508373_4 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Blome-Tillmann, M.: Knowledge and presupposition. Mind 118(470), 241–291 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cappelen, H., Lepore, E.: Context shifting arguments. Philos. Perspect. 17(1), 25–50 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cohen, S.: Knowledge and context. J. Philos. 83(10), 574–583 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cohen, S.: Knowledge, context, and social standards. Synthese 73(1), 3–26 (1987)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cohen, S.: Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: skepticism, gettier, and the lottery. Australas. J. Philos. 76(2), 289–306 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Cohen, S.: Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philos. Perspect. 13(s13), 57–89 (1999)Google Scholar
  10. Cohen, S.: Contextualism defended: comments on Richard Feldman’s ‘skeptical problems contextualist solutions’. Philos. Stud. 103(1), 87–98 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. DeRose, K.: Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 52(4), 913–929 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. DeRose, K.: Solving the skeptical problem. Philos. Rev. 104(1), 1–52 (1995)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. DeRose, K.: Now you know it, now you don’t. In: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Epistemology, vol. V, pp. 91–106 (2000)Google Scholar
  14. DeRose, K.: Single scoreboard semantics. Philos. Stud. 119(1–2), 1–21 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. DeRose, K.: The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, vol. 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Goldman, A.: Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. J. Philos. 73(20), 771–791 (1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Hawthorne, J.: Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford (2004)Google Scholar
  18. Jaster, R.: Contextualism and gradability. In: Spitzley, T., Hoeltje, M., Spohn, W. (eds.) GAP.8 Proceedings, pp. 318–323 (2013)Google Scholar
  19. Kaplan, D.: Demonstratives. In: Almog, J., Perry, J., Wettstein, H. (eds.) Themes from Kaplan, pp. 481–563. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1989)Google Scholar
  20. Kompa, N.: The semantics of knowledge attributions. Acta Anal. 20(1), 16–28 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Kompa, N.: Knowledge in context. Riv. Int. Filos. Psicol. 5(1), 58–71 (2014)Google Scholar
  22. Lewis, D.: Scorekeeping in a language game. J. Philos. Log. 8(1), 339–359 (1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Lewis, D.: Elusive knowledge. Australas. J. Philos. 74(4), 549–567 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Ludlow, P.: Contextualism and the new linguistic turn in epistemology. In: Preyer, G., Peter, G. (eds.) Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, pp. 11–49. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)Google Scholar
  25. Montminy, M.: The role of context in contextualism. Synthese 190(12), 2341–2366 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Nozick, R.: Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press, Harvard (1981)Google Scholar
  27. Rysiew, P.: Epistemic contextualism. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/contextualism-epistemology/
  28. Schaffer, J.: What shifts? Thresholds, standards, or alternatives? In: Preyer, G., Peter, G. (eds.) Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, pp. 115–130. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)Google Scholar
  29. Sgaravatti, D.: In conversation with the skeptic: contextualism and the raising of standards. Int. J. Study Skept. 3(2), 97–118 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Stainton, R.: Contextualism in epistemology and the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’. In: Campbell, J.K., O’Rourke, M., Silverstein, S. (eds.) Knowledge and Skepticism, pp. 137–163 (2010)Google Scholar
  31. Stanley, J.: On the linguistic basis for contextualism. Philos. Stud. 119(1–2), 119–146 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Stanley, J.: Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Stine, G.C.: Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure. Philos. Stud. 29(4), 249–261 (1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Unger, P.: Philosophical Relativity. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1984)Google Scholar
  35. Wilburn, R.: Possible world of doubt. Acta Anal. 25(2), 259–277 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FINO Consortium, Department of Philosophy and EducationUniversity of TorinoTorinoItaly
  2. 2.DAFIST, School of HumanitiesUniversity of GenovaGenovaItaly

Personalised recommendations