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Three Versions of Semantic Minimalism

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10257)

Abstract

All of the semantic minimalists come together in seeking to reduce contextual inputs in semantics to a minimum, but they disagree over what this quantity may be, and more specifically, the extent to which something can still be classed as “minimal”. With this issue increasingly addressed, three versions of semantic minimalism can be identified: weak, strong, and radical. They are still gathered under the tag “Semantic Minimalism”, yet what they share is in fact less than their divergences as regards the minimal role of context. By revealing their divergent answers to the Range Problem and the Intention Problem, we will clearly see within semantic minimalism the schism, which is preliminary to assessing it.

Keywords

Semantic minimalism Context-sensitivity The range problem The intention problem 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This paper is funded by Chinese Scholarship Council, grant number: 201306140060. Special thanks go to my supervisor Anne Reboul and the autonomous reviewer for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS, UMR5304, Laboratoire sur le langage, le cerveau et la cognition & Department of Philosophy, East China Normal University & UMR 5317, ENS de LyonLyonFrance

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