Occasion-Sensitive Semantics

  • Tamara DoblerEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10257)


In this paper we provide a formal model for occasion-sensitive semantics motivated by so called ‘Travis cases’ (Travis 1978, 2000, 2008, 2009). We suggest that understanding of an utterance of \( \varphi \) (knowing its truth conditions) can be modelled as a twofold partitioning of worlds in logical space, where the initial partition is induced by the context-invariant meaning of the sentence uttered and the latter on the basis of context-dependent goals. Our model uses only a single parameter to capture occasion-sensitivity of sentences: practical goals.


Initial Partition Atomic Sentence Conventional Meaning Compositional Semantic Illocutionary Force 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language, and ComputationUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamNetherlands

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