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Pejoratives, Contexts and Presuppositions

  • Manuel García-CarpinteroEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10257)

Abstract

Kaplan started a fruitful debate on the meaning of pejoratives. He suggests that a dimension of expressive meaning is required, separated from the straightforward “at issue” content. To account for this, writers have elaborated on this suggestion, by arguing that the separated expressive meaning of pejoratives and slurs is instead either a conventional or conversational implicatures, or a presupposition. I myself prefer a presuppositional account; however, in order to deflate a very serious objection that has been raised against accounts of that kind, it is on the one hand essential that we take what is presupposed to be genuinely expressive, and, related, it is also essential that we adopt a more complex view than the one usually assumed on the nature of the context relative to which speech acts make their contributions.

Keywords

Pejoratives Slurs Expressive meaning Presuppositions 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS-Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la CiènciaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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