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The Pitfall of Hypostatization and the Reality of Social Things

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Encouraging Openness

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 325))

Abstract

Abstractions and hypothetical constructs are a necessary part of scientific inquiry, our collective effort to understand the social and natural world. The problem of hypostatization occurs when we confuse these abstractions and hypothetical constructs used to probe reality with reality itself. However, the attempt to avoid hypostatization by denying existence to social things can end up encouraging a tendency to hypostatize the constructs social science imposes on social reality. This paper advances a remedial approach to the problem of hypostatization. It advocates a practical ontology of the social, and attention to formulating falsifiable hypotheses. Lack of such a practical ontology of social reality encourages a seductive psychological disposition to hypostatize. It makes it difficult to envision how social reality might “kick back” at the constructs social science seeks to impose upon them and render them problematic. Improvement of our sense of social reality is the only effective means of combating is hypostatization. The clearer a researcher’s sense of social reality, the more falsifiable his/her hypotheses can be, the better reality can kick back and shatter hypotheses the researcher seeks to impose on it, and drive research forward.

Fred Eidlin (deceased)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The term “reification” is used much more frequently in the social sciences than the term “hypostatization.” The two terms overlap in meaning, however there is an important difference between them. Hypostatization is simply a logical fallacy—treating an abstraction as if it were a real thing. “Reification” means hypostatization, but it also means more. The term has been introduced into the social sciences mainly by scholars inspired by Marx . For Marx and Marxists, “reification” is not only a logical fallacy, it is part of ideology. Workers falsely believe the miserable conditions in which they live to be natural and unchangable. They will therefore not think about trying to change them. When the workers’ consciousness is raised, they will realize that their conditions are not natural and unchangable, and will be motivated to change them. In this paper, I am interested only in the logical fallacy of hypostatization, not in reification in the Marxist sense. So I will use the term “hypostatization” unless the Marxist usage of “reification” is intended.

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Acknowledgements

Fred Eidlin passed away on October 28, 2016. We are fortunate and grateful to be able to publish here his last work. We thank his son, Barry, for helping us bring it to print, and for making sure that the nearly final draft here included was indeed Fred’s last.

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Correspondence to Barry Eidlin .

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Eidlin, F., Eidlin, B. (2017). The Pitfall of Hypostatization and the Reality of Social Things. In: Bar-Am, N., Gattei, S. (eds) Encouraging Openness. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 325. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57669-5_33

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