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Differential Bias Attack for Block Cipher Under Randomized Leakage with Key Enumeration

  • Haruhisa KosugeEmail author
  • Hidema Tanaka
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10239)

Abstract

In the formal analysis of side-channel attacks, a theoretical model of side-channel information (leakage model) is supposed and dedicated attacks for the model are considered. In ASIACRYPT2015, a new leakage model for the analysis of block cipher was proposed by Bogdanov et al. The model assumes an adversary who has leaked values whose positions are unknown and randomly chosen from internal results (random leakage model). They also proposed an attack, differential bias attack for the model. This paper improves the security analysis on AES under the random leakage model. In the previous method, the adversary requires at least \(2^{34}\) chosen plaintexts, therefore, it is infeasible to recover a secret key with a small number of data. However, there may be an adversary who can recover the secret key using his computing power. To consider the security against the adversary, we reestimate complexity for the adversary given a small number of data. We propose another hypothesis-testing method which can minimize the number of required data. The reestimation of complexity shows that the proposed method requires time complexity more than \(T>2^{60}\) because of time-data tradeoff, however, some attacks are feasible under \(T\le 2^{80}\). In addition to the above method, we apply key enumeration to differential bias attack, and evaluate its efficiency by rank estimation. From the experimental evaluation, we show that the success rate of the attack can be practical if there is an advantageous restriction on the positions of leaked values.

Keywords

Block cipher Side-channel attack Formal security analysis Leakage model AES Differential bias attack Key enumeration Rank estimation 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Defense Academy of JapanYokosukaJapan

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