Structural Injustice: The Eurozone Crisis and the Duty of Solidarity

  • Erik O. EriksenEmail author


In this chapter, Erik Oddvar Eriksen takes a closer look at how the Eurozone crisis raises the problem of structural injustice. Eriksen claims that the beneficiaries receive a diverse array of benefits under an enduring social structure, and he studies the type of duties that this structure triggers. Particular actors, he argues, have directly or indirectly participated in causing some injustices, and some injustices benefit them, some harm them and some do both. However, things may be wrong but not unjust in the sense that it is others’ responsibility. Eriksen shows that we are confronted with the normative puzzle of injustice. These injustices benefit some, while no one in particular is liable to pay damages. In effect, the Eurozone crisis gives rise to duties, but not in the form of compensatory obligations. Rather, it gives rise to duties of solidarity—to correct wrongs in order to satisfy political justice.


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© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ARENA—Centre for European StudiesOsloNorway

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