Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Parables: Crossroads Between the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Argumentation Theory

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Narration as Argument

Part of the book series: Argumentation Library ((ARGA,volume 31))

  • 902 Accesses

Abstract

Parables are considered a form of expanded metaphors, with varying levels of complexity in their narrative structure. They are defined by their perlocutionary purpose, meaning that they typically aim to convey a moral or spiritual teaching. This meaning is an indirect meaning, in the sense that it is inferred under structural and contextual constraints. Two kinds of parables are analyzed: conventional parables, such as the religious parables of the Gospel, and open texture parables, exemplified by Kafka’s parable “My destination”. The aim of this chapter is threefold. After a brief consideration on the nature of parables and some comments on the kind of knowledge they convey, the mechanisms whereby the meaning of the parable is accessed are examined. Section 6.5 details the structural requirements for working out the meaning of parables. These encompass the preservation of formal principles, such as the principle of invariance. Finally, Sect. 6.6 defines the conditions for such inferred meaning to be integrated into an analogy-based argument, that is, the requirements that allow parables to be used relevantly in argumentative exchanges.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    As the well known quote from Shakespeare expresses: “Thou shalt never get such a secret from me but by a parable” (Two Gentlemen of Verona 2.5.34–35).

  2. 2.

    In fact, Maimonides contended that all biblical stories should be interpreted in a non-literal way. For him, such an interpretation (metaphoric, allegoric, parabolic) was the true philosophical one, compatible, but different from the literal interpretation offered by institutional interpreters (rabbis, theologians) (see Yvry 2005)

  3. 3.

    As stated in the Gospels: “Jesus told the crowds all these things in parables; without a parable he told them nothing” (Matt 13:34; cf. Mark 4:33–34).

  4. 4.

    Luke 15: 11–32.

  5. 5.

    See Tiffany (2011).

  6. 6.

    In F. Kafka (1979). There are shorter versions of this parable, even with other name, “The departure” (Kafka 1971). The edition and translation of Kafka’s works have always been a conflictive issue (Durrani 2002).

  7. 7.

    For instance, Bruce (2002).

  8. 8.

    Recanati (2004)

  9. 9.

    See Snodgrass (2008); Wierzbicka (2001).

  10. 10.

    They can be considered as story schemes as well (Walton 2012).

  11. 11.

    See Leavitt (2012)

  12. 12.

    Forceville’s and Stockwell’s critiques question the unidirectionality of the principle of invariance. According to the principle of invariance, the cognitive topology of the source domain has to be preserved in the target domain, without any possibility of the target domain to transfer at least part of its structure to the source domain. The theory of blended mental spaces (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) modifies this shortcoming of the principle of invariance.

  13. 13.

    Think of the Basque Country and Spain, Scotland and the United Kingdom, the U.K. and Europe, etc.

  14. 14.

    Lakoff (2008).

  15. 15.

    Kienpointner (2012) contends that the functions of an argument to be pro or contra are not symmetric. Figurative analogies (the parables among them) are more justified, according to him, when they express contra arguments against the position of an arguer. That is, it is more difficult for them to constitute a reason that proves (by itself) the rightness of a standpoint.

  16. 16.

    That is, she is questioning whether the Relevance Similarity Premise holds (Kienpointner 2012, p. 114).

References

  • Borodinsky, L. 2000. Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors. Cognition 75 (1): 1–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bruce, I. 2002. Kafka and Jewish folklore. In The Cambridge companion to Kafka, ed. J. Preece, 150–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bustos, E. de. 2000. La metáfora: ensayos interdisciplinares. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Metáfora y terrorismo étnico. Isegoría 46: 105–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. Metáfora y argumentación. Madrid: Cátedra.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. Metáforas, maniobras estratégicas y argumentación. In De la demostración a la argumentación. Ensayos en honor de L. Vega, ed. H. Marraud and P. Olmos, 217–233. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Carston, R. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark, H. 1996, Using language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Durrani, O. 2002. Editions, translations, adaptations. In The Cambridge companion to Kafka, ed. J. Preece, 216–226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fauconnier, G., and M. Turner. 2002. The way we think. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forceville, C. 1995. (A)symmetry in metaphor: the importance of extended context. Poetics Today 16 (4): 679–708.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garssen, B. 2009. Comparing the incomparable: Figurative analogies in a dialectical testing procedure. In Pondering on problems of argumentation, ed. F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen, 133–140. Amsterdam: SicSat.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Govier, T., and L. Ayers. 2012. Logic, parables, and argument. Informal Logic 32 (2): 161–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, M. 1987. The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason. Chicago: University of Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kafka, F. 1971. The complete stories. New York: Schoken Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979. The Basic Kafka. New York: Pocket Books. (My destination: 185–186).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kienpointner, M. 2012. When figuratives analogies fail: Fallacious uses of arguments from analogy. In Topical themes in argumentation theory, ed. F.H. van Eemeren and G. Garssen, 111–125. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1990. The invariance hypothesis: Is based on image abstract schemas reason? Cognitive Linguistics 1: 39–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1996. Sorry, I’m not myself today: The metaphor system for conceptualizing the self. In Spaces, worlds and grammar, ed. G. Fauconnier and E. Sweetser, 91–123. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. The neural theory of metaphor. In The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought, ed. R. Gibbs, 17–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the flesh. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leavitt, J. 2012. The mystical life of F. Kafka, theosophy, cabala and modern spiritual revival. Oxford: Oxford University. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macagno, F., and D. Walton. 2010. The argumentative uses of emotive language. Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación 1: 1–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F. 2004. Literal meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. 1978. Literal meaning, Erkenntnis 13/1: 207–224. Reprinted in J. Searle (1979, pp. 117–136).

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979. Expression and meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Snodgrass, K. 2008. Stories with intent: A comprehensive guide to the parables of Jesus. Michigan: Eerdsman Pu. Co..

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber, D. & D. Wilson. 1986/1995 2nd ed. Relevance, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern, G. 2005. Parable. In The Routledge encyclopedia of narrative theory, ed. A.D. Herman, M. Jahn, and M.L. Ryan, 418–419. Oxford: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stockwell, P. 1999. The inflexibility of invariance. Language and Literature 8 (2): 125–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tiffany, G. 2011. Shakespeare’s parables. Reformation 16: 145–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Eemeren, F.H. 2010. Strategic maneuvering in argumentation discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Van Eemeren, F.H., and R. Grootendorst. 2004. A systematic theory of argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton, D. 2003. Relevance in argumentation. Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2006. Fundamentals of critical argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Story similarity in arguments from analogy. Informal Logic 32 (2): 190–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2014. Argumentation schemes for argument from analogy. In Systematic approaches to argument from analogy, ed. H.J. Ribeiro, 23–40. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wierzbicka, A. 2001. What did Jesus mean? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Yvry, A.L. 2005. The Guide and Maimonides’s philosophical resources. In The Cambridge companion to Maimonides, ed. K. Seeskin, 58–82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain

    Eduardo de Bustos

Authors
  1. Eduardo de Bustos
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Eduardo de Bustos .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics, Modern Languages, Logic and Philosophy of Science, Theory of Literature and Comparative Literature, Autonomous University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Paula Olmos

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

de Bustos, E. (2017). Parables: Crossroads Between the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Argumentation Theory. In: Olmos, P. (eds) Narration as Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 31. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56883-6_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation