Abstract
The question of when a human life begins is usually posed in ethical contexts. Whoever wants to know if – and when – abortion is ethically permissible links the question of the beginning of life with genuine ethical problems: the question of the ethical status of the human individual in her first stages of life is one way to frame the issue. The same applies to the disputes concerning the admissibility or inadmissibility of research on human embryos and preimplantation diagnostics. Whoever enquires about the point in time at which an individual human life starts to exist does this mostly with a moral intention. Furthermore, the question of the beginning of life is frequently expressed in the first-person perspective, as exemplified by the title of Ford’s book When did I begin?.
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Notes
- 1.
This question is understood here as being a question of when a specific human organism begins to exist, i.e. live.
- 2.
A printing error which slipped into the following review of Ford’s book (1991) provides evidence of how difficult it evidently is to not make ethical contexts the subject of discussion. In Flaman (1991, p. 39) the original subtitle of Ford’s book, which is “Conception of the human individual in history, philosophy and science“, reads as the “contraception” of the human individual.
- 3.
For this reason, the issue of the affiliation to species of transgenetic creatures plays just as minor a role as the question of the ethical admissibility or inadmissibility of the genetically modified link between human and non-human genes; cf. Quante (2001b).
- 4.
The distinction between definition and criterion is analog to that of the definition and criterion of death and borrowed from that discussion context (cf. the next chapter on this).
- 5.
The attempt to develop a general theory of ‘biological individuality’ runs into sheer insurmountable obstacles in view of the variety of forms of life (on this cf. Wilson 1999).
- 6.
With this event or process conception of life and the organism, the biological approach does in fact depart from the concept of common sense; DeGrazia (2005) has developed a conception very similar to the one suggested in this study, in which he doesn’t commit himself to such process conception of life and organisms. My aberration is, however, justified in that such a conception is not only more compatible with scientific facts, but also leads to ethically worthier results with regard to the determination of death (cf. Sect. 4.5.2. in Chap. 4 on the latter).
- 7.
Wilson names the following as paradigmatic attributes of higher organisms, which are mostly and wrongly imputed to be broadly binding: spatial and temporal continuity, spatial and temporal boundedness composed of heterogeneous causally related parts, development from a single cell to a multicellular body, subject to impaired function if some of its parts are removed or damaged, ability to reproduce sexually, and genetic homogeneity (Wilson 1999, p. 9 – an even more comprehensive list can be found on p. 56).
- 8.
The stronger condition, that one can only describe this process with loss of information if one waives the concept of self-regulation, I also consider plausible as regards organisms. But since I cannot defend it here, above I only draw on the weaker condition. However, my above assumptions imply that the concept of integration can be analyzed without recourse to the participant perspective.
- 9.
- 10.
Due to this fact, the biological approach does not fulfill the so-called “Only-X-and-Y-Principle” either; only such facts may be relevant for the identity of X and Y over time as, according to this principle, belong intrinsically to X (resp. Y) (cf. Quante 1995a, p. 41 ff., also Garrett 1990; Noonan 1991, p. 16 f.). The intuitions based on the “Only-X-and-Y-Principle” are either due to the Cartesian intuitions of the first-person perspective, which have already been rejected (cf. Chap. 2), or they rest on the confusion of (numerical) identity and persistence (cf. Chap. 1).
- 11.
The bond between causality and persistence is shown in general form by Brennan (1988, p. 26 ff. and 99 ff.) and elaborated as regards biological entities by Wilson (1999, p. 52 ff.). Implicit or explicit references to a causal component of persistence in the context of the discussion of our problem of the beginning of human life can also be found in Williams (1990, p. 169) and Ashley (1976, p. 127 – the latter even speaks of “definitive laws”).
- 12.
In the discussion it is more or less undisputed that in terms of scientific facts there is no dissent (either regarding the knowledge or with respect to the areas in which the facts are not completely clarified, or hardly clarified at all). In fact, the dissent only arises on the level of the philosophical interpretation of these facts, either as regards their metaphysical or ethical significance. In respect of the biological facts, the following remarks rest on the views of Bodden-Heidrich et al. (1997), Fisher (1991), Ford (1991) and Morowitz and Trefil (1992).
- 13.
- 14.
So the objection by Tonti-Filippini (1989, p. 41 – all the following quotes come from this source) against this criterion (this activation “occurs from within the zygote itself”) comes to nothing; the spatial location is not enough to bring forward self-integration. The zygote therefore only has the potential (“contains its own programming”) to initiate an integrated life process, but this actually begins only at the moment of the “switching-on of the embryonic genome”. In his criticism, Tonti-Filippini misjudges the objective thrust of the discussion about the switching-on of the genome when he replies that “genetic uniqueness or individuality is neither sufficient nor necessary to establish ontological individuality”. According to the biological approach, at least, the argument about the switching-on of the genome is about self-regulation as being the execution of a capacity and not merely a potential or an unused capacity.
- 15.
In the next section I will go into more detail about the various aspects of the problem of fission.
- 16.
In the case of multiple embryo formation, Williams (1990, p. 175) also falls back on a disclaimer. However, this consists in explicitly assimilating the no-fission-condition in his criterion for the beginning of life, whereas this case is covered by the underlying structure of the laws and thus the ad-hoc objection does not hold water.
- 17.
It should be remembered that because of the recourse to biological laws, the biological approach has no validity in such cases in which technical interventions have been executed.
- 18.
With this, the objections raised by e.g. Dawson (1993, p. 44 ff.) to the “genetic argument” are not cogent here, since neither is the issue of affiliation to a species clarified, nor is the genetic identity drawn on as the only criterion for biological individuality.
- 19.
In the literature on personal identity, the familiar thought experiments about fission and fusion have their realist counterparts in this context. For this reason the various solution strategies and thought models known from this discussion also reappear (cf. Quante 1999a for a detailed portrayal).
- 20.
- 21.
This answer is given explicitly by Tonti-Filippini (1989, p. 42) and also implicitly by Williams (1990, p. 175) who includes factual non-fission in his variant of the “Zygotic Principle”. In contrast, Forbes (1985, p. 135) argues – and Stone (1987, p. 818 f.) follows him in this – with the indication that even the possibility of fission is irreconcilable with Leibniz’ law of identity. But this argument confuses identity and persistence and inadmissibly transfers the modal characteristics of the former to the latter.
- 22.
Without these extra theological premises there is no reason why twin formations should not be interpreted in accordance with the above suggestion that a human organism ceases to exist as two new ones begin to exist. The idea of ensoulment therefore seems primarily to be what makes Ford search for a point in time at which no further twin formation can occur (also see Bole 1989, p. 652 fn. 2). But Ford inexplicably omits to distinguish between possible and factual fission. Tonti-Filippini, on the other hand, rightly rejects the objection of possible fission and seeks a solution strategy for factual fissions, in order to defend the “Zygotic Principle”.
- 23.
The most likely objection, that we quite possibly have no clue as to who is the copy or rather the offshoot and who the persistent original, is blocked by Tonti-Filippini (1989, p. 43) with the pointer that no ontological consequences can be drawn from an epistemic conundrum. Even if this reposte is accepted, it does divulge the general snag that the concept of ensoulment cannot be dealt with empirically (which does not apply to the biological approach in this form).
- 24.
With this, Moraczewski’s answer to the fission problem contains implicit recognition of the objection of internal-external differentiation – cf. objection (d).
- 25.
It is not clear to me which “scientific evidence” Billings (1989, p. 122) is referring to. What is more, he must implausibly look upon the potential for fission as adequate for the factual existence of several organisms. But it is interesting that with his conception he adopts a strategy which is known in the literature on twin formation as the thesis of multiple occupancy.
- 26.
For this reason, the lack of empirical knowledge regarding the causal factors that lead to multiple embryo formation has no effect on the biological approach.
- 27.
- 28.
Fisher and Flaman include the placenta with the embryo, so as to meet the objection of lacking internal-external differentiation without taking into account that they then have to meet the objection to fusion in the form of Siamese twins.
- 29.
Events occupying the same space-time location then have to be individuated via diverse causal relations. This is possible even when, ultimately, events are normally individuated via space-time locations. The spatiotemporal coincidence is then a special case which can be resolved with the help of the causal relations. In general, the identity of events – pace Davidson (1982, Chap. 8) – cannot be defined via causal relations, as these relations must themselves be individuated as concrete occurrences via the events accomplishing them; on this, cf. Quine (1992).
- 30.
This is conceivable because the special features of the first-person perspective, which lead to the Cartesian intuition that a mental event can essentially only belong to exactly that subject whose experience it portrays, do not figure within the framework of the biological approach
- 31.
- 32.
Whether this objection even applies to the criterion suggested here depends on whether the totipotency gets lost after the “switch on” of the genome or beforehand. But since the objection is generally invalid, the lack of empirical knowledge has no effects on the biological approach.
- 33.
With this, nothing is gained in the ethical question of whether one may do research with the totipotent cells released out of the blastomere or what moral status they have.
- 34.
The discussion of the empirical findings by Bedate & Cefalo being held between Suarez (1990) and Bole (1989) suffers from their shared assumption that the differentiation between purely intrinsic and extrinsic factors is relevant to the persistence issue. Since this condition does not play a role according to the biological approach to human persistence, I will not go into it further.
- 35.
Tonti-Filippini (1989, p. 42) aptly emphasizes that no problem ensues from the existence of copies for the master copy of the clone.
- 36.
Since Becker and Morowitz & Trefil interpret the moment at which “humanness” is attained not only as a morally decisive threshold, but also at the same time as the criterion for the beginning of life, their approach resembles the moral strategy that is adopted in the debate about a suitable criterion of death e.g. by Hoffman (cf. on this, Sect. 4.1 of the next chapter).
- 37.
Hence, Lockwood’s argumentation corresponds to the one in the context of the debate on the criterion of death named “ontological strategy” (cf. Sect. 4.4.2.1 of the next chapter on this).
- 38.
When, in the next chapter, the criterion of whole brain death is defended, in no way is the brain life criterion being construed from it (cf. also the discussion of the fourth objection in Sect. 4.5.1 of the next chapter).
- 39.
That the “switch on” of the genome and the final loss of the up to that moment still possible totipotentiality of the blastomere cells presumably occur together, also speaks for the criterion for the beginning of life proposed here. This is not the case because thereby the objection of totipotentiality is dispensed with as being – as shown – invalid, but because there is a case for the new quality of self-regulation resp. integration.
- 40.
As regards the bringing forward of the beginning of existence, in the text by Bodden-Heidrich et al. there is a certain tension that indicates that the authors are uncertain or at variance here. Later on there is discourse to the effect that the “self-regulation of the embryo probably occurs at the pronucleus stage, but at the latest in the zygote (Bodden-Heidrich et al. 1997, p. 78 f.). Here, the authors hark back to the zygote conception and reduce the question of the beginning of existence to one merely of definition (ibid. p. 77). In all, the ethical and political interest in bringing even the oozyte under the protection of the German embryo protection law is consistently noticeable in the contribution by Bodden-Heidrich et al. Regarding the repeated allusion to the continuity of development that would make a later onset criterion for the beginning of life implausible, let it just be said at this point that Morowitz & Trefil (1992, p. 43 f.) use precisely this argument to justify as late a moment as possible. One can see clearly in both cases how effective existing ethical suppositions are, independent of the ontological problems, and how they lead to implausible conceptions.
- 41.
- 42.
Stone (1987, p. 816) also raises the objection against the gametes conception, that it is incompatible with our concept of identity, that both sperm and egg are identical with the later human organism without being identical with one another. Further, he points out the problem that it is possible for a specific sperm to fertilize a different egg so that this sperm must then be identical with two different organisms. Whereas I view the first of Stone’s arguments as plausible, the second one bases on mixing the modal properties of the identity relation with the criteria for persistence and is therefore not taken up by the biological approach. But Harris himself, similarly to Hare, undermines the difference between factual and future possibly existing entities and thereby also mixes persistence and modality in a problematic way (cf. the fourth section of this chapter on this).
- 43.
Counterfactual since the factual existence of the person in her actual constitution is assumed in the description. Furthermore, Harris must assume that e.g. the damage to the gametes is such that the „cross-world-identity” of the factually existing person is conserved with that which existed in the counterfactual scenario. This does not seem to me to be a trivial condition (cf. Sect. 3.4 of this chapter).
- 44.
- 45.
Cf. also Grobstein (1988, p. 58 f.). With reference to the so-called pre-embryo, Warnock (1983, p. 238 f.) also speaks of a mere cell mass or cell collection (cf. Warnock 1983, p. 241 and 243 or Warnock 1990, p. 215 and 228), although she considers the question of the beginning of human existence to be unanswerable. With this she also draws ex negative on the criterion of integration and self-regulation.
- 46.
For this reason, an organism cannot survive phases of completely halted integrative achievement. Such an event is tantamount to the death of that organism.
- 47.
This gradual growth should not be confused with the thesis that an organism comes into existence gradually. As regards this metaphysical question, my above considerations remain neutral (cf. the discussion on this in Quinn 1984, p. 149 ff.).
- 48.
Strictly speaking, according to the criterion being defended here, the beginning of the existence of the human organism lies within the stage which is otherwise called the pre-embryo, so that the above remarks apply only to the period that comes temporally after the beginning of existence.
- 49.
- 50.
For a general overview of the application of the concept of person in the debate on abortion cf. Ach (1993), English (1975) or Macklin (1984). As Birnbacher (2001) describes, the attempt to justify an exceptional moral status via the concept of person leads to the concept of personhood via a list of properties and capabilities. Such a conception can be found, for example, in Harris (1985, 1999) and Tooley (1983, 1998). However, in an early study, the latter also used the concept of person normatively, and this usage must be strictly distinguished from the metaphysical usage. Whereas in the metaphysical usage the capabilities accompanying personhood are drawn on as a justification of the moral status, the concept of person in its prescriptive usage represents all entities that have a certain moral status without the implication of a justificatory relation (cf. Tooley 1990, p. 159, where Tooley speaks of a “pure moral concept”).
- 51.
For a detailed critique and refutation of this widely accepted way of argument see Quante (2014b, Chapter IV).
- 52.
As this does not concern questions of animal ethics, the problem concerning the limitation of the concept of person to members of the biological species: human being will not be expounded further; cf. Birnbacher (2001). According to my own analysis there are, however, no conceptual or logical reasons for attributing personhood only to human beings. However, this extra complication can be ignored for the purpose of this study.
- 53.
An entity X is an actual person iff it exists actually and can be ascribed personhood and personality; X is a potential person iff X exists actually and has the capacity to develop into such a stage that personhood and personality can be ascribed to X then (this means that X actually isn’t a person but already an existing individual human organism).
- 54.
Birnbacher (2001) and – with reference to Tooley (1983) – Leist (1990, p. 140 f.) also object to P**. The above comments do not purport that a champion of the thesis that only persons have a special claim on life could not have further ethical or metaphysical arguments to offer. But I maintain that the attempts to establish a categorical difference between persons and non-persons are futile; cf. Quante (2014b, chapter I and IV).
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
Harris (1999) e.g. chooses the potentiality concept which accommodates his ethical intuitions that are independent of potentiality. Ford (1991, p. 99) also claims that “the meaning of a potential person needs to be understood in the context of genetically human life and of the above moral concepts”. In contrast, the question of the ethical value of the potentiality will be blended out in the following, since the controversy over the potentiality argument only becomes arguable when potentialities can be measured adequately, independently of ethical and other premises which are controversial in the debate.
- 60.
In addition, he distinguishes between potentiality and identity arguments, a differentiation that I maintain is mistaken, for reasons to be explained later on.
- 61.
In order to distinguish between the case of a sleeping person and a human embryo, one must understand a potential as the potential to develop a property or capacity in the future. A sleeping person, in contrast, has the capabilities linked with personhood, but is not factually making use of them. Capabilities will be understood in the following as being attributed to an individual at a point in time, whereas a potential consists in enabling a property or capacity to be developed some time in the future; cf. on this problem also Bole (1989, p. 651 fn. 10) and Engelhardt (1977, p. 24).
- 62.
Inherence must not be confused with autarky. Many a conception of strong potentiality is implausible because it imputes that an inherent potential must be completely independent of favorable external conditions (cf. Stone 1987); cf. for this criticism also Wolbert (1998, p. 46). In his differentiation between active and passive potentiality, Tooley (1998, p. 122) avoids this error by pointing out that the potential need not be “fully active”.
- 63.
- 64.
The difference between the gametes that are not yet unified and the existing human individual is not decisive because no potentiality could be ascribed to a set of distinct entities. In this respect, the objection by Singer and Dawson (1993, p. 85) is reasonable. But for one thing, the decisive difference for the potentiality argument is that no active inherent potential can be ascribed to a set of distinct entities (cf. Steinbock 1992, p. 65). And for another, e.g. Harris’s consequences would only follow if one could identify the potential of a set of entities with that of the individual entities of this set. Whether this is possible, or whether in fact this is a composition fallacy, as I suspect, requires further discussion (cf. Elster 1981, p. 154 ff.). For the same reason, Leist’s (1990, p. 88 f.) objection to the attempt to solve the demarcation problem by means of the concept of the inherent active potential also fails.
- 65.
This is also the reason why the differentiation between potentiality and identity arguments undertaken by Leist (1990) is misleading, since a criterion for the beginning of life is exactly what is assumed for the attribution of potentiality referred to in the potentiality argument. Leist even notices this himself in his discussion of this kind of potentiality, when he understands by the recourse to strong potentiality by Stone (1987) “that in fact it means an identity argument on the basis of numerical or spatiotemporal identity” (Leist 1990, p. 89).
- 66.
The same applies to Engelhardt (1986, p. 110 ff.). Engelhardt’s thesis, that a fetus can only be ascribed the potential to engender something, but not the potential to develop, which is described as a curiosity by Baumgartner et al. (1997, p. 230), can be explained by Engelhardt’s criterion for the beginning of life, according to which a fetus/an embryo is not yet a somebody and therefore not identical with the later person.
- 67.
The reason he considers potentiality in connection with numerical identity to be morally relevant however, is justified by Lockwood in that the concept of person from whom the moral worth is derived is being applied. In contrast, the above considerations forego the concept of person and can therefore only be drawn on as prerequisites for rendering the potentiality argument at all manageable for ethical questions. On this point, one must agree with Wolbert (1998, p. 45 f.): The necessary specification of the problematic kind of potentiality does not suffice for this potential to be pronounced ethically relevant.
- 68.
Singer and Dawson (1993, p. 77 u. 87 f.) admit that although the potentiality argument is usable for normal or natural procedure, it is unsuitable in the context of technical reproduction (cf. also Steinbock 1992, p. 64). This assessment can be borne out. When potentiality is interlinked with the biological approach, then a contextually and methodologically controlled ascription of potentials is not based on “physical possibilities”, as Singer and Dawson (1993, p. 79) believe, but on specific biological regularities. Nevertheless, it applies that these can be overridden when there are technical interventions. In this way the biological approach can also explain why the potentiality argument loses its orienting function in the context of reproduction technologies. Hence the biological approach is bound to the thesis that one cannot ascribe the same potentiality to an embryo in vitro as to an embryo in vivo sans phrase.
- 69.
Despite the recourse to species-specific biological laws, the ascription of potentialities in the biological approach remains centered on the individual due to the involved criterion of the beginning of life. This means that the potentials specific to the members of this species cannot just be ascribed to a human organism with defective genome (perhaps in the sense of a second rank potential). But since, on the other hand, the affiliation to a species also plays a role, the biological approach at least allows a reconstruction of why we understand the lack of the normal potential as a loss – Wilkes refers to this in a nice turn of phrase as an “Aristotelian loss.”
- 70.
Thus the criticism by Leist (1990, p. 104 ff.) of the identity arguments is only justified when they are expected to deliver ethical answers at the same time. Leist, like many a defender of the identity argument, is buffaloed by the ambition to answer ontological and ethical questions at one and the same time. In contrast, the advantage of the biological approach consists in the clarification of the systematic bond that exists between the potentiality argument and the issue of the beginning of the existence of a human organism.
- 71.
- 72.
This is of course much too broad for a precise definition. But in our context it suffices to mark the decisive difference.
- 73.
For an overview of this debate see the contributions in Roberts et al. (2009).
- 74.
Another possibility of getting through (3) without committing the theory to quantifying over possible human beings would be to presume strict determinism. Then the amount of all entities endowed with the potential of becoming a person could be quantified, since which entities exist at any particular time is predetermined. In contrast, Hare’s own argumentation disallows this option (cf. Hare 1988, p. 222 ff.; Hare 1993, 1998, p. 402).
- 75.
Such an obligation can be justified via contingent demands in case of their actualization. (cf. Schöne-Seifert 1995, p. 211), even if no actual obligation to install production can be justified therewith. For this one can speak about future generations via a universal quantifier. But with an existential quantifier, reference to possible persons should be avoided, as will be demonstrated shortly. However, it is precisely this difference that is blurred by Hare (1995b, p. 314 f.) when he transfers – in his example – from the group of future church attainders to “a possible person” (cf. also Birnbacher 1988 on the problem of responsibility for future generations).
- 76.
Cf. Quine (1979) on this; with reference to the objection of missing identifiability Schöne-Seifert (1995, p. 211 f.) is too generous, presumably because she wants to confront Hare on moral ground. Even in contexts of immediate procreative actions, neither the future action nor the possible person is individuated (the only impracticable alternative for Hare himself would be the presumption of strict determinism).
- 77.
Perhaps Hare overlooks this because in his deliberations on abortion and the golden rule he always assumes the factual existence of a person who evaluates retrospectively possible alternatives in the light of their actual interests (cf. Hare 1993, p. 173). Here, an individuation seems possible – at least prima facie; however, for this Hare has to understand names (or definite labels) as rigid designators, whereby he is bound to the strong reading of Kripke’s conception: Rigid designators always designate the same individual, even in worlds in which the individual does not exist.
- 78.
I will not expand on this dimension of the debate in the following, as it does not affect the theses of the biological approach.
- 79.
Since both Zohar and Kahn differentiate between the person and the organism as separate entities, from the perspective of my biological approach they blur the decisive difference between genetic interventions before and after the beginning of the existence of a human organism.
- 80.
Even if the biological approach in general loses its validity for contexts of technical interventions, at least it can be partially shown to which assumptions he is obligated in this context.
- 81.
The reference to individual possible organisms could be avoided through a more technical formulation as regards possible worlds; it has only been chosen for the sake of simplicity, though it is strictly speaking incorrect.
- 82.
For this reason, Harris’s claim (1998, p. 81) that the events that befell the gametes from which a specific organism has evolved belong to the life history of this organism can only be understood as applying exclusively to the factual procedure. As soon as one considers counterfactual procedures having influenced the procreative event then one can only speak of this specific organism post festum rather than prospectively, as in the latter case it simply does come into existence and possible organisms are not individuated.
- 83.
As regards this case Zohar is therefore borne out. There cannot be prospective person-regarding arguments (referring to A) for gene-technical interventions before the moment of the beginning of A’s life. But it is naturally not impossible for there to be person-regarding arguments in respect of other factually existing persons (e.g. the potential parents). Such an intervention is as yet necessarily ethically indifferent, because possibly there are indeed impersonal ethical reasons – for which Parfit pleads (whereby such recognition of impersonal reasons in ethics does not pledge a utilitarian position).
- 84.
This does not mean that there could not also be gene-therapeutical interventions that are incompatible with persistence. If, e.g. such an intervention leads to multiple formation, the fusion of previously distinct individuals, or to a termination of the integrated life process, then the persistence of the original organism would be ended.
- 85.
Concerning technical interventions, not even the limitation to the natural species/kind would be demanded, as the biological approach does not provide any answers in this context.
- 86.
Limited to the boundaries drawn through the premise of necessity-of-origin. However, this premise signifies a purely quantitative and not a qualitative conception of the essence of an individual.
- 87.
Due to the implicit essence of natural kind I also consider it possible to effect an initial limitation of the “genetic defect” concept via the specific characteristics of normally developed members of a species. Since the concept of ill health also has a social dimension, however, this does not itself suffice to draw boundaries between the correction of genetic defects and the improvement of human organisms. And the question of whether the difference between ethically permissible and ethically impermissible interventions runs along this boundary, cannot be decided herewith.
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Quante, M. (2017). The Beginning of Life. In: Personal Identity as a Principle of Biomedical Ethics. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56869-0_3
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