Abstract
This chapter extends the previous theoretical framework to consider explicitly also the multi-partisan case, while including in the analysis all the parties competing in a given election (both incumbent and opposition parties), as long as their incentive to highlight corruption issues is involved. The empirical part is focused on a large number of countries and elections in a comparative perspective (basically all Western democracies since post-WW2), while also investigating whether the impact of ideological considerations on campaigning on political corruption is mediated by some intervening variables (at the party level and/or electoral ones). The ‘valence outreach’ of the theory is then controlled for, by seeing whether it can be extended to cover non-policy valence issues other than corruption.
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Appendices
Appendix: Country Fixed Effects and Perceived Corruption
Figure 3.10 plots the 42 country fixed-effects coefficients as they result from Model 1 in Table 3.2 against the average level of CPI recorded by those same countries. As can be seen, the correlation between the two measures, after discounting for the impact of extemporaneous variables like those included in the statistical model (such as SPATIAL PRESSURE), is rather high (−.66). 1 This is reassuring about the ability of the country fixed effects in the model to capture relevant differences among countries in terms of perceived corruption, irrespective of any other further variable, such as the CONTEXTUAL CORRUPTION variable introduced in Model 2 in Table 3.2.
Contrasting CPI index with country fixed-effects coefficients (as they arise from Model 1, Table 3.2)
Note
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The correlation is negative because the omitted country fixed-effect category in estimating Model 1 in Table 3.2 is Sweden, that is, a country with a very low level of perceived corruption (i.e. a high score in the CPI index).
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Curini, L. (2018). The Ideological Incentive to Campaign on Corruption Issues: The Multi-party Case. In: Corruption, Ideology, and Populism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56735-8_3
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