1974–July 1978: Waning Relationships and Interests

Abstract

From 1974 until Kenyatta’s death in 1978, the direct and tangible benefits which had made Kenya such a useful partner for Britain and vice versa seemed to be in decline. Jomo Kenyatta had for so long seemed to offer security for British interests, but from the mid-1970s he was seen less positively. This led some British diplomats to be particularly pessimistic and more inclined to criticise. J. M. Kariuki’s murder in 1975 encouraged British doubts about Kenya’s elite and showed that they were not as knowledgeable as they had believed. The relationship also appeared to be waning as British policy-makers no longer had the money or military ability to pursue their former policies. This was particularly apparent in the military alliances, plans and understandings on which the relationship had previously been built. In 1974, British policy became one of supporting an arms build-up in Kenya and turning the Kenyans away from potential reliance on direct British intervention. In 1978, the idea of ending the Bamburi Understanding was for the first time seriously contemplated, with gradual disengagement favoured. The key event was Britain’s failure to supply Kenya with ammunition following the Israeli raid on Entebbe. This made explicit the global military and financial weakness of Britain, with the emptiness of British commitments and abilities laid bare. Both sides were reassessing the terms of the security alliance.