Abstract
Possible explanations for re-electing corrupt incumbents are that elections are not free and fair, or that voters are uninformed or misinformed about incumbents’ corruption. After adjusting for election freedom and press freedom, this study addresses whether voters in Africa punish incumbent parties for corruption, whether voters’ access to information enhances the re-election chances of the incumbent parties in Africa, and whether information about corruption changes the response of electors. Using probit models to analyze 50 elections from 30 African countries, the study finds that corruption does not affect the re-election chances of incumbent parties in Africa; that voters’ access to information reduces the re-election chances of incumbent parties in Africa; and that there is no evidence that information about corruption affects the re-election chances of incumbent parties. This may mean that African voters do not understand the negative impact of corruption on their economic wellbeing.
Mavuto Kalulu is an economist whose research interests include public choice and political economies, especially corruption and its effect on the electoral process in developing countries. In this chapter, he concludes that information about corruption does not affect the re-election chances of incumbent parties and offers a possible reason for this situation.
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Kalulu, M. (2017). Media Exposure of Corruption and the Re-Election Chances of Incumbent Parties in Africa. In: Ngwainmbi, E. (eds) Citizenship, Democracies, and Media Engagement among Emerging Economies and Marginalized Communities. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56215-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56215-5_7
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