Skip to main content

Board Composition and Corporate Governance Mechanisms in the Nigerian Banking Sector

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Dimensional Corporate Governance

Abstract

As a result of recent corporate failures the unique role played by directors has come under tremendous scrutiny and has led to legislation excerpts codifying director’s duties and responsibilities. It is clear that director’s ability to fulfill their responsibilities has an impact on shareholders, investors and the public, indeed on all stakeholders. The position in the Nigerian scenario is far from clear cut mainly because information available are largely the result of anecdotal evidence and limited empirical study. The central aim of this research is to engage in a critical analysis of the board structure in Nigeria with particular attention being paid to the perception of various stakeholders on board composition and corporate governance mechanisms in the Nigerian banking sector. The study raises interesting findings in relation to boards in the Nigerian context. In particular the study shows that boards are not fulfilling their role and responsibilities to the extent of the standards laid down in the applicable laws and codes. The findings show problems hindering sub-committees from efficiently and effectively fulfilling their role and responsibilities include appointments based on favouritism, personal contacts and majority shareholders, lack of independence of sub-committees, lack of relevant qualifications, lack of time commitment, non-implementation of recommendations made by sub-committees to the board and the propensity for bribes offered by banks in some instances which compromises the independence of regulatory supervisors. The study makes an empirical contribution to the growing body of literature in this area thereby providing a theoretical perspective on which future research and policy initiatives can be developed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Abiola, J. (2012). Corporate governance in Nigerian banking sector and relevance of internal auditors. British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 5(1), 66–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abor, J., & Fiador, V. (2012). Does corporate governance explain dividend policy in sub-saharan Africa? International Journal of Law and Management, 55(3), 201–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance, 62(1), 217–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adegbite, E., Amaeshi, K., & Nakajima, C. (2012). Multiples influences on corporate governance practice in Nigeria: Agents, strategies and implications. International Business Review, 22, 524–538.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aguilera, R. V. (2005). Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective. British Journal of Management, 16, 39–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Principles. (2010). Principles for enhancing corporate governance. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. D. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1, 101–124.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Transaction Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231–274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, N. (2006, November). Boards of directors and firm performance: Is there an expectations gap? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 577–593.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 189–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2011). Business research methods (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cadbury, S. A. (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cadbury, A. (2002). Corporate governance and chairmanship: A personal view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • CAMA. (1990). Companies and Allied Matters Act of Nigeria. 1990: Chapter 59 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. (2004). Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for a complex world. Harvard: Harvard Business Review Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code. (2006). Code for best practice for banks and others. Central Bank of Nigeria.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. (2002). Corporate governance and the audit process. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19, 573–594.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coles, J., Lemmon, M., & Mescke, J. (2005). Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance. Arizona State University working paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Companies Act. (2006). Accessed January 2, 2013, from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf

  • Cooper, S. M. (2007). Corporate governance in developing countries: Shortcomings, challenges and impact on credit. In Modern Law for Global Commerce Congress to Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Session of UNCITRAL Vienna, 9–12 July 2007 (pp. 1–6).

    Google Scholar 

  • Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, D., Daily, C., Johnson, J., & Ellstrand, A. (1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 674–686.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Andres, P., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 2570–2580.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Demb, A., & Neubauer, F.-F. (1992). The corporate board: Confronting the paradoxes. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, L., & Davies, J. H. (1994). Boards and company performance – research challenges the conventional wisdom, corporate governance. An International Review, 2(3), 151–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1993). The need for theoretical coherence and intellectual rigour in corporate governance research: Reply to critics of Donaldson and Davis. Australian Journal of Management, 18, 213–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2009). When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96, 125–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, M. J., & Roy, M. J. (2006). Measuring the effectiveness of corporate boards and director’s. In M. J. Epstein & K. O. Hanson (Eds.), The accountable corporation. Westport, CT: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. (1997). Executive remuneration and corporate performance. In K. Keasey & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance: Responsibilities, risks and remuneration (pp. 61–92). Chichester: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. (2005). Board of directors and the role of non-executive directors in the governance of corporations. In K. Keasy, S. Thompson, & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance accountability, enterprise and international comparisons. London: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fields, M., & Keys, P. (2003). The emergence of corporate governance from wall St. to main St.: Outside directors, board diversity, earnings management, and managerial incentives to bear risk. Financial Review, 38, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Wu, Q. (2012). Do corporate boards affect firm performance? New evidence from the financial crisis. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, pp. 1–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillan, S. L. (2006). Recent developments in corporate governance: An overview. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12, 381–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 241–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough?: An experiment with data saturation and variability. Field Methods, 18, 59–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33, 1034–1062.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A theory of board control and size. The Review of Financial Studies, 21, 1798–1832.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic evidence. Economic Policy Review, 9, 7–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–880.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 275–303.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lincoln, A., Fields, R., & Adedoyin, O. (2013). Chairman/CEO duality and its effects for the management of corporate governance in Guyana. International Journal of Business and Management, 8(20), 36–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacAvoy, P., & Millstein, I. (2003). The recurrent crisis in corporate governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Macey, J. R., & O’Hara, M. (2003). The corporate governance of banks. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 9, 97–107.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mallin, C. A. (2013). Corporate governance (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (2003). Corporate governance (3rd ed.). London: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Munisi, G., Hermes, N., & Randoy, T. (2014). Corporate boards and ownership structure: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. International Business Review, 23, 785–796.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muth, M. M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and board structure: A contingency approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6(1), 5–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nordberg, D. (2011). Corporate governance: Principles and issues. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD Principles. (2004). Principles of corporate governance. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    Google Scholar 

  • Okpara, J. O., & Kabonjo, J. D. (2010). Corporate governance in a developing economy: A study of barriers and issues in Nigeria. Advanced Management Journal, 75(3), 41–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pathan, S., & Faff, R. (2013). Does board structure in banks really affect their performance? Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 1573–1589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Patton, A., & Baker, J. (1987). Why do directors not rock the boat? Harvard Business Review, 65, 10–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pi, L., & Timme, S. (1993). Corporate control and bank efficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20(2), 515–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Randoy, T., & Jenssen, J. (2004). Board independence and product market competition in Swedish firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 281–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and organisational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ritchie, T. (2007). Independent directors: Magic bullet or band-aid? Corporate Governance E-Journal, 3(1), 1–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sanusi, L.S. (2010a). The Nigerian banking industry: What went wrong and the way forward. Lecture presented at Bayero University Kano, February. Accessed July 26, 2012, from http://www.bis.org/review/r100419c.pdf

  • Sanusi, L. S. (2010b) Keynote address at the 4th annual banking and Finance Conference of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, September 23–24. Accessed January 2, 2013, from http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/SPEECHES/2010/GOVERNORS%20KEYNOTE%20ADDRESS.PDF

  • Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (2002). Congress of the United States of America.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2012). Research methods for business students (2nd ed.). Dorling Kindersley: India.

    Google Scholar 

  • Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code. (2011). Code of corporate governance for public companies in Nigeria. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sewell, M. (2008). The use of qualitative interviews in evaluation. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanna, S., Pasiouras, F., & Nnadi, M. (2011). The effect of board size and composition on the efficiency of UK Banks. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 18(3), 441–462.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tricker, B. (2012). Corporate governance: Principles, policies and practices (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van der Walt, N., & Ingley, C. (2003). Board dynamics and the influence of professional background, gender and ethnic diversity of directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 218–234.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walker Report. (2009, July 16). A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities. The Walker Review, Secretariat, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang, J., & Dewhirst, H. D. (1992). Boards of directors and stakeholder orientation. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(2), 115–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431–461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wong, S. C. Y. (2011). Elevating board performance: The significance of director mindset, operating context, and other behavioural and functional considerations. Northwestern University School of Law and Economics Research Paper, 11–12, 2–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Janet Laugharne .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lincoln, A., Adedoyin, O., Laugharne, J. (2017). Board Composition and Corporate Governance Mechanisms in the Nigerian Banking Sector. In: Capaldi, N., Idowu, S., Schmidpeter, R. (eds) Dimensional Corporate Governance. CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56182-0_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics